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Abstract 
Technical analysis is the study of price movements in traded markets so as to forecast 
future movements or identify trading opportunities. Following a review of the history 
and research of technical analysis, three empirical chapters evaluate a number of 
propositions popular among technical analysts. 
One approach used widely over the last century assumes that support and resistance 
levels can be predicted by projecting the ratios between the length and duration of 
successive trends, in particular using Fibonacci ratios like 1.618. This proposition is 
rejected for the Dow Jones Industrial Average by identifying turning points and 
testing for clustering by developing a block bootstrap procedure. A few significant 
ratios appear to support such anchoring by the market, but no more than would be 
expected by chance. 
The thesis then reports a survey based experiment that tests whether individuals 
themselves do have an in-built tendency to anchor forecasts of future trends on 
previous trends. The significance of the survey results are tested using a novel kernel 
density estimator based bootstrap methodology. Respondents' forecasts do bear some 
relationship to the size of the most recent trend by certain whole-number ratios by 
more often than would be expected by chance. 
The third experiment addresses the criticism that academic studies do not use a rich 
enough characterisation of technical analysis. 120 active market-timing strategies are 
tested using a regression based framework of equity fundamentals, macroeconomic 
fundamentals, behavioural variables and a diverse set of mainstream statistical 
indicators from technical analysis. Our recursive approach uses time-invariant rolling 
and expanding estimation windows as well as conditional windows based on the 
presence of structural breaks, identified using the conditional reverse ordered cusum 
method (ROC), of Pesaran and Timmermann (2002). Models that include both 
fundamental and technical indicators perform well, even allowing for realistic levels 
of transactions costs. And accounting for structural instability via the ROC method 
also improves performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate a number of propositions popular among 
technical analysts. Technical analysis is the study of price movements in traded 
markets so as to forecast future movements and/or identify profitable risk:reward 
trading opportunities. When engaging in technical analysis analysts primarily use 
infonnation generated by the marketplace such as: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Past and present traded prices 
Liquidity 
Volume 
Open interest 
CFTC Commission Commitment of Traders (COT) Report 
Market depth e.g. Nasdaq Level II data 
Equity short interest 
Put: call ratios 
NYSE Odd-lots 
This study of market-detennined statistics contrasts with the study of fundamental 
infonnation, which would also consider the drivers of prices such as news about 
economic statistics, company earnings and so on. The tools of technical analysis are 
visual, with turning points identified from patterns in charts of price movements and 
indicators derived from price or volume data. Usually this process is judgmental and 
not based on a statistical model of price movements. The rationale for technical 
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analysis is that prices are not driven by a single underlying data generation process, 
but by market psychology which is episodic but leaves distinctive patterns in prices, 
perhaps through the channels of fundamental news flow (Neely, 1997) and order-flow 
(Osler 2001 and 2002). The same technical analysis techniques are applied to foreign 
exchange, metals, agricultural commodities, energy commodities, indices, equities, 
debt instruments and derivatives serving all these markets (Murphy, 2000). Many 
techniques are applied at all data frequencies from intraday through daily, weekly and 
monthly data right up to analysis of very long term waves in market activity. 
Technical analysis is popular. It is used as a primary or secondary method of 
forecasting market trends by ninety per cent of participants in the foreign exchange 
market, the largest traded market according to the surveys of Allen and Taylor (1992) 
and Lui and Mole (1998), in London and Hong Kong respectively. Moreover, a 
quarter to a third of all currency traders rely on technical techniques exclusively 
(Cheung and Chinn, 1999; Cheung and Wong, 1999). Similar figures do not exist for 
the equity markets, but Internet search engine results are supportive of its use. Google 
yielded 1,540,000 hits for "technical analysis stock market," as compared to only 
471,000 for "fundamental analysis stock market" or 345,000 for "fundamentals stock 
market." 
Chapter 2 introduces the concept and history of technical analysis and surveys the 
academic literature in this area. Academic interest in technical analysis is growing. 
This has been stimulated partly by the emergence of "Behavioural Finance" as an 
alternative paradigm to "Efficient Markets Theory" (that left no room for time series 
based forecasting methods, technical or fundamental). Interest in technical analysis 
has also grown because improved computing power, databases and testing 
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methodologies have made it possible to identify and test the significance of chart 
patterns. However, there remains a large gulf between the literature and industry 
practice, and the three studies in this thesis aim in different ways to help bridge that 
gulf. 
There is for example a widespread belief in financial markets that trends in prices are 
arrested at support and resistance levels that are to some degree predictable from the 
past behaviour of the price series. Specifically, many market participants believe that 
ratios of the length and duration of successive price cluster around "round fractions" 
like Y2 or 1, or Fibonacci ratios like 1.618. Chapter 3 of the thesis tests whether this is 
really true of movements in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The concept of 
anchoring is in itself not new (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and nor is the idea 
that forecasters base judgemental forecasts on patterns in preceding data. Yet this 
phenomenon has been neither documented nor tested in the literature. This thesis 
distinguishes the proposition from other fonns of time-series anchoring with the tenn 
proportional phase anchoring. Objectively identifying turning points in financial 
time series is of central importance when evaluating many tools used by technicians. 
The chapter thus documents a number of approaches to identifying turning points in a 
time series. Turning points are identified by heuristics similar to those used in 
business cycle analysis, and test for clustering by developing a block bootstrap 
procedure. A few significant ratios appear, but no more than would be expected by 
chance given the large number of tests conducted, so we reject the proposition that 
proportional phase anchoring occurs in the aggregate US market index. 
The idea that proportional phase anchoring might exist depends on market 
participants holding definite views about the "right" amount of recovery that the price 
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of a share, say, might exhibit when recovering from a recent down-trend. Chapter 4 
reported the results of an experiment designed to see if people do have an in-built 
tendency to prefer certain price targets over others. The significance of the survey 
results are tested using a novel KDE bootstrap methodology. This finds that 
respondents' forecasts of future turning points do bear some relationship to the size of 
the most recent trend, and that certain whole-number ratios (for example the idea that 
prices will recover by 112 of the most recent downtrend) occur more often than would 
be expected by chance. Interestingly, the format of series presentation does influence 
this kind of judgment. It is observed when the data are presented as charts, but not 
when the data are presented as simple numbers, in non-graphical form. This suggests 
that people apply a kind of visual aesthetic to the question of what is a "right" amount 
of price recovery. 
The final study, reported in Chapter 5, is more conventional in design. It tests 120 
active market-timing strategies using equity fundamentals, macroeconomic 
fundamentals, behavioural variables and mainstream indicators from technical 
analysis. Previous literature has not integrated behavioural or technical indicators into 
a regression-based framework for forecasting and trading. Investors' "real-time" 
trading decisions are simulated through recursive forecasting of excess returns from 
the Standard and Poors 500. Our recursive approach uses time-invariant rolling and 
expanding estimation windows. As noted above, technical analysts (and indeed 
efficient markets theorists) believe that any structure in the process driving market 
prices is temporary. The selected methodology is therefore careful to test for the 
presence of structural breaks, using the conditional reverse ordered cusum method 
(ROC), of Pesaran and Timmermann (2002). We find that models that include both 
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fundamental and technical indicators perform well, even allowing for realistic levels 
of transactions costs. Using technical indicators alongside fundamentals improves 
performance. And accounting for structural instability via the ROC method also 
improves performance. However, model selection can be very different depending on 
whether the criterion used is model fit, predictive accuracy, returns, or risk-adjusted 
returns. 
Chapter 6 reflects on the thesis and summarises the results of our work and considers 
avenues for future research. 
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2. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS: A SURVEY 
There are many different mainstream technical analysis tools that are used by 
practitioners, described in standard industry texts such as Pring, 1998, Achelis, 2000, 
Murphy, 2000 and Edwards and Magee, 2001. These vary from easily replicable 
statistical indicators such as moving averages of prices, through support and 
resistance levels based on recent troughs and peaks in prices, to more subjective 
reversal patterns like "double tops", and even more nebulous sequences of "waves". 
Some of these indicators have a clear theoretical underpinning. The crossover of a 
price and a moving average of past prices will anticipate a turning point of an 
underlying price series that consists of a regular cycle plus noise. Other concepts like 
Elliott Waves and Fibonacci numbers are more esoteric. There is a growing academic 
literature, but this is mainly focussed on statistical indicators, and many commonly 
used approaches have not had the benefit of any academic attention. It is this very 
lack of academic exposure in the face of practitioner usage over at least one hundred 
years that provides our research imperative. 
Examining the literature's coverage of technical analysis highlights that substantive 
shortfalls exist. Whilst this alone does not necessarily suggest any worth, 
practitioners' texts on technical analysis cover a wide range of tools of which the 
academic literature seems unaware. Furthermore, the existing literature often assumes 
it is assessing the entire body of knowledge of technical analysis by examining single 
aspects of it - or is interpreted as such. Unrealistically simple mechanical rules 
employed by the existing literature often constitute a "poor caricature" (Batchelor and 
Kwan, 2003) of practical technical analysis. It is wrongly asserted by the literature 
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that technical analysis is used exclusively for short-time horizons (for example Neely, 
1997) - this is not correct. Frequencies ranging from intra-day tick data to monthly or 
even quarterly data are in fact used (Achelis, 2000, Gann, 1949, Pring, 1998, Edwards 
and Magee, 2001 and Murphy, 2000). The likelihood that an analyst will also 
consider fundamental data of a security will necessarily increase as their time horizon 
increases. The cumulative conclusion is that it strongly appears that there has been 
little appreciation of what it is a technical analyst actually does and what they believe 
to be important. It certainly does not help that industry textbooks can only provide 
stylised examples of analysis outwith the context of practical application. 
2.1. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
The lineage of technical analytical techniques stretches back at least several hundred 
years. The first futures markets were born in Japan in the 1600s to redistribute the 
risk related to the production and distribution of rice. At the Dojima and Sakata 
exchanges' speculative culture embedded itself in Japanese culture, the candlestick 
method of representing rice markets evolved, most notably codified and successfully 
applied during the mid-1700s by Munehisa Sokyu Homma (1724 - 1803). Homma' s 
success was legend, to the extent that songs were composed and sung about his trades 
and after becoming a financial consultant to the government he was granted the 
honorary title of Samurai. Whilst a highly respected field domestically, Japanese 
technical analysis evolved in a relative vacuum into a distinct fonn of pattern analysis 
with little dialogue between these and western techniques until the early 1990s 
(N ison, 1991 and Hirter, 2003). Other techniques to have been less successful in 
penetrating the west include Kagi, Rennko and Ichimoku Kinko Hyo (Nison, 1994). 
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During the first half of the twentieth century Dow Theory was recognised as the 
codified underpinning of much of western technical analysis. Charles Dow developed 
the theory, writing editorials on the subject in The Wall Street Journal, of which he 
was both part owner and editor, up until his death in 1902. To implement his theories 
of self-similar trend waves and of confirmatory trends between market indices, he 
developed the Rail (now Transportation) and Industrial Averages that bear his name 
and that of his partner Edward Jones. Whilst credit is given to Dow, the codification 
of Dow Theory was performed by others. Nelson (1902) first used the term "Dow 
Theory," refining the theory into its modem form, along side the work of William 
Hamilton's editorials in The Wall Street Journal between 1902 and 1929 and 
Hamilton (1922). Robert Rhea (1932) further distilled Dow's and Hamilton's 
editorials into a series of assumptions and theorems. Schabacker (1932) and Gartley 
(1935) are taken as seminal texts that further the work of technical analysis, 
culminating in Edwards and Magee (2001), this eighth edition revising the original 
1950s text. R.N. Elliot's esoteric 1940s work on his wave theory (Prechter and Frost, 
2000) extended Dow Theory's notion of primary, secondary and tertiary trends within 
a framework of proportionality between defined behavioural market phases. W.D. 
Gann (1942 and 1949)'s work provided additional perspectives in terms of trend 
analysis, proportionality and cyclicality. Other than Lefevre (1923) and Livermore 
(1940), both chronicling the trading discipline of one of the early twentieth century's 
most renowned traders, other technical analysis related texts pre-dating WWII are 
either rarely used or have quite simply not stood the test of time amongst 
practitioners. 
Murphy (2000) IS seen as the modem touchstone of stylised technical analysis. 
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Achelis (2000) is often referred to as an overarching reference for the techniques 
above, and for statistically determined technical indicators developed over the past 
half a century. It is in this area, outwith the realms of chart-reading, that the most 
recent developments in technical analysis have arisen. Technical indicators include 
trend analysis indicators such as simple or exponential moving averages (Murphy, 
2000), Appel (1985)'s moving average convergence/divergence (MACD) or Wilder 
( 1978)'s Average Directional Index (ADX). Oscillators attempt to quantify cyclical 
oscillations and include moving average oscillators (Murphy, 2000), the Directional 
Movement Index (DMI) (Wilder, 1978) or the Relative Strength Index (RSI) (Wilder, 
1978) - not to be confused with relative strength analysis of the ratio between two 
time-series. George Lane's inappropriately named Stochastic Oscillator was 
developed in 1948, extending the notion of oscillation to consider the relationship 
between daily closing prices and intra-day extreme highs and lows (Lane, 1984a, 
Lane, 1984b and Myers, 1998). 
2.2. SUPPORT AND RESISTANCE LEVELS 
As Pagan and Sossounov (2003) point out, time series of cumulative financial returns 
do not move in straight lines but in series of cyclical phases divided by peaks and 
troughs. The meaning of support and resistance levels is something that is implicitly 
clear and understood between market participants that use technical analysis. The 
often-cited standard definition is that support (resistance) exists at a price level where 
demand (supply) is sufficient to cause an at least temporary interruption of a 
downward (upward) move. The persistent resistance at the 1,000 level on the Dow 
Jones Industrials for a twenty year period starting in the early 1960s is often cited and 
provides a vivid textbook example (Figure 2-1). 
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Figure 2-1 - DJ-30 Long Term Trading Range (19605- J 9805) 
lJJ -JU (t>ow Jones Industroals) Monthly 
U o"'-J 1:i:t'I)S 
.,.yo.' ,~io~"~~:; :0'" 
Analysts normally identify levels subj ectively by examining previous turning points. 
Technical analysis also states that support becomes res istance, and vice versa, once 
that level is broken. This provides one of the strategies that technicians follow for 
stop-loss order placement to enter or ex it positions. Nevertheless , technica l analysts 
observe that levels may not be precise and that volatility could briefl y dri ve prices 
beyond zones of support or resistance whil st maintaining these zones (F igure 2-2). 
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Figure 2-2 - Support and Resistance Levels 
t t 
J A s D 00 F M A 
The academic literature caters for this with the u e of thresho ld around levels, 
although these appear to have little effect on result (Osler, 2000) . 
The idea of there being a concentration of supply or demand at pec ific price levels 
has been an inherited lore for practitioners for a century or two. Yet thi s is not 
entire ly self-evident in modem fin ancia l theory. Technical analys is tex tbooks claim 
that support and resistance leve ls come from a ys temic order flow effect at the prices 
of previous extremes. Furthermore, they assume that stop and limit order cluster 
around these previous turning points and prices cascade when the leve ls are br ached. 
Rosenberg and Shatz (1995) spec ifically advocate referring to technica l analy is wi th 
more effort behind such economic explanations; yet the general fin ancial literature 
has been sceptical of any notion of concentrated order-fl ow. 
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Existing analyses suggests that stop-loss orders are not rational (Dybvig, 1982), yet 
the industry literature shows that market participants have used them to impose self-
discipline to avoid the disposition effect for at least a century. Moreover, Osler 
(2001) points out that the assumptions of the standard models are not satisfied: price 
slippage means that trading is not frictionless and information imperfections do exist 
between market participants. Relevant information is overwhelming, even for those 
who can give their full attention to market news. A bank's order book constitutes 
private information that can be used to improve forecasts and improve risk 
management. Offsetting stop orders at identical prices demonstrates that agents are in 
fact heterogeneous in their utility functions and beliefs. If that were not enough to 
place doubt in one's mind, institutional factors also tum out to be relevant in price 
discovery - quotation conventions are shown to have a measurable influence upon 
exchange rates. Osler (2001)'s critique showed that the assumptions underlying many 
models are in fact so tenuous that conclusions drawn from them against an order-flow 
hypotheses may be just as tenuous. Goodhart and Payne (1996), Osler (1998), Evans 
and Lyons (1999), Rime (2000), Lyons (2001), and Evans (2001) all suggest that 
order-flow is pivotal in defining short-run currency movements. 
Osler (2001 and 2002) takes a micro-structural approach to explain the success of 
familiar technical predictions: the triggering of stop-loss driven price cascades. 
Foreign exchange literature suggests that news flow can indeed be secondary to order-
flow in driving exchange price movements (Cai, Jun, Van-Leung, Lee and Melvin, 
2001 and Evans, 2001). Osler's thesis, however, is not that stop-loss orders are the 
sole or principal cause of extreme forex moves. Her thesis is that when stop-loss 
orders cascade, other factors are often involved as well e.g. currency crises, 
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intervention, news, etc. There are nevertheless also events where rational, yet 
uninformed investors, could accentuate cascades by trading with triggered stop-losses, 
thinking that they reflected genuine information flow (Osler, 2002). 
Osler (2001) studied 9,700 currency stop-orders from an institutional forex stop-order 
book across nearly seven and half months. These included stop-losses, which close 
positions to minimise losses, and profit-stop orders, which liquidate all or part of 
profitable positions. A statistically significant asymmetry in the distribution of stop-
loss orders was found at round numbers when compared to fairly symmetric 
distribution of profit-stop orders. Stops-losses tended to be placed just below (above) 
round numbers or support (resistance) and orders to take profits are at round numbers 
or support (resistance) - consistent with trading axioms. This must be at least 
partially self-fulfilling, as the actions of others in placing their stops in this manner 
could make it rational for others to do so. Yet this is not a conclusive point, as Osler 
(2001) points out; clustering at such levels will have had reasons for starting in the 
first place. Osler (2002) takes this notion of examining price cascades through 
concentrated order levels further, arguing that these may explain the economic 
rationale behind forex returns' "fat-tails." Stop-losses clearly provided positive 
feedback into a trend generating price cascades, whilst negative feedback from profit-
stop order does not cause cascades. Osler (2002) does stress that the idea that stop-
loss orders contribute to price cascades is not original and is embedded industry lore. 
Such work has uncovered similar results in the equity market. Limit book cumulative 
depth on the NYSE limit book is cointegrated with support and resistance levels 
(Kavajecz and Odders-White, 2004). The previous price level: liquidity relationship 
was high and a finding consistent with Osler (2001),s trend reversal findings in the 
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currency markets. 
An understanding of the microstructural factors behind levels is important, but this is 
distinct from examining analysts' predictions of significant levels. Osler (2000) 
provides the benchmark assessment. Price reaction to published levels is compared to 
the reaction to 10,000 randomly chosen levels using a bootstrap procedure. An 
exchange rate was defined as having hit one of these support (resistance) levels if the 
bid (ask) price fell (rose) to within a 0.01 threshold of that level. The trend was 
defined as interrupted if the bid (ask) exceeded (fell below) support (resistance) 
fifteen minutes later. To compensate for the arbitrary nature of these values, 0.00 and 
0.02 thresholds and a thirty-minute interruption filter were also used, making little 
difference to the results. An interval of 15 minutes was settled upon by the time of 
Osler (2002) on the basis of the analysis of Yao (1997). Yao found that prices 
sustained their response to a trade for approximately sixteen minutes (the product of 
the average four minutes between passive trade times and the five-trade time interval 
for the maximum price impact). Significant forecasting ability was for all 16 firms: 
currency pairs, with some firms performing better than others. Round numbers did 
constitute a large proportion of the published levels (a phenomenon reconfirmed in 
Osler, 2001 and Batchelor and Kwan, 2003). The industry belief regarding "range 
trading" was also empirically supported by the finding that the number of statistically 
significant levels increased when volatility was lower, as markets were range bound 
rather than trending. Osler (2000)'s place in the literature is central as it involves the 
anticipation of bounces in time-series, rather than continuations in a trend (as found in 
Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992), Curcio, Guillaume, Goodhart and Payne, 
1997 and Sullivan, White and Timmermann 1999). Moreover the levels were created 
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by market participants and on a high frequency basis. 
Nevertheless, a key weakness is that the published levels were not classified by the 
techniques used to detennine the levels. Possible techniques include subjectively or 
objectively identified prior turning points, price retracements or projections, 
divergence between technical indicators and price trends, technical trendlines and 
trend channels. Osler did acknowledge this in pointing out that the published levels 
came from a variety of different methods. Each of these approaches is distinct in 
approach and analyst preference. 
There are also a number of papers that examme stylised, systematic trading 
approaches based on breakouts through levels. Whilst a clearly related literature, it 
must be distinguished from the above work; trading systems are concerned with 
systemic trading decisions rather than understanding the underlying phenomenon. 
Brock et of (1992)'s found statistically significant forecasting ability in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average using a channel-breakout system to generate a buy (sell) signal on 
breaks of the local maximum (minimum) over a specified period. Conditional 
empirical returns were significantly greater than trades on simulated series. These 
results potentially stem from the order-flow price cascade thesis of Osler (2001 and 
2002) but methodological weaknesses do exist. Transaction costs were not 
accommodated for in this study and data-snooping risks were revealed by Sullivan et 
of (1999)'s re-examination. They used a different bootstrap methodology to correct 
for the effects of data-snooping to evaluate whether superior performance came from 
"superior economic content, or just due to luck." This risk of survivorship bias within 
the remaining rules still used in practice was balanced by a universe of around eight 
thousand parameterisations of trading rules. These were applied also to the Dow 
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Jones Industrial Average over the same period as Brock et al (1992), plus an out-of-
sample test over the following ten years. As per Brock et ai, from 1897 to 1996 some 
of the rules were profitable, even after adjustments for data snooping were made. Yet 
even the best performing rule was not profitable out-of-sample. 
Interesting questions remain from this literature; a key point of Brock et al (1992) still 
stands after Sullivan et al (1999). Their returns were not consistent with either the 
random walk, the AR(1), GARCH-M or Exponential GARCH models. Moreover, 
predictive levels were not dependent on central bank intervention (Osler, 2000 and 
2002 versus LeBaron, 1996). Even where there is strong correlation this is not 
necessarily causation (Neely, 2000) and intervention may often be caused by the 
exchange rate moves that precede them (Osler, 2001). It is also unlikely that chaotic 
processes were responsible, as these are independent of the round numbers that 
dominate published levels (Osler, 2000, 2001, 2002 and Batchelor and Kwan, 2003). 
2.3. CHART PATTERNS 
The technician's definition of a bull trend is series of higher peaks and troughs, and 
consecutively lower extremes in a bear trend. They believe that chart patterns are 
deviations from this definition of a trend and have a systematic effect. The textbook 
theory is that patterns are based on the notion of price cascades following these 
deviations from trending extremes. Chart patterns can by separated into reversal 
patterns and continuation patterns. Reversal patterns have been the dominant focus of 
the academic patterns literature and occur at trend reversals. Whilst reversal patterns 
form the basis of at least temporary trend reversals, continuation patterns analyse 
confirmation of and continuation of a pre-existing trend via price cascades (as per 
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Osler 200 I and 2002). The frequency of data that a pattern forms within determines 
its importance. A reversal pattern formed on a chart with a five-minute frequency is 
not likely to be interpreted as having long-term implications, for example. 
The head and shoulders pattern is perhaps one of the best known chart patterns, also 
amongst those who are not familiar with how investors use technical analysis. Head 
and shoulders are also seen as major reversal patterns that form after an extended 
trend. The textbook rationale is the initial disappointment in the market when the 
third peak does not break the resistance at the second peak and forms a lower high. 
The pattern is made up of two peaks at a similar price level separated by a peak at a 
higher level. The two troughs prior to the breakout through these lows are at a similar 
level. The second peak marks the highest point of the current trend; the current trend 
does not appear in jeopardy at this time. The following trough is not higher than the 
previous, placing the current trend under question, but not yet invalidating the trend 
by forming a lower low. The following peak is substantially lower than the last, 
perhaps only meeting the approximate level of the penultimate peak, again placing the 
trend at risk. This two-stage warning comes from the technicians' definition of a 
clear trend in a market, a series of higher peaks and troughs. The trend reversal is 
confirmed by the break of support triggering the pattern and volume would be 
expected to expand on up swings and contract on down swings. The pattern is 
completely reversed for the bullish head and shoulders bottom patterns. 
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Figure 2-3 - Head and Sholliders Top 
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Levy (1971) provides a relatively early example of the few examinations of chart 
patterns. This examined 9,383 long/short signals from thirty-two combinations of 
what it termed " fi ve point patterns" across 548 NYS ~ tock over fi ve year . The 
findings were that "neither the best nor the worst (patterns) p rfo rmed very di ffere ntly 
from the market." After accounting for commissions no patterns were profit able. 
Interestingly, the most bullish patterns identified by Levy were textbook bearish 
patterns. After an interlude of nearly thirty years, Lo, Mayansky and Wang (2000) 
examined a range of chart patterns. They examined ten diffe rent tex tbook reversal 
patterns, which contrast with continuation pattern during pau es in a trend (see 
Leigh, Modani , Purvis and Robert, 2002 and Leigh, Paz and Purvis, 2002). Patterns 
were identified after smoothing the series using k mel regressions. Comparing the 
unconditional return distribution to the conditional di tributions revealed that everal 
chart patterns provided incremental information over a 31-year sample period. These 
patterns also occurred around turning points more often than would be expected by 
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chance. Lo el af do not comment on whether this can be translated into a profitable 
mechanical trading strategy. Jegadeesh (2000) questioned whether the patterns found 
could indeed be traded - the standardised means were "remarkably close to zero" and 
none of the I-statistics were reliably different from zero. Jegadeesh also highlights the 
subjectivity in Lo et aI's systemisation of chart patterns (the actual pattern definitions, 
choice of smoothing technique and smoothing parameterisation), but accepts that it is 
unavoidable. Interestingly, the increased recognition of patterns after Lo el aI's 
consultations with practitioners was not seen as important by Jegadeesh a priori. The 
assumption was the statistically optimal bandwidths for the kernel regressions would 
suffice, yet a 30% reduction of the smoothing window followed these consultations. 
This is of interest because practitioners would see the sensitivity of the turning point 
dating as important a priori. 
The remaining chart pattern literature focuses on the best-known chart pattern, the 
head and shoulders pattern. Yet the literature does not explain the technicians' 
rationale for this pattern - a three-stage interruption of the sequence of higher (lower) 
lows and highs that form a technical up (down) trend. Put otherwise, a head and 
shoulders pattern combines "smoothed trends, peak-and-trough-progression patterns, 
resistance levels, volatility clustering, time limits and trend reversal patterns" (Lucke, 
2000 p.2). It is clear that even the limited conclusions of Lo el af (2000) are not 
uncontested facts. Research performed at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did 
conclude that the head and shoulders pattern was "not just some flaky pattern" (Osler 
and Chang, 1995). Yet the controversy is aptly represented with the later renaming of 
the published paper, referring to instead to "methodical madness" (Osler and Chang, 
1999). Six currencies were examined across twenty-one years of daily closing prices. 
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Predictive power existed for the pattern in two out of four currencies examined. 
When adjusted for transaction costs, interest rate differentials or risk, profits in the 
yen and mark remained "substantial." Moreover speculation in all six currencies 
would have been both statistically and economically significant, yet the minimum 
textbook returns did fail 78% of time. These results were robust to the algorithm's 
parameterisation, the sample period and assuming GARCH driven returns rather than 
a random walk. Nevertheless, the pattern was inefficient - it was dominated by 
simpler forex trading rules. Application in the equity markets has been even more 
critical. The pattern was found to be unprofitable for 100 finns chosen randomly 
from CRSP database (Osler, 1998), even though there was systematic activity 
revealed by a significant increase in volume following the pattern. 
Bulkowski (2000) must be highlighted only because it is a rare practitioners' attempt 
to evaluate a number of chart patterns systematically. It finds generally supportive 
evidence across a large number patterns and variations. Whilst more rigorous than the 
majority of textbooks, it does not give an academic level of methodological detail. As 
a result Bulkowski's results must be balanced with its lack of methodological 
transparency. 
2.4. WAVE THEORIES 
DOW THEORY 
Dow Theory is important both as the primary foundation of western technical analysis 
and as an early discourse on the nature and duration of long-tenn equity trends, with 
their guidelines parameterising Pagan and Sossounov (2003)'s cycle dating model. 
The goal of Dow and Hamilton was to guide identification of the primary long-tenn 
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trend and trade in that direction, rather than dictating precise trading decisions. Dow 
Theory is explicitly not intended for short-tenn trading. Hamilton (1922) stated that 
those who successfully applied Dow Theory would rarely make in excess of four or 
five trades annually, a range echoed by Gann (1942 and 1949), s application of other 
longer tenn techniques. This must be contrasted with the general academic 
assumption that technical analysis is only used with short-time horizons (for example 
Neely, 1997). Dow Theory assumes that manipulation of the primary, long-tenn, 
trend is not possible and it must reflect trends in the underlying fundamentals as the 
"averages discount everything" (Hamilton, 1922). Whilst the unexpected will occur, 
it is usually only shorter-tenn trends that are affected according to Dow. Shorter-tenn 
trends, lasting hours or weeks, could also be subject to "manipulation" by institutions, 
speculation, news flow or rumours according to Hamilton. Hamilton believed that 
more highly capitalised equities were less open to "manipulation" and that it would be 
virtually impossible to directionally manipulate the market as a whole for any 
sustained period. 
Figure 2-4 - Dow Theory: Trend Risk, Violation and Confirmation 
Trend at Risk Trend Violation Trend Revmal Confirmed 
It was Dow Theory that first codified the technicians' definition of a clear trend 
(Figure 2-4). A technical up (down) trend is defined by prices that form a series of 
rising (falling) peaks and troughs. An up (down) trend is considered at risk if a lower 
(higher) high (low) fonns. An up (down) trend is considered as violated if a lower 
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low (higher high) forms. These two notions are seen as particularly decisive if a 
lower high (higher low) is followed by a lower low (higher high). These are all 
deviations from the standard definition of a definite technical trend of higher (lower) 
highs and lows. 
Dow and Hamilton stratified trends in the Dow Jones Industrial and Transportation 
Averages into primary movements interrupted by secondary movements. These are in 
tum constituted by tertiary day to day daily fluctuations. Primary moves are 
described as lasting from a few months to many years and reflect the broad trends of 
business conditions - the commentators' bull and bear markets. Although Hamilton 
gave general guidelines for the amplitude and duration of primary trends, he warned 
against using these as rules for forecasting what he saw as largely indeterminable. 
The primary trend in the market as a whole is traditionally determined by agreement 
in the individual trends of the Dow Jones Industrial and Transportation Averages. 
Hamilton arguing that activity would begin in the Rail Average before the Industrial 
Average. When Dow Theory was being developed at the tum of the last century the 
railroads were a vital link in the economy. The belief was that economic activity that 
was sufficient to drive long-term stock market trend would first have to show in the 
transportation of goods and raw materials - and hence the earnings and valuations of 
transportation companies. This underpinning definition of a trend is also applied to 
the secondary trends and daily fluctuations. Hamilton believed that secondary 
reactions defied the primary trend for several weeks to months and combated 
excessive speculation. Hamilton observed that secondary movements retrace 113 to 
2/3 of the primary move, with 50% being the typical amount, and that these tend to be 
more volatile than the preceding primary move. Tertiary daily fluctuations are those 
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trends that last a few hours to a few days, nonnally lasting less than a week. Dow 
Theory sees daily fluctuations as being individually untradable, unless fonning an 
analysable chart pattern. 
Rhea (1932) did emphasise that whilst Dow Theory gave volume a role in confinning 
the strength of an advances and identifying potential reversals, price action was the 
ultimate detenninant. 
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Table 2-1-Accumulation and Distribution Cycles (Hamilton. 1922. Wyckoff, 1924 
and Soros. 1994) 
Primary Bull Market 
Stage 1 - Accumulation 
Hamilton saw that the first 
stage of a bull market as 
largely indistinguishable 
from the last reaction rally 
of a bear market. Stocks 
appear "cheap" but are not 
in demand. Patient value 
investors step in for the 
long haul. Stocks quietly 
firm up to widespread 
disbelief that a bull market 
has begun. 
Primary Bear Market 
Stage 1 - Distribution 
Informed investors begin 
to close positions, realising 
that fundamentals are not 
as previously thought. The 
public constitutes willing 
uninformed investors. 
Dow Theory sees the 
financial press as giving 
little to indicate a bear 
market and general 
business conditions remain 
good. Returns falter whilst 
very few forecasters or 
investors believe a bear 
market has started and 
most remain bullish. 
Hamilton noted that swift 
secondary reaction rallies 
during bear markets give 
false hopes to bullish 
sentiment. 
Primary Bull Market 
Stage 2 - Sustained Trend 
Hamilton considered this 
stage as the biggest, driven 
by improving fundamentals. 
Participation is fairly broad 
and trend followers begin to 
participate. 
Primary Bear Market 
Stage 2 - Sustained Trend 
As with the primary bull 
market, Hamilton saw this 
stage of a pnmary bear 
market as providing the 
largest move. This is when 
the trend has been identified 
as down and business 
conditions begin to 
deteriorate. Earnings 
estimates are reduced, 
shortfalls occur, profit 
margins shrink and 
revenues fall. As business 
conditions worsen, the sell-
off continues. 
Primary Bull Market 
Stage 3 - Excess 
Hamilton construed this 
period as driven by 
excessive speculation and 
appearing inflationary 
pressures. Public 
involvement IS 
widespread and 
extraordinarily confident, 
fuelling excessIve 
valuations. 
Primary Bear Market 
Stage 3 - Despair 
All hope is lost and stock 
ownership IS taboo. 
Valuations are now low, 
yet supply persists as 
market participants exit at 
all cost. Fundamentals 
remain bleak and are 
priced into stocks until 
complete, perhaps 
irrationally underpriced 
by this stage. 
Hamilton identified three behavioural stages for both primary bull markets and 
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primary bear markets, driven by cycles in accumulation and distribution of securities. 
These are shown in Table 2-1. These stages are analogous to the product life cycle 
model in marketing that has been extrapolated to the company-dividend life cycle. 
Wyckoff (1924) also expands upon this concept of accumulation and distribution 
cycles and Soros (1994) uses the same structure to understand market psychology. 
Brown, Goetzmann and Kumar (1998) is apparently the only recent research of 
practitioner wave theory. They re-examine the seminal Cowles (1934) evaluation of 
Hamilton's 1902-1929 record. A neural network system was developed that 
incorporated rules for identifying the primary trend and was tested against a buy-and-
hold approach for the period from 1929 to September 1998. The system switched 
between long positions in the equity market and fixed income securities. It was these 
fixed income periods that significantly reduced the volatility of the portfolio, central 
to both Dow Theory and modem portfolio management theory. Over the 70 year 
sample the system outperformed buy-and-hold by about 2% per annum, whilst also 
bearing less risk. It under-performed buy-and-hold during bull markets and 
outperformed during bear markets, as expected a priori of a lagging approach 
(Hamilton, 1922). As a result, the final 18 years of the sample, a prolonged bull 
period, showed the Dow Theory system under-performed by a margin of 2.6% per 
year. Nevertheless adjusting for risk means that the Dow Theory system still 
outperformed buy-and-hold over that 18-year period. 
ELLIOTT WAVES 
In the 1940s Ralph Nelson Elliott expanded upon Dow's belief that market trends 
exist within three distinct campaigns divided by two corrective moves. Whilst 
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Hamilton urged analysts not be overly rigid when conceptual ising how markets work, 
Elliott Wave theory attempts to prescribe many facets of markets' trend or counter-
trend states. Mandelbrot (1999) dismissed Elliott Wave theory outright in his 
examination of fractals and scaling in finance. This is because "wave counting" is 
perhaps the most extreme example of subjectivity in technical analysis and thus 
incredibly difficult to define or evaluate. An impressive number of interpretations are 
possible when identifying "Elliott wave counts". This is even despite the successful 
penetration of the principle in the finance industry. There have been a number of 
pieces of the software that tackle the issue (EWaves, Advanced GET, etc.), none of 
which usually agree on a wave count. 
Elliott wave theory stretches Dow Theory within a framework of proportionality and 
definitive predefined market phases. These waves contain sub-waves that are meant 
to adhere to the same rules in a kind of self-similarity, in the fractal sense. These 
widely used principles incorporate proportionality into subjective identification of 
behavioural waves in markets. Specific waves are believed to be key proportions of 
specific preceding waves or pairs of waves. This same proportionality is claimed to 
apply to sub-waves or waves of a higher degree. This is believed to allow increased 
confidence in wave projections as higher degree wave projections would be supported 
by sub-waves' projections. 
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Figure 2-5 - Stylised Elliott Wave Advance and Correction 
Several rules are outlined by Elliott (Prechter and Frost, 2000). 
Wave 2 can never retrace more than 100% of Wave 1, i.e. the first correction 
(reaction) of an impulse wave must not exceed the start of the impulse wave. 
Wave 4 can never retrace more than 100% of Wave 3. 
Wave 4 overlap can never overlap with Wave 1, i.e. the final correction of an 
impulse wave must never move into the price range constituting the first wave of 
the impulse. Practitioners do not always hold to this rule, particularly in 
commodity markets. 
Wave counting often allows for Wave 4 to overlap into Wave 1, but no further 
than the level of Wave 2, support (resistance) at the end of an impulse wave's first 
correction (reaction). This is claimed as occurring particularly often if wave 1 is 
the extended (largest) wave of the five-wave impulse sequence. 
Prechter and Frost (2000) provide the basis for the outline of Elliott Wave theory 
given below. We document only some of the detailed prescriptions. The level of 
subjectivity when labelling waves is clear from this, even when compared to chartism 
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in general. Figure 2-5 illustrates the archetypal theory of "impulse waves" in the 
direction of the trend exist in a five-wave sequence. After an impulse five-wave 
sequence, a "corrective wave" retraces the impulse wave. Elliott Wave practitioners 
describe this corrective wave as an "ABC" or "zig-zag" pattern. Figure 2-5 also 
documents basic wave counting. As stated, Elliott Wave expands Dow Theory's self-
similar trend paradigm, that of each trend being part of a greater trend and in tum 
composed of sub trends (Figure 2-6). 
Figure 2-6 - Elliott Waves: Stylised Primary and Secondary Wave Structure 
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The primary two stage impulse- corrective pattern is identified by [1] and the 
[2]. The secondary trend's peaks and troughs are identified in brackets. Its 
subwaves, the tertiary trend, are identified without brackets. Notice that 
waves (1),(3),(5),(a) and (c) are all five stage impulse waves because they are 
in the direction of the higher degree trend, whether that is impulse or 
corrective. Similarly, waves (2), (4) and (b) are all three stage corrective 
waves. 
Elliott Wave considers the occurrence of the Fibonacci series as having a pivotal 
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influence - 1,2,3,5,8, 13,21,34,55,89, 144, etc., with each number being the sum 
of the last two. In the context of waves and their sub-waves, the number of waves 
within the stylised self-similar outline in Figure 2-6 increases along the Fibonacci 
series as one subdivides the waves (Table 2-2). 
Table 2-2 - Fibonacci Progression of Self-Similar Elliott Waves 
Waves Number of Number of Total 
Degree on waves waves constituting Figure constituting constituting Waves (I] and 
2-6 Wave (I) Wave (2] (2) 
Largest [I] and 
+ I 2 = 
waves [2] 
Sub- (1) ... (5) 
and 5 + 3 = 8 divided (a) ... (c) 
Further 
1. .. 5 and 21 + 13 34 sub- = a ... c 
divided 
Further Not 
sub- 89 + 55 = 144 
divided marked 
The progressIon of the total number of waves and the number of sub-waves 
constituting Wave [1] and Wave [2] separately all increase along the series, omitting 
two Fibonacci numbers each time. This stylised process of sub-dividing to a smaller 
degree continues indefinitely until such time that the timeframe concerned does not 
maintain a perceived wave structure. 
Whilst Elliott Wave theory identifies impulse waves as only having five waves, it has 
identified other corrective patterns over and above the three-stage (5-3-5) "ABC" 
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pattern above (Figure 2-7). A "simple" correction, such as an "ABC" pattern, would 
be expected to be followed by a "complex" pattern such as a triangle (Figure 2-8). 
Figure 2-7 - Elliott Waves: Flat and Triangle Correction/Consolidations 
B B 
A c A c 
Bu. Market Bear Martcel 
Flat Correction Triangle Corrections 
Figure 2-8 - Elliott Wave: Principle of Alternation 
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PROPORTIONAL PHASE ANCHORING 
As aforementioned in the context of Dow Theory, Hamilton (1922) observed that 
market corrections roughly retraced 33% to 66% of a primary trend, with 50% being 
the typical price retracement. These price retracements are measured by analysts, 
measuring the percentage that prices have retraced from the high to the low. For 
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example, if a stock moves from a low of 50 to a high of 100 and then retraces to 75, 
this 25 point move would have retraced 50% of the original move from 50 to 100. 
Elliott wave analysts have specific prescriptions for the proportions between specific 
phases. Nevertheless, a greater number of technicians look at proportionality 
generally, regardless of any wave counting "structure" as per Hamilton. Measuring 
price retracements is believed to be helpful in determining price levels/ranges at 
which prices may reverse and continue their prior trend. Furthermore, bull (bear) 
trend phases are often asserted as being proportional to previous bull (bear) phases. 
Analysts often combine multiple retracement levels with projected levels, support, 
resistance, pattern analysis or indicator analysis. The same analogy is applied to the 
proportion of the time spent in those trends e.g. bull trend phases would be 
proportional in their duration to previous bull phases. 
If such a phenomenon exists this would mean that market participants anchor 
expected cyclical phase amplitudes and durations on the amplitudes and durations of 
previous phases. This is why we have called such a phenomenon Proportional Phase 
Anchoring. The ratio between phases is often claimed to be an integer multiple of a 
previous phase being compared to or a half of it: 50%, 100%, 150%, 200%, etc. 
Claims vary between texts as to how useful the precision of these ratios is - many 
only advocate them as a rule of thumb. There are, however, more esoteric proportions 
examined by many technical analysts, the most widely used ratios stemming from the 
Fibonacci series and Phi. 
Figure 2-9 - S&P: Longer Term Price and Time Retracements 
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The following examples show how an analyst would make use of two commonly used 
ratios from the Fibonacci seri es: 0.6 18 and 0.382. Figure 2-9 shows the May to 
September 200 I fall on the Standard and Poors 500 index . Here there i an example 
of a 61.8% price retracement (shown by the price labels) as we ll a a 6 1.8% time 
retracement (shown by the verti cal lines) of this fa ll that halted the ubs quent 
advance in December 2001. Despite the above explanations being in reference to 
uptrend corrections, this example is of a correction of a downtrend. The arne 61.8% 
price retracement level outlined in Figure 2-9 i equal to the 38.2% price retracement 
in Figure 2- 10. Figure 2- 10 shows the same index, but inclusive of th data going 
back to the March 2000 all time high - the 38.2% price retracem nt is of the March 
2000 to September 200 I decline (shown by the price labels). 
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Figure 2- 10 - S&P: Shorter Term Price Retracement 
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The majority of the literature has not focused on the phenomena examined by pur 
chartism. The focus has been on mechanical implementations of various technical 
indicators, as these are more readily u able and a essable. They do requIre 
parameterisation, but present fewer problem than replica ting visual pattern 
recognition. 
Figure 2- 11 - Technical Indicators 
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Figure 2-11 is stereotypical example of what a technical trader would look at. In the 
top pane one can see volume and historical prices with two imple moving averages 
of different sample sizes of closing price . The trader would form pattern and trend 
analyses with these seri es. Below this one ees three other indicator that intend to 
capture cyclical oscillations in the market. There are a large number of indicator that 
seek to trigger trades by quantifying trends, oscillation and volatilities. "Filter 
rules" trigger trades in the direction of price moves greater than a defined percentage. 
They do not seem to appear in textbook technical analysis yet form the starting point 
for much of the literature in the area. Alexander (1961 ), Fama and Blume (1966) and 
Sweeney (1988) found no value in such rules in the equity markets. Sweeney ( \986) 
and Levich and Thomas ( \993) implemented a number of different ized filters on 
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daily closing pnces of major currencies m the years 1975-80 and 1976-1990 
respectively. Large filters, up to 10% were profitable, with small filters of between 
0.5% and 1 % being significantly more profitable than would be expected by chance 
(Sweeney, 1986). Moreover, out-of-sample performance was also consistent. There 
was also a significant difference between the conditional returns and those from 
bootstrapped series (Levich and Thomas, 1993). 
Moving averages are popular in practise and as topics of research but they have born 
contradictory results. When examined by Brock et al (1992) and Gunasekarage and 
Power (2001), excess profits were obtained. Yet as aforementioned, Sullivan et al 
(1999) criticised data-snooping biases in the work of Brock et al. Neural network 
systems driven by moving averages have found profitable application (Gencay 1996 
and 1998) yet the moving average application in the forex markets have not found 
profitability (Lee and Mathur, 1994, Lee, Gleason and Mathur, 200 I, Lee, Pau and 
Liu, 2001 and Olson, 2003). 
It is an entire literature in itself, yet the field of applied machine learning is also 
relevant (Vapnik, 1998). Allen and Karjalainen (1998) used genetic algorithms to 
generate that a trading system that switched between stocks and T -bills between 1928 
and 1995. Consistent excess out-of-sample returns were not achieved. Neely, 
Weller and Ditmar (1997) also used a genetic programming approach to identify 
trading rules across a variety of currencies in the period between 1975 and 1980 and 
then scrutinize their out-of-sample perfonnance between 1981 and 1995. They also 
did not find consistent excess out-of-sample returns. It is important to note that the 
profitability of singular trading rules is consistently lower than the profits from the 
more complex genetic combination of a number of indicators (Neely and Weller, 
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1999). 
2.6. FINANCIAL THEORY AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
Jegadeesh (2000) was disappointed that Lo et al (2000)'s title "Foundation of 
Technical Analysis" did not lead to a theoretical justification or potential coexistence 
with mainstream financial theory. Kavajecz and Odders-White (2004) claim that 
technical analysis can co-exist with the efficient markets hypothesis if it is understood 
solely in the context of liquidity provision, rather than forecasting a relationship with 
future prices. Transaction costs could be minimised through strategic limit order 
placement at previous extremes, where they found limit order book depth to be high. 
Whilst these empirical results are of value, the attempt to reconcile technical analysis 
and market efficiency appears strained. A deeper investigation of technical analytical 
rationale reveals interesting coincidences that may contain the building blocks to 
build that bridge. 
Interestingly, many facets of modem traded markets seen as barriers to technical 
analysis are in fact the very environment that technical analysts are encouraged to 
trade in. The efficient markets hypothesis states that symmetrical information 
distribution and a high volume of trading means that opportunities are traded away 
and price alone is a useless predictor - yet textbook technical analysis actually 
identifies these as the fertile trading arenas. This prescription is clearly a paradox. 
Texts encourage technical analysts to focus on liquid markets where patterns and 
trends are believed to be "smoother" and a more persistent reflection of the market's 
perception of fundamental information (Hamilton, 1922, Gann, 1949, Pring, 1998, 
Achelis, 2000, Murphy, 2000 and Edwards and Magee, 2001). The technicians' 
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belief in the central relationship between liquidity and information absorption runs to 
the very core of western technical analysis. 
At the end of the 1800s, Dow stated the central tenet of his theory that "the market 
discounts everything" (Hamilton, 1922, Rhea, 1932, Brown, Goetzmann and Kumar, 
1998 and Murphy, 2000). This is strikingly similar to EMH. Thus, according to both 
EMH and Dow Theory, the market has determined the "correct" price, discounting the 
past, present and known future. It is at this point that technical analysis texts claim 
that Dow Theory is thus the same as EMH and simplistically dismiss the challenge 
from modem financial theory. Murphy (2000) was rightly censured by Neely (1997) 
for this inadequate argument. This inadequacy is rooted in their differing assumptions 
and paradigms. When dismissing Murphy (2000)'s statement, Neely (1997) rightly 
took Murphy's statement for what it said, pointing out that Dow Theory's proposition 
that price contains the market's collective knowledge is not the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Technical analysis texts do not rigorously outline exactly how their 
understanding strays from generic EMH, even if it is mistaken. Technical analysts 
perceive the trend of prices at a particular time horizon as an additional piece of 
information in itself. Even when strong-form efficiency exists in an EMH paradigm, 
markets make continuous trends - prices generally do not "gap" without trading 
taking place between these levels. A technician would also suggest that the time-
series of many types of fundamental data also contain persistent trends that drive 
market trends and make them persistent. If they made use of academic terminology 
perhaps they would call such trends "efficient trends." They would argue that such 
trends may last minutes or perhaps years and, if it exists, the concept would differ 
from the behavioural notion of rational trend chasing (Orosel, 1998). 
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It is clear that technical analysts have not adequately expressed what they believe and 
others have reasonably dismissed these half-explained claims, yet have not inquired 
further. Malkiel (1996) and Paulos (1995) point out that random walks also exhibit 
trends, suggesting that trends in financial time-series also start and terminate 
randomly. This assertion does become less tenable as one's time horizon increases. 
Presumably they are not suggesting that any macro-economic trends driving long-
term equity trends are in fact a purely random occurrence. Neely (1997) points out 
that technical analysts do not claim their methods to be magical. They claim to take 
advantage of order-flow and the perception of fundamental news flow via trends in 
the markets. This idea of trend is what distinguishes Dow Theory from EMH and 
perhaps offers a contentious bridge to behavioural finance. Shiller (2002),s 
demonstration of excess volatility in US equities versus fair value could be explained 
by private information fuelling investor overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998) or an initial under-reaction and later overreaction (Hong and 
Stein, 1999). If the former is true, such a marketwide effect would be an abject 
failure in the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission. If the latter is true, 
this is very similar to the guidelines offered by Dow Theory discussed previously. 
Dow suggested that long-term trends have three behavioural stages (Hamilton, 1922). 
Bull markets start with unnoticed accumulation by informed investors, continue as 
improved clarity in the fundamentals accelerates broad participation and end with 
speculative excess, overvaluation and overconfidence. Similarly, Dow suggested bear 
markets start with unnoticed distribution of positions by informed investors, continue 
as improved clarity in the fundamentals accelerates a broad sell-off and end with 
despair and undervaluation. Dow also saw an overlap between the first stage of a 
trend and last stage of the preceding trend. The framework is a cycle of under and 
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overreactions that fuel later reversion to the mean and fundamental value. Dow's 
paradigm of behavioural waves remains core technical theory. It also forms the 
bedrock of much mainstream modem practice (see Soros, 1994). Whilst fragile, there 
is certainly a more than casual link between overreaction in behavioural waves versus 
the momentum phenomenon (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and between the 
corrective behavioural waves versus the long-term reversal phenomenon (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985). 
2.7. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS RESEARCH - AN APPRAISAL 
Analysts, private traders, professional traders, hedge fund managers and mutual fund 
managers are all amongst those who use technical analysis. This diverse group will 
evidently use such tools in different ways. Forecasting may be the priority for the 
analyst versus trade profitability - two distinct objectives (Batchelor and Kwan, 1997 
and Batchelor and Kwan, 2003). Different analysts may focus on different technical 
tools, as would different fundamental analysts, or a trader might use technical rules as 
triggers when exploiting mispricings. One may take an entirely systematic approach, 
an entirely discretionary approach or a combination of both. Furthermore these are all 
placed within the context of a trader's analysis of market conditions. The reality of 
this complexity is one that is far from matched by the simplicity of existing academic 
research and the poor explanations from technicians. Kavajecz and Odders-White 
(2004) point out the methodological difficulties created by the "art versus science 
quandary". Technical analysis and trading are often referred to by practitioners as 
arts to avoid scientific scrutiny, but accepting this subjectivity is as intellectually 
honest as it is uncomfortable. When examining the head and shoulder pattern, 
Dempster and Jones (1998[bD found the pattern to be loss-making but avoided 
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making conclusions for the whole body of knowledge of technical analysis. They 
restricted their conclusion to the unprofitability of trading every systematic 
formulation of this pattern in their sample and consider that "many traders use 
implicit or explicit filters that aid their selection of 'winning' patterns. Furthermore, 
profitability can be gained from a well-informed or skilful exit policy that may well 
rely on exogenous information. (p. 21)". It must be stressed that this cannot mean 
that charting must be worthwhile. A burden of proof remains on technical analysts 
and those who claim to research that which analysts use. 
Jegadeesh (2000) highlights that analysts do not use single tools in their analyses and 
"the usefulness of such conditional trading strategies is hard to verify objectively 
(short of directly evaluating a chartist's actual trades)". Batchelor and Kwan (2003) 
provide that evaluation and cast a shadow of doubt over the value of many existing 
empirical studies. They demonstrate the stark failure of even ex post optimised rules 
from the literature to yield significant profits compared to analysts' trade 
recommendations. Additionally, this was after adjusting for market frictions and, 
critically, none of the mechanical rules encapsulated the vital qualities of the analysts' 
recommended trading positions. They conclude that contemporary academic 
interpretations of technical analysis may "systematically understate" any potential 
value by assuming that traders follow simple mechanical trading rules. Of course it 
was not concluded that a speculatively efficient market would allow all analysts to be 
as successful. 
We must then ask where the weaknesses may lie in the literature. 63% of technicians 
in a sample of leading technical analysts rated various chart-reading tools as their 
primary analytical tools (Batchelor and Kwan, 2001). Yet the academic literature 
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focuses almost entirely on statistical indicators as these can be easily examined 
systematically. Dempster and Jones (1998[a] and 1998[b]) also point out that 
technical analysts do not rely on analysis of an individual security alone when making 
decisions. Analysts also examine other relevant series in an attempt to understand the 
market as a whole (Murphy, 1991 and 2000 and Ramyar, 2004). Such ""intermarket 
analysis" may be as simple as analysing the price action or relative strength ratios of 
commodities related to particular equities or between securities, sectors or wider 
indices. Analysts also try to understand the extent of and the nature of the liquidity in 
the market. The Commitment of Traders reports, published by the CFTC, categorise 
open interest on US futures contacts and their options. Market Breadth indicators 
may also be used by equity analysts, advancing versus declining issues/volume or 
those others developed by technical analysts, the best known of which is the ARMS 
index (Arms, 1988 and Keswani, 2003). The role of active position management of 
(Lyons, 1998 and Bensaid and De Bandt, 1998) and position sizing in the light of stop 
order placement (Jones, 1999 and Vince, 1995) is well documented. Yet neither has 
received sufficient attention in the literature and the interplay between risk-control 
and a trader's emotional tolerances (Brady and Ramyar, 2004) is an avenue yet to be 
explored thoroughly. 
To summarise, the evidence supporting the various technical analysis approaches is 
indeed mixed. The market microstructural evidence and analysts' forecasts of support 
and resistance levels appears sound. Yet implementing levels within simple trading 
systems yields mixed results. Moreover, the evidence for predictive power from chart 
patterns or employing statistical indicators in trading systems is just as contradictory. 
Nevertheless, neither central bank intervention, random walk, AR(l), GARCH-M nor 
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Exponential GARCH models explained the phenomena witnessed by the academic 
literature, even where these were also economically significant. Moreover, 
incremental information can exist even when accounting for these phenomena. 
Despite these interesting points, there remains a large gulf between the literature and 
industry practice and few examples of dialogue. Even optimising stylised academic 
technical tools in-sample can fail to replicate practitioner performance or the 
characteristics of their trades. Practitioners use a wide range approaches in a manner 
more complex than the literature generally assumes. Ironically this problem is not 
always eased by reference to industry textbooks. 
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3. MAGIC NUMBERS IN THE DOW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter tests a popular but previously untested proposition about the behaviour 
of the stock market that was introduced in Chapter 2, the hypothesis of proportional 
phase anchoring. The proposition is that when the market changes direction after a 
period of trending prices, the magnitude and duration of the next trend is not random, 
but depends on the magnitude and duration of the previous trend. Specifically the 
thesis is interested in whether the ratios of successive trends cluster around Fibonacci 
ratios or "round numbers". 
The idea that price trends may be arrested at predictable support and resistance levels 
is one of many tools used by technical analysts. Technical analysis - the prediction of 
turning points in financial markets by chart-based methods - has long been popular 
among practitioners, but viewed with suspicion by academics. Burton Malkiel, in his 
classic book writes, among many similarly cutting remarks - "Technical strategies are 
usually amusing, often comforting, but of no real value" (Malkiel, 1996, p 161). 
The root of the problem is the failure of technical analysts to specify their trading 
rules and report trading results in a scientifically acceptable way. Too often, rules are 
so vague or complex as to make replication impossible. Too often popular texts 
contain dramatic examples of successful predictions of turning points, with no count 
of misses or false alarms. Recently, however, academics have begun to look 
systematically at some of the more easily replicable technical trading rules. Park and 
Irwin (2004) provide a comprehensive review of these studies. Of 92 studies 
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published in the period 1988-2004, 58 reported positive excess profits from a 
technical rule, 10 yielded mixed results, and 24 reported losses. Even allowing for a 
bias towards publishing positive results, and the possibility that not all studies 
properly accounted for transactions costs and risk, this does suggest that not all of 
technical analysis can be dismissed prima facie. 
The Chapter falls into four sections. Section 3.2 below introduces our hypothesis and 
reviews relevant research findings. Section 3.3 introduces our data - high/low/open 
close prices for the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the years 1914-2002 - and 
develops a method for identifying turning points in range data based on Pagan and 
Soussonov (2003). Section 3.4 reports the resulting distributions of price and time 
ratios for successive trends, and compares them to distributions that would be 
expected to occur by chance using the Politis and Romano (1994) stationary block 
bootstrap methodology, again modified for the special features of our data. 
3.2. SUPPORT, RESISTANCE AND FIBONACCI NUMBERS 
The popularity of technical analysis among market practitioners is evident from any 
casual reading of the financial press and the many web-based financial information 
services, and has been widely documented. Allen and Taylor (1992) and Lui and 
Mole (1998) find that technical analysis is used as a primary or secondary method of 
forecasting market trends by ninety per cent of players in the foreign exchange 
market. A third of currency traders rely on technical techniques exclusively (Cheung 
and Chinn, 1999; Cheung and Wong, 1999). 
Technical analysis itself is an umbrella term for a heterogeneous set of techniques, 
some relying on visual recognition of chart patterns, others on values of statistical 
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indicators calculated from recent price or volume data. Many practitioner books 
describe these techniques, most prominently Achelis (2000), Murphy (2000), Edwards 
and Magee (2001), and Pring (1998). Neely (1997) provides a readable academic 
summary. Academic research has focussed on the profitability of trading on 
mechanical technical indicators. Many early studies investigate filter rules that require 
a trader to go long if price rises more than k% above the most recent low price, and 
vice versa. Examples are the classic stock market studies of stock market efficiency 
by Alexander (1961) and Fama and Blume (1966), and the contrary finding of 
profitable filter rules in currency markets by Sweeney (1986) and Levich and Thomas 
(1993). More recent studies investigate moving average rules that require the trader to 
go long or short if the current price (or short term moving average of price) is above 
or below a long term moving average. LeBaron (1996) finds evidence that this 
generates profits in currency markets. Brock e/ al (1992) claim to find profits from 
applying moving average rules to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, though this is 
disputed by Sullivan, Timmerman and White (1999). A smaller number of studies 
evaluate pattern-based trades. Some look at trendline breaking rules that require the 
trader to buy or sell if the price breaks above some overhead resistance level, or falls 
through some lower support level (see for example Curcio et al. 1997). Others look at 
reversal pattern trades that require the trader to sell if some sequence of prices 
characteristic of the end of an upward trend appeared - the well-known "head-and-
shoulders" or "double top" patterns for example. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) use 
local smoothing process to identify ten patterns often cited in technical analysis texts 
in a large sample of US stocks. They show that the statistical characteristics of returns 
change following familiar chart patterns, but stop short of claiming that this leads to 
profitable trading rules. Zhou and Dong (2004) use fuzzy logic to identify these 
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patterns, but find no excess profits from trading. The study of the head and shoulders 
pattern in currencies by Chang and Osler (1999) does find some excess profits, but for 
only two of the six currencies examined, and in both these cases profits from the 
pattern based rules are lower than those from mechanical moving average rules. 
The balance of this academic research does not mirror the relative way technical 
analysis techniques are viewed by practitioners in practice. From a small survey, 
Batchelor and Kwan (2001) find that the pattern-based methods, including use of 
support and resistance trendlines, are used much more often than moving average 
rules and other indicators, in both stock markets and currency markets. The attraction 
of technical indicators for academic research seems to be that the rules are easily 
formalised, while identification of chart patterns and support and resistance levels is a 
more subjective business. Also, much early academic research was aimed at testing 
market efficiency rather than understanding or evaluating technical analysts, when the 
realism of the trading rule is not an issue. 
To put our own study in context, and to define some tenns, consider the path of prices 
shown on Figure 3-1. The price has hit a trough at time Tl and price PI. It has then 
risen in a bull phase until it reaches a peak at time T2 and price P2. P2 can be 
regarded as a resistance level. The price then experiences a reversal and moves into a 
bear phase until another trough is reached at time T3 and price P3. P3 can be 
regarded as a support level for the price, which is then starting to turn up into another 
bull phase. The fall from (T2, P2) to (T3, P3) is tenned a retracement of the bull 
phase (TI, PI) to (T2, P2). Any subsequent reversal into a bull phase, such as a rise 
from (T3, P3) to (T4, P4) is tenned a projection of the previous bull phase (TI, PI) to 
(T2, P2). 
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Figure 3-J - Bull and bear phases. retracement and projection 
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This kind of chart can fonn the basis for a trading rule so long as well-defined support 
and resistance levels exist, and can be predicted ex ante. The trading rule would 
require selling as the price approached the resistance level from below but failed to 
break it, and buying as the price fell near to the support level. If sufficient traders 
agreed on where resistance and support lay, and followed this strategy, their beliefs 
would become self-fulfilling, and price trends would be arrested at the resistance and 
support levels. 
In a benchmark study, Osler (2000) asked currency analysts at six major US banks to 
supply daily support and resistance levels for three major currencies from January 
1996 to March 1998. There are three interesting features of her data. First, quoted 
support and resistance levels are very often "round numbers". Second, for any 
individual finn the levels did not change dramatically from day to day, so there is 
some consistency in choices about support and resistance levels. Third, there was only 
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limited agreement among analysts about where these critical pnce levels lay, 
suggesting that a variety of rules were used to determine these levels. In spite of this 
heterogeneity, Osler (2000) finds that exchange rates "bounce" off the levels quoted 
by the analysts much more often than from randomly chosen levels. This strongly 
suggests that reversal trades are indeed triggered when prices approach support and 
resistance levels and that there is some rationale for analysts choosing these levels. 
The phenomenon of price clustering around round numbers - that is, price levels 
ending in 0 or 5, or 00 and 50 - has been confirmed in the currency markets (de 
Grauwe and Decupere, 1992) and in stock indices (Donaldson and Kim, 1993; Ley 
and Varian, 1994; Cyree and Domian, 1999; Mitchell, 2001). These are often called 
"psychological barriers", but Osler (2001) shows that there are good market-driven 
reasons expecting support and resistance at round numbers. Many currency trades are 
made in response to conditional retail orders (for example. stop-loss and limit orders) 
and these are very often set at round number exchange rates. Option strike prices are 
almost invariably round number values of the underlying currency or index, and cash 
prices around the strike price are liable to induce exercise or hedging trades in the 
cash market. 
Imagine then that we have just passed time T3 on Figure 3-1. and the price has started 
to rise above P3. How can the likely target resistance level P4 be forecast? In addition 
to looking for round numbers above P3, technical analysts have two systematic ways 
of determining support and resistance levels. One is to identify them as previous 
peaks and troughs, the minima or maxima achieved over some window of past price 
data. The longer the window, the wider the band between support and resistance, and 
analysts typically quote a number of possible support and resistance levels, 
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corresponding to different window sizes. The rationale for this approach is that the 
recent maxima and minima reflect price levels at which sellers and buyers have 
caused reversals in price in the past. Unless there has been some fundamental change 
in sentiment one might therefore expect them to enter the market again at these levels 
in the future. As a variant on this method, analysts may draw "trend lines" through 
recent minima and maxima, and base their support and resistance levels on an 
extrapolation of this channel. Again, the longer the window of past data used, the 
wider the band between support and resistance. The rationale here is that the trend 
accounts for likely changes in fundamental sentiment. 
The second way that analysts determine the target price P4 - and the focus of this 
Chapter - is by means of what we term "magic numbers". Many analysts believe that 
the ratio of the size of the prospective rise in price I P4-P3 I to the size of the 
preceding fall I P3-P21 is not random, but is likely to lie close to one of a small 
number of critical ratios. As outlined in the discussion of proportional phase 
anchoring in Chapter 2, these retracement ratios themselves may be either "whole 
numbers" like 0.5, I, 1.5 etc., or may be one of the set of Fibonacci ratios 0.382, 
0.618, 1.618, etc. Similarly, many analysts believe that the ratio of the prospective 
rise in price I P4-P31 to the previous bull phase price rise I P2-Pll is likely to be 
close to one of these key ratios. Some analysts argue that ratios of durations of 
successive runs, say I T4-T31 I I T3-T21 may also follow some Fibonacci rule. 
A Fibonacci series is an ordered set of numbers fl' f2' f3, f4, ... , fi-I' fi, ... where tenns 
from f3 onwards are the sum of the two preceding numbers in the series. The 
Fibonacci ratio is ~ = limi-+oo (filii-I) = 1.618034 .... Related ratios are ~2 = limi-+oo 
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(f/ fi-2) = 2.6 18034 . . . , ~3 = 4.236068, and th Ir m erse 0.6 18034 .. . , 0.38 1966 .. , and 
0.236068 . The number ~ occurs naturally in th geometry of the pentagon, and in 
spiral forms found in botany and biology (8 a in , 1963). All textbook m technical 
analys is devote considerable space to de cription and di cu ion of these ratios. or 
example, Murphy (2000) a serts that 0.5 and 0.6 1 are th key ratios for determining 
target prices m retracements. Other ratio include 0.3 2, 0.7 6 I, 1.5 . 1.6 1 ,2 and 
2.6 18. The proportions primarily u ed by technical analy t are gIven m Appendix 
3- 1. Figure 3-2 Ii ts a few of the many cita tion of Fibonacci ratio m technical 
comment by respected market sour es, including Ih Financial Time , Reuters, Dow 
Jones and Standard and Poors Money Mark t rv l e covering bond, tock, forex 
and commodity markets during ju t thre unexceptional day in 2004. 
Figure 3-2 - Fibona i ratio in the market, 6- 0 tober 2004 
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While there is clear logic in the use of round number or recently realised extreme 
values as support and resistance levels, it i not at all clear why the ratio! P4-
P3 ! / ! P3 -P2! should be 0.6 18 rather than ay 0.816. One po ible argument is 
aesthetic. The length of a Fibonacci-determined bull run ' look right" on a chart 
relative to the previous bear pha e - neither too hort nor too long - and nly at thi 
point will sellers feel the market has ri sen too far. Enthu iasts for "the golden ratio" ~ 
have claimed to see it in the proportions of cIa ical architecture and art and it wa 
very consciously used by the 20th century archit ct L orbu ier. However many 
speculations about ~ appear to be the result of i ual ' data mining" and wi hful 
thinking - a judicious choice of where exactly to tart mea uring the ba e of the 
Parthenon, for example, or the selection of only tho e artwork that display prominent 
verticals about 61.8% from their left hand edge. The debate about the tatu f ~ in art 
is summarised in the entertaining and informativ monograph of Li i (2002. At a 
more fundamental level, the pioneering p ychologi t Gu ta Fechner (I 76) 
conducted experiments that seemed to show that people had prefi rence for rectangle 
with sides approximately in the ratio 1: ~ . Thi idea wa challenged by odkewit ch 
(1974) but has since found some support ( ee for example M Manu 19 0). 
Another argument for u ing Fibonacci ratio in determining upp rt and re i tance 
levels is purely empirical, or po ibly upernatural. arly in the hi tory of t ck 
market indexes developed by harle Dow ditor of the Wall treet Journal from 
1900-1902 and part-owner commentator viewed their olution a a erie of ne t d 
irregular "waves". A central tenet of Dow Theory a codified by Nel n (1903) 
Hamilton (1922), and Rhea (1932) is that the market ha a cycle wa e that la t 
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between 2 and 10 years, interrupted by horter term primary (about I year), secondary 
and tertiary fluctuations. Dow theory also contain om tatement about the likely 
shape of these waves. Hamilton, for example, asserts that "secondary movements 
retrace 33% to 66% of the primary move, with 50% being th typical amount". 
Cowles (1934) tests the value of Hamilton ' stock tip , which to ome extent follow 
from Dow Theory, but with negative results. Hamilton's reputation as a forecaster i 
rescued by the reappraisal in Brown, Goetzmann and Kumar (199 ). Elliott (193 )' 
extension of Dow theory takes some analy ts into esot ria and a rath r different wave 
theory of the stock market. His basic idea i that th market typically ri e in five 
waves or phases (bull, bear, bull , bear bull), and then fa ll in three pha e (bear, bull , 
bear). Moreover, this pattern is self- imilar and can been at all data frequencie 0 
that within each long tenn wave there are ft e ri ing and three falling pha e , and 
within each of these are simi lar pattern : and 0 on. 0 lIiott Wa might be 
observed in the century long tenn stock market history in a hart of la t year' 
fluctuations , or in today's chart of 5-minute pric bar . Figur 3-3 how an lIiott 
Wave pattern superimposed on two month data on the NA DAQ inde . The 
numbers I, 2, 3, 4, 5 show the turning point in the up-trend and the letter A, B 
show the turning points on the downtrend. Within the major wa e one om mtnor 
waves are also shown. 
56 
Figure 3-3 - ame Elliall Waves in the 'A DAQ 
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In a later newsletter Elliott (1940) furth r laim d that p ifi wa e ar key 
proportions of specific preceding wa e or pair In igur 3-3 n might 
expect the retracement ratio of the pric range between turning point 2 and 3 t be a 
Fibonacci ratio mUltiple of the range between point 1 and 2. r on might e peel Ih 
projection ratio of the range from B to to b a Fibonacci ratio multipl f the rang 
between points 5 and A. Prechter and Fro t (2000 10,h d. oUllin the ba i , tyli d 
ideal proportionality between id ntified wa e (Table 3-1). 
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Table 3-/- The Base Elliott Wave Proportionality Framework 
Wave 2 targets include retracements of 38.2%, 50% and 61.8% of Wave 1 
Wave 3 is seen as most likely to be the "strongest" wave, approximately 1.618 times Wave 
Wave 4 targets include retracements of 23.6% or 38.2% of Wave 3 
Wave 5 is seen as being 61.8% of Wave three, where Wave three is the longest wave. 
Wave 5 is believed to equal wave 1 most of the time 
Wave B targets include retracements of38.2%, 50% and 61.8% of Wave A 
Wave C is seen as being equal to or 161.8% Wave A 
A minimum corrective wave, correcting a five wave impulse wave, would comprise of a 
38.2% time retracement and a 50% price retracement of that entire impulse wave 
Elliott believed that this followed from some underlying mathematical principle 
driving a wide range of physical and sociological phenomena, and published his 
beliefs in a book entitled "Natures Law - the Secret of the Universe" (Elliott, 1946). 
The Elliott Wave was subsequently much elaborated and popularised from the 1970s 
onwards by Prechter and Frost (2000, 10th ed.), with considerable success. Fibonacci 
ratios are mentioned more often than moving averages in the Batchelor and K wan 
(2001) survey of techniques used by practising analysts. There are other layers of both 
price and time proportionality that are offered by Prechter and Frost and Neely and 
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Hall (1990) in an Elliott Wave structure, both between waves and within sets of 
waves. This all depends on the extreme subjectivity of Elliott Wave counting that 
Mande1brot (1999) dismissed outright. For this reason, any objective examination of 
proportional anchoring must be independent of any perceived Elliott structure in price 
trends. 
Some adherents of wave theory use methods attributed by Gann (1942, 1949), though 
these are less popular than Elliott Wave analysis. In a long and apparently successful 
career as a stock tipster and seller of trading systems, Gann promulgated the idea that 
prices retraced to some predictable "round fraction" of the previous trend - usually 
0.5, but possibly any multiple of 1/8. He applied these and other "market geometry" 
techniques to predict the timing as well as the level of likely turning points. There 
seems to be no logic for the ratios used by Gann, who found justifications for his 
many different trading systems in numerology, astrology and Biblical arcana. 
The idea that prices retrace to a Fibonacci ratio or round fraction of the previous trend 
clearly lacks any scientific rationale. However, this phenomenon is well bedded into 
the mind of the marketplace, and so may be self-fulfilling. In the essays collected in 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), the authors note that in an uncertain 
environment people tend to "anchor" decisions to available numbers, regardless of 
relevance. In the classic Tversky and Kahneman (1974) experiment, a number is 
chosen at random by spinning a wheel of fortune, and subjects are asked to whether 
the percentage of African nations belonging to the United Nations is higher or lower 
than that number, and to estimate the exact percentage. There is a high correlation 
between the number from the wheel and the percentage estimate, even though the 
events are obviously unconnected and the choice of number random. The mechanism 
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of anchoring is disturbingly close to the environment of the trader. In the language of 
Chapman and Johnson (2002), subjects (traders) are presented (by technical analysts) 
with a salient but uninfonnative number (a Fibonacci ratio) before making a judgment 
(price target). So it is simply human nature for traders to take the technical support 
and resistance levels as starting points for thinking about price targets, regardless of 
their logic. 
Most people are also subject to the "illusion of control", and confronted with random 
events or time series will claim to see patterns rather than admit to the existence of 
coincidence or randomness. This is particularly acute in business environments where 
an appearance of competence must be maintained. Fenton O'Creevy, Nicholson, 
Soane and Willman (2003) report an experiment in which professional traders were 
asked to use a computer mouse to control a dot on the screen. In reality, the 
movements of the dot were random and the mouse was not even connected to the 
computer. But the traders happily reported that they were learning a rule linking the 
two, and controlling the dot. 
Regardless of whether Fibonacci ratios are natural laws or optical illusions, the 
proposition that stock prices retrace to such levels is unusual among technical trading 
rules, in the sense that it can be clearly fonnulated in numeric terms, and is potentially 
testable. Provided, that is, that one can identify the peaks and troughs the price series. 
3.3. IDENTIFYING PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE DOW 
The data for our analysis are daily observations on the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(OJIA) for 22,194 trading days between January 1915 and June 2003 (Appendix 3-2). 
From January 1914 to October 1928 we have only closing prices for the index. 
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Thereafter we use daily open, high, low and close prices. The index does not include 
dividends, since the research interest is in identifying cycles that might be observed 
by traders rather than computing returns to any trading rule. 
Dating the peaks and troughs in nonstationary time series has long been of concern to 
business cycle analysts, and in recent years their methods have been applied also to 
identifying cycles in the stock market. The problem is to find some way of filtering 
out noise from the time series so that underlying bull and bear market trends can be 
revealed, and the peak and trough prices and dates accurately identified. A technical 
analyst would do this by eyeballing the chart, and marking trends with a ruler, or the 
line drawing tool on some software package. Objective research needs a more 
systematic method that ensures turnings points are identified in a consistent way 
throughout the time series, and that makes explicit the rules by which the turning 
points are chosen. 
There are a number of ways to approach to the problem, depending on how much 
structure is imposed on the underlying time series. 
The first is a simple filter rule. Suppose that we are in a bull market, and the highest 
price achieved so far occurred at time t. If subsequently the cumulative fall in price 
from the high is more than some threshold percentage (say 10%) then we can say that 
a peak occurred at t, and the price series has switched from a bull to a bear phase. A 
similar rule can be used to identify troughs. This approach is used in Chauvet and 
Potter (2000), and in Lunde and Timmerman (2003) who investigate symmetric and 
asymmetric filters in the range 10%-20%. Lunde and Timmerman elaborate and 
formalise the concept further (Table 3-2). Narrow filters generate many turning 
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points, while broad filters discount short tenn reversals and generate a smaller number 
of turning points and hence longer bull and bear trends. Even this simple approach 
requires some subjective judgment about what constitutes a reasonable decomposition 
of the price series into trend and noise components. As it stands the rule is liable to 
generate larger numbers of turning points at times of high market volatility, so a 
variable filter size might give more plausible results. Levy (1971) used a more 
dynamic fonn of percentage switching. The highest (lowest) point preceding a 
decline (advance), with the filter c = a + bV , where a and b are constants, fixed by 
Levy as a = 0 and b = 6, and V is 131-day percentage volatility. Levy percentage 
filter was thus completely driven by volatility and made no use of constants. 
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Table 3-2 - Percentage Turning Point Filter (Lunde and Timmerman. 2003) 
II is a market state dummy variable taking the value I (0) if the stock 
market is in a bull (bear) market at time t. Measuring time on a 
discrete scale, suppose that at to the market is at a local maximum, 
meaning P max = PIO. where PIO is price at to. The threshold filter that 
triggers a switch between bull and bear states is c and T ~ 1 is a 
stopping time variable defined by 
r=mint-l n{~ ~PmuJ~ < (l-c)Pmu } I 0.1 t-, 
When the first condition is fulfilled the local maximum in the current 
bull state is updated 
The continuation of the bull regime between to and tOt r means that ltu = 
... = ltu+r = 1. Conversely, if P, .. , < (l-c)Pmaxis met, fulfilling the 
second condition, a bear market is defined as existing between to and 
to+r thus I'max = ... = ltu+r = O. As per bull markets, the above holds 
for bear markets as: 
T = min;=, .... " {P,_., ~ Pmin V P, .... , < (1- c )Pmm } 
Secondly, a filter might take the form of a time filter. Swing charts (Gann, 1942, 
1949) are practitioner rules that switch state based on duration based filter of price 
moves. An openlhigh/low/c1ose series should move in a direction for at least x 
consecutive days to not be designated as mere noise and ignored. For a swing to tum 
up (down) a market must have a x bars where the high (low) of the bar is higher 
(lower) than the previous bar and the low (high) is higher (lower) than the previous 
bar, where 3 is the normal value of x. A choice needs to be made as to how to treat 
inside and outside bars, bars that are enveloped by or envelope the previous bar. They 
can be ignored or swing changes can be based on the close prices. Swing charts are 
perhaps analogous to Okun's now popular rule of thumb that two or more quarter's 
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negative growth constitutes a recession (see Layton and Banarji, 2003) and more 
loosely to duration dependence. There is no academic literature on this switching 
approach but their role in industry, simplicity and their claimed robustness makes of 
them interesting for future research. 
A third approach is to apply a more complicated heuristic that enforces some 
desirable features on the turning points and market phases. A good example is the 
procedure developed for stock market analysis by Pagan and Sossounov (2003). This 
is derived from the pioneering paper on the determination of business cycle peaks and 
troughs by Bry and Boschan (1971), which in tum automated the task performed by 
the NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee (see Bums and Mitchell, 1946). The 3 
step process outlined by Pagan and Sossounov (2003) is shown on Table 3-3. 
Edwards, Biscarri and de Gracia (2003),s formalisation is included along with 
additional formal expression of the original three point table. The parameters used 
reflect the monthly frequency of the price data used in their study, and are explicitly 
selected to yield cycles consistent with Dow Theory. Provisional peaks and troughs 
are identified as the highest and lowest points in a moving k-month (8-month) 
window. Any cases where there are successive peaks or troughs are resolved and any 
odd effects that occur at the start or the end of the series, where the window width 
necessarily shrinks, are also removed. Finally, to address the problem of excessive 
numbers of cycles being generated at times of high volatility, any cycles or trends that 
look too short (cycles less than 16 months, phases less than 4 months) are removed, 
unless they correspond to an obvious market crash. Similar methods are used by 
Edwards et al (2003) and Gonzalez, Powell and Shi (2003). 
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Table 3-3 - Pagan-Sossounov (2003) procedure for identifying turning poinls 
I. Determination of initial turning points in raw data. 
Determination of initial turning points in raw data by choosing local peaks I 
troughs, as occurring when they are the highest Ilowest, values in a window 8 
months on either side of the date. 
Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting highest of multiple peaks (or 
lowest of multiple troughs 
2. Censoring operations. 
Elimination of turns within 6 months of beginning and end of series. 
Elimination of peaks (or troughs), at both ends of series which are lower (or 
higher) than most recent. 
Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than 16 months. 
Elimination of phases whose duration is less than 4 months, unless fall/rise 
exceeds 20%, . 
3. Statement of final turning points 
As formally expressed in relation to monthly data by Edwards et al (2003), there 
is a peak at price P, and time 1 if [P,_II''''' PH < P, > Ph ..... ' P'+H] and there is a 
trough at price P, and time 1 if [P,-H"",P,-I > P, < P'+I'.··,P,+s] 
We can alternatively express 
P, >= max(p,_H , ... , P,-I' PI+I , ... , P'+H) 
P, <= min(p,_H , ... , PH' PHI"'" PI+H)' 
this as 
and 
peaks occuning 
troughs 
when 
when 
We have formally expressed the written defmition given by Pagan and Sossounov 
of phase filtering as follows, where D is duration, A is the amplitude (phase 
returns), T is the turning point being identified, t is the time of the turning point 
and F, is a dummy variable, where F, = I when AphQ.t~ > min(Apw~) and F, = 0 
when Aphas~ < min(Aphas~) 
[min(phase) = mineD phase )(1- F, ) + mine A pIttJH)F,] 
WhereDphase=lr-lr-l; (min(Dphast')=4 months) and ApltMe =abs(pr-pr-l]; 
Pr-l 
(min(A phas .. ) =20%) 
A sixteen-month minimum peak (trough) to peak (trough) cycle rule is imposed, 
rather than the original Bry Boschan fifteen months. We can fonnally express the 
definition given by Pagan and Sossounov as follows 
mine D peakcycle) = 16 months mine DIrOfIIItcycIt') = 16 months 
where D peakcycle = 1 P -I P-2 where DtrotogIIcyclt' = Ir -lr-2 
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The choice of an eight month rolling window is more restrictive than the original Bry 
and Boschan choice of six months. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) accept the lack of 
clarity as to how one selects an appropriate value in the context of asset prices. For 
example, Gonzalez et 01 (2003) identify all peaks (troughs) that are higher (lower) 
than all points five months on either side - the highest (lowest) of multiple 
peaks(troughs) are then selected. Whilst no justification is given by Pagan and 
Sossounov for eight months in particular to be used either side of the window, there is 
one given for the alteration of the minimum time to be spent in each phase. Pagan 
and Sossounov (2003) describe Dow Theory as amongst the "oldest fonnal literature 
emphasising bull and bear markets". As their work "shares an interest with Dow 
theorists a fundamental interest in primary movements", Dow's guidelines steered the 
remaining parameterisation of the model. Dow's suggestion of minimum phase 
durations of three months fonned the basis of final choice of four months. Yet the 
impact of fat-tails would mean that this filter would ignore some of the important, yet 
short-lived, swings in price. The 1987 crash only lasted three months for example. 
They felt that reducing the four months to three would catch too many spurious cycles 
and so the minimum phase requirement was amended. Where there is a swing of at 
least twenty per cent, the four month filter is overridden. Gonzalez el 01 (2003) were 
also uncomfortable with the blanket requirement that each equity market phase have a 
duration of at least five months. They instead replaced it with a restriction entirely 
based on minimum returns - a minimum 10% phase rule. Whilst in the context of 
GDP based business cycle identification, Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (199S) also 
altered the amplitude requirement of the BB approach, imposing a minimum 
amplitude of one standard error of the monthly growth rate. These are all of course 
also blanket requirements, just ones that differ from the original 1971 assumptions. 
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The strength of the Pagan and Sossounov approach in censoring phases lies in it 
having a phase filter conditional on either phase amplitude or duration. 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) refers to Dow's definition of a primary bull market as 
being one that lasts, on average, for at least two years (yet can be interrupted by 
secondary corrections). It was felt that a two-year restriction would disallow the 
identification of primary corrections, which would likely be shorter in duration than 
their bull counterparts in equity markets. With Dow Theory suggesting that a 
complete cycle lasts one year at the minimum and the original Bry Boschan approach 
giving fifteen months, sixteen months was settled on. This results in a neat 16, 8, 4 
parameterisation of the duration parameters for long term equity cycles. 
Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) use a fourth, and apparently more objective, method 
to identify peaks, troughs and local reversal patterns in high frequency data on US 
stocks. Turning points are identified as points with zero time derivatives in kernel 
regression functions fitted to moving windows of closing price data. Although this 
looks less arbitrary than the heuristic approach, in practice many ad hoc adjustments 
and subjective judgments have to be made. Successive peaks and troughs, and points 
of inflexion have to be removed. As with the Pagan-Sossounov procedure, the 
window size has to be determined, depending on the desired number of cycles. 
Interestingly, the window sizes automatically chosen by their regression package on 
the basis of an estimate of the noise-signal ratio (large) produced too few turning 
points in the opinion of an expert technical analyst who audited the Lo, Mamaysky 
and Wang (2000) procedure. The authors therefore narrowed the window size to bring 
the results closer to market practice. 
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The fifth possibility is to identify turning points by some Markov switching model of 
the type popularised in business cycle analysis by Hamilton (1989), and compared to 
the heuristic approach by Harding and Pagan (2003a). The idea is to characterise 
stock returns as coming from either a bull state (positive mean, low variance) or a 
bear state (negative mean, high variance), with some high probability of staying in 
each state once the bull or bear market is under way. The means, variances and 
probabilities can be estimated from time series data on prices, and from these one can 
infer the probability that the market was in a bull or bear state at each point in the time 
series. Dates at which the probability of being in the bull state fall from above 0.5 to 
below 0.5 count as provisional peaks, and dates when this probability cuts 0.5 from 
below count as provisional troughs. Bodman and Crosby (2002) argue that these 
regime switching models are "non-judgmental", and in his comment on Harding and 
Pagan (2003a) Hamilton (2003) similarly agues that they capture the underlying 
structure of the time series. However, as Harding and Pagan (2003b) point out, the 
objectivity is more apparent than real. Choices have to be made about the number of 
states, the time series process driving the means and variances, whether the transition 
probabilities are time varying and if so whether they are dependent on the duration of 
the regime. Guidolin and Timmerman (2002), for example, successfully parameterise 
3-regime models of returns to UK bond and stock markets. Rather importantly, the 
results of these switching models may well violate common sense, in that the switch 
points need not occur at local peaks or troughs. Harding and Pagan (2003b) also 
argue that Markov cycle models are not intuitively transparent. There is a lack of any 
intuitive meaning in the estimated parameters over and above the knowledge that they 
represent the probability of being in a state. 
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We have chosen to identify turning points in the Dow using the approach of Pagan 
and Sossounov (2004), with two modifications that we have developed for this 
Chapter. One is that the methodology employs daily high and low price series as 
potential highs and lows respectively, rather than the closing price. This recognises 
that technical analysts in practice employ charts with daily bars rather than single 
points. It does make a difference to cycle dating. For example, a trough in the Dow 
identified at a level of 416.2 in October 1957 (the lowest low) would not have been 
identified by the Pagan-Sossounov algorithm. instead being put at 424.2 (the lowest 
close) in December 1957. A second is the addition of the censoring rule that any 
peaks (troughs) are greater (less) than their preceding trough (peak), to ensure 
appropriate alternation. This is in addition to the alternation censor specified by 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003), which simply ensures that peaks (troughs) are followed 
by troughs (peaks). 
As noted by Biscarri and de Gracia (2001) and Edwards el al. (2003), the Pagan-
Sossounov procedure is quite sensitive to the window size used for initial 
identification of turning points. One could parameterise the Pagan and Sossounov 
model in such a way to segment a long time series into a handful of extremely large 
phases or several hundred small phases. As an illustration, our model with Pagan and 
Sossounov's parameters (a 16-month window with a minimum cycle length of 16 
months) identifies 46 turning points in the Dow between 1915 and 2003. Halving the 
window size increases the number of turning points to 60. Combining this smaller 
window size with a minimum cycle of 8 months, rather than 16, increases the number 
of turning points further to 72. 
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Table 3-4 - Comparison posH'val' tllrning point with Pagan- 0 'Oll110V (_ 003) 
Peaks 
Batchelor-Ramyar 
Troughs 
Batchelor-Ramyar 
Pagan-Sossounov 
29 May 1946 May-46 
14 June 1948 Jun-48 
05 January 1953 Dec-52 
09 April 1956 Jul-56 
04 January 1960 Jul-59 
15 November 1961 Dec-61 
09 February 1966 Jan-66 
02 December 1968 Nov-68 
28 April 1971 Apr-71 
11 January 1973 Dec-72 
22 September 1976 Dec-76 
11 September 1978 
27 April 1981 
30 November 1983 
25 August 1987 
03 June 1992 
14 January 2000 
Nov-80 
Jun-83 
Aug-87 
May-90 
Jan-94 
Pagan-Sossounov 
30 October 1946 Feb-48 
14 June 1949 Jun-48 
15 September 1953 Aug-53 
22 October 1957 Dec-57 
25 October 1960 Oct-60 
25 June 1962 Jun-62 
10 October 1966 Sep-66 
26 May 1970 Jun-70 
23 November 1971 Nov-71 
09 December 1974 Sep-74 
01 March 1978 Feb-78 
27 March 1980 
09 August 1982 Jul-82 
25 July 1984 May-84 
20 October 1987 Nov-87 
Oct-90 
05 October 1992 
Jun-94 
21 September 2001 
Table shows date a/peak and trough frO Ill appl)il1 the Bat helor-Ramyar /U!IIri Ii liter to d ii ' 
data in the year 1945-2001, ompar d to th 111101' ( 00 ), 
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The algorithm is also sensitive to data frequency. Pagan and Sossounov (2003) used 
monthly S&P returns, while the Batchelor-Ramyar procedure is applied using daily 
data. Adjusting their censoring parameters for daily data using a 252 day trading year, 
the procedure finds 46 cycles from monthly data, 52 from weekly and 47 from daily. 
Table 3-4 compares the dating of the post WWII cycles from their monthly data with 
the dates found using our method for daily data. There is general agreement about 
timing until the 1980s. Of the 16 cycles identified by Pagan and Sossounov, our dates 
for troughs are within three months of theirs in 12 cases, and in the case of peaks our 
procedure agrees in 11 cases. The concordance breaks down completely at the end of 
the sample, and we have one additional cycle in 1978-80. 
The cycles found by Pagan and Sossounov are of roughly the same periodicity as the 
underlying economic business cycle. This is not relevant to our purposes, since we 
want to mimic the cycles seen by, and possibly caused by, short term traders. The 
base-case parameters for our study of retracement and projection ratios have therefore 
been chosen to filter out much less noise than the Pagan-Sossounov model. The initial 
rolling window on either side of each turning point is defined as 21 trading days 
(approximately one calendar month). The minimum cycle duration is defined as 42 
trading days (approximately two calendar months). The minimum phase duration is 
set to to trading days (approximately two calendar weeks), unless absolute returns 
exceed 5%. This results in 430 identified turning points in the Dow series. Following 
the lead of Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000), a qualified technical analyst confirmed 
the realism of the patterns produced. However, it will clearly be necessary to test the 
sensitivity of any results to changes in these parameter values. 
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Table 3-5 - Summary statistics for bull and bear phases 
Phase Dimension units Minimum 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Maximum 
Bear Price Level index points 2.9 22.6 60.8 156.5 217.6 3288.0 
log Price IOO·log price 0.3 7.7 11.4 15.1 18.2 79.9 
% of Price % of price 0.3 6.2 9.7 13.2 15.4 105.2 
Duration days 3 23 42 52 64 337 
Bull Price Level index points 5.6 26.0 66.1 161.0 236.8 2455.0 
log Price IOO·log price 3.7 9.0 12.9 16.2 20.9 79.9 
% of Price % of price 0.3 6.4 9.5 12.4 14.7 54.8 
Duration days 7 30 50 63 75 337 
The table shows statistics on the distribution of the 430 bull and bear phases 
identified by our heuristic from daily data on the Dow in the period January 1915 -
June 2003. Note that all price changes in bear phases are negative, and the table 
shows their absolute values 
The characteristics of the cycles are summarised in Table 3-5. Typical (median) bear 
phases last about 42 days, and bull phases 50 days. As would be expected given the 
long tenn upward trend in the Dow. the mean (log) return in bull phases is a little 
higher than in bear phases. Bear phases are also on average shorter than bull phases 
(52 days versus 63 days). Both price amplitude and duration are positively skewed. 
The mean log-return in a bull phase, for example is 15.1 % as against a median of 
11.4%. The picture is therefore one of a large number of relatively short-lived and 
small cycles and a long tail of quite long-lived bull and bear trends. 
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3.4. BOOTSTRAP ANALYSIS OF RETRACEMENT AND PROJECTION 
RATIOS 
The Chapter's aim is to test a hypotheses of the fonn 
R Ef±E 
where R is some ratio measured from the identified turning points in the Dow, f is a 
round number or Fibonacci ratio, and E is a small bandwidth around f. 
Two types of ratio R are measured, retracements and projections. Recall from the 
discussion of Figure 3-1 that a retracement is the ratio of one phase to the 
immediately preceding phase. There are therefore two types of retracement - a bull 
retracement when the market switches from a falling to a rising trend, and a bear 
retracement, when the market switches from a rising to a falling trend. A projection is 
the ratio of one phase to the most recent similar phase. Again, there are bull 
projections - the ratio of one uptrend to the previous uptrend - and bear projections. 
The size of the trend is measured in two ways, by price and time. A bull time 
projection is the ratio of the duration of one uptrend to the duration of the previous 
uptrend, both measured in trading days. A bull price projection is the ratio of the 
change in price through one uptrend to the change in price in the previous uptrend. 
For retracements we look at the absolute value of the price ranges, so all ratios are 
positive. Analysts chart prices and calculate changes in various ways. Some look at 
simple price bar charts. Some plot the bars on a logarithmic scale. Some calculate 
ratios using percentage changes rather than absolute price changes. For all price 
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retracements and projections we have calculated the ratios m three ways, usmg 
differences in prices, differences in log-prices, and percentage differences in prices. In 
total we calculate 2 types (retracement and projection) x 2 trends (bull and bear) x 4 
dimensions and price measures (time, and price, log price and percentage change in 
price) = 16 ratios. 
We compare the observed values of R with the conjectured round number ratios f = 
0.5, I, 1.5, and with the Fibonacci ratios f= 0.382, 0.618,0.786, 1.382, 1.618,2.618 
and 4.236, making 10 hypothesized values in all. Initially we look for values of R in a 
band in the ranges f ± E where E is taken as 0.025, so as to keep a clear distance 
between adjacent ranges. 
The voluminous literature on empirical characteristic of stock returns suggests that the 
process driving the mean return is unstable, generally close to white noise, and 
punctuated by the manias and panics that lead to the best-defmed bull and bear 
phases. There is however positive serial correlation between daily volatility, measured 
either by the daily price range, or by the c1ose-to-c1ose range. Cont (200 I) provides a 
nice summary of these stylized facts and their implications for the returns distribution. 
One implication is that there is no recognizable theoretical distribution for the ratios 
we have calculated, so testing will have to rely on bootstrap distributions. The 
existence of local trends and second moment serial correlation means that a simple 
bootstrap is inappropriate since key properties of the returns would be destroyed by 
simple randomization. 
Some block bootstrap method is necessary, and we have used the stationary bootstrap 
of Politis and Romano (1994). The pseudo-series from our sample of size n = 22194, 
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are generated by resampled blocks, starting at a random observation number Nand 
containing a random number of observations b, where the length of each block is 
drawn from a geometric distribution with a mean of p=20, the approximate number of 
trading days in a month. The shape of a geometric distribution dictates that whilst the 
mean block-size is 20 trading days, there will be large number of smaller blocks and a 
smaller number of blocks longer than 20 trading days. In common with the circular 
bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1992), the stationary bootstrap arranges the data 
circularly so that PI follows Pn when the required block allocating a block size b 
starting at observation N > n-b. Unlike standard resampling or the moving blocks 
bootstrap, the stationary characteristics of the empirical series are maintained by the 
stationary bootstrap. Note that what is resampled is the whole vector of open, high, 
low and close prices. The resampled series thus retains the vectors four return 
distributions of the original series, so for example the serial correlation between 
successive daily ranges is approximately preserved. As with all block bootstrap 
methods there are discontinuities at the joins of blocks, but with our large sample size 
this is unlikely to bias the results. 
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Figure 3-4 - Bootstrap distribution of bear price level retracements 
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For each of2000 bootstrap replications, a set of turning points is determined u ing our 
algorithm, and the corresponding values of the 16 retracement and projection ratio 
calculated. Figure 3-4 shows the distribution of just one of these ratio in the actual 
data - the bear retracement ratio in the price level - plotted against the distribution 
from the bootstrap experiments. If retracements were to specific levels and were not 
randomly distributed, one would expect to see significant differences between actual 
and bootstrap distributions, with the actual data concentrated around round number 
or Fibonacci ratios. Looking at Figure 3-4 there are slightly more retracements in the 
ranges 0.4-0.6, 1.2-1.4 and 2.4-2.6 than suggested by the bootstrap di tribution. To 
test formally whether there is a significant difference between these histograms Table 
3-6 shows the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) p-values between each of the 16 empirical 
phase-ratio distributions and their relevant bootstrap distributions. Each KS p-value 
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tests the null hypothesis that the whole distribution of each of the 16 phase-ratios does 
in fact match the bootstrap distribution (which in this context would suggest that 
nothing interesting is happening). The KS statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of empirical and bootstrap distributions being drawn from the same distribution. The 
results also tend towards the probability that the empirical distributions match the 
bootstrap distributions. On the face of it this does not support the idea that market 
action causes unusual spikes in the distribution of price or duration ratios. 
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Table 3-6 - p-values from Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between actual and bootstrap 
distributions of ratios 
Phase 
Bear 
Bull 
Dimension 
Price Level 
log Price 
Percentage price 
Duration 
Price Level 
log Price 
Percentage price 
Duration 
Retracements Projections 
0.727 
0.567 
0.634 
0.865 
0.692 
0.409 
0.676 
0.940 
0.458 
0.576 
0.838 
0.806 
0.877 
0.698 
0.605 
0.298 
The table shows p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics between the 
distribution of each type of ratio in the Dow, and the corresponding distribution from 
2000 random stationary bootstrap replications of the index series. Failing to reject 
the null hypothesis of a shared population distribution is not supportive of the idea 
that markets follow the textbook patterns examined. Values under 0.10 or 0.05 would 
indicate that the distributions were drawn from population distributions significantly 
different at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
To test whether each specific ratio occurs more often than expected from the 
bootstrap distribution, we count the number of occurrences of the ratios within a band 
of size & around each of the 10 hypothesized values f. The bandwidth & has been set 
initially at 2.5%, and full results are set out in the following table. For each 
type/phase/dimension and each round number or Fibonacci ratio f we count the 
number of occurrences of the ratio in the interval f ± & where & = 0.025. This is 
compared to the distribution of occurrences in 2000 random block bootstrap 
replications of the index series. Table 3-7 shows the percentile of the actual number of 
occurrences in the bootstrap distribution. Values over 0.90 indicate significance at the 
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10% level, and values over .95 indicate significance at the 5% level. Discounting the 
results for the ratio 4.236, where there were few occurrences in the actual data or the 
bootstrap samples, only 15 of the 144 ratios exceed 0.90. This is only slightly more 
than the 14.4 that one would expect to observe under the null of equality between 
sample and bootstrap frequencies. Moreover, there is no consistency in the type of 
ratio or Fibonacci number at which these few significant results occur. 
It is of course possible that our results are an artefact of the parameters of our testing 
procedure. We have experimented with shorter (10 day) and longer (40 day) average 
block lengths in our bootstrap, as against the base case of 20 days. We have also 
conducted tests using narrower (.01) and broader (0.05) bands around the 
hypothesized ratio values as against the base case value for e of .025. None of these 
sensitivity tests undermine our basic, negative, result. 
Our conclusion must be that there is no significant difference between the frequencies 
with which price and time ratios occur in cycles in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
and frequencies which one would expect to occur at random in such a time series. Our 
introduction noted that empirical evidence from academic studies suggests that not all 
of technical analysis can be dismissed prima facie. The evidence from this Chapter 
suggests that the idea that round fractions and Fibonacci ratios occur in the Dow can 
be dismissed. 
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Table 3-7 - Bootstrap percentiles testing retracement and projection ratios against roundfraction and Fibonacci ratios 
Type Phase Dimension Ratios (f) 
~---. ------ -
0.382 0.500 0.618 0.786 1.000 1.382 1.618 2.000 2.618 4.236 
Retracement Bear Price Level 0.42 0.20 0.71 0.89 0.18 0.46 0.36 0.05 0.81 1.00** 
log Price 0.99** 0.Q3 0.68 0.81 0.49 0.07 0.73 0.95** 0.30 0.33 
% of Price 0.42 0.31 0.97** 0.24 0.12 0.06 0.86 0.10 0.22 0.80 
Duration 0.88 0.22 0.71 0.76 0.83 0.02 0.03 OAO 0.18 0.42 
Retracement Bull Price Level 0.26 OAO 1.00** 0.88 0.50 OA6 0.41 0.00 0.57 1.00** 
log Price 0.95** 0.53 0.85 0.97** 0.21 0.65 0.67 0.87 0.16 0.75 
% of Price 0.14 0.06 0.94* 0.35 0.22 0.00 0.74 0.24 0.00 0.30 
Duration 0.50 0.02 0.35 0.64 0.87 0.31 0.31 0.04 0.72 0.82 
Projection Bear Price Level 0.12 0.10 0.18 0.50 0.69 0.76 OAI 0.79 0.66 1.00** 
log Price 0.82 0.07 0.87 0.69 0.35 0.89 0.62 0.67 0.06 1.00** 
% of Price 0.41 0.65 0.54 0.88 0.64 0.00 0.50 0.75 1.00** 1.00** 
Duration 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.98** 0.78 0.13 0.89 0.08 0.64 1.00** 
Projection Bull Price Level 0.56 0.70 0.38 0.58 0.57 0.79 0.42 1.00** 1.00** 0.43 
log Price 0.40 0.54 0.68 0.56 0.55 0.11 1.00·· 1.00·· 0.63 1.00·· 
% of Price 0.83 0.53 0.90· 0.74 0.41 0.92* 0.63 0.81 1.00** 1.00·· 
Duration 0.62 0.60 0.05 0.74 0.26 0.73 0.60 1.00·· 1.00** 1.00** 
For each type/phase/dimension and each round number or Fibonacci ratio f we count the number of occurrences of the ratio in the interval f ± 
& where & = 0.025. This is compared to the distribution of occurrences in 2000 random block bootstrap replications of the index series. The 
table shows the percentile of the actual number of occurrences in the bootstrap distribution. Values over 0.90* indicate significance of a 
textbook ratio:phase combination at the 10% level, and values over 0.95** indicate significance at the 5% level. 
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3.5. APPENDICES 
Appendix 3-1 - "Fibonacci" Ratios 
"Whole Number" ratios 
0.5* 
1* 
2* 
*more commonly used ratios 
Phi Ascension 
Declension 
0.236 
0.382* 
cp=0.618* 
<1>= 1.618* 
2.618* 
4.236* 
/ phi Secondary 
Ratios 
0.786(--Jcp) 
1.272 CV<1» 
The ratios 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 are not actually derived from Phi at all but are merely 
Fib 
integer or half multiples of prior cyclical phases. These are considered by analysts 
along with Phi based ratios so regularly that a reference to the use of "Fibonacci 
ratios" would also assume inclusion of these proportions by a trader. All ratios in the 
second column are related by Phi (1.618) and phi (0.618), depending on whether one 
is ascending or descending through the ratios. The third column's ratios are 
mainstream but appear to be used by less analysts. 
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Appendix 3-2 - Dow Industrial Series 1915:2003 (logarithmically scaled) 
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4. PROPORTIONAL PHASE ANCHORING - TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
AND BEHAVIOURIAL ANCHORING 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter tests the same proposition as Chapter 3, that the expected amplitude and 
duration of the next trend is not random, but depends on the amplitude and duration of 
the previous trend. Whilst Chapter 3 tested whether the phenomenon existed in the 
Dow Jones Industrials index, this Chapter examines the behaviour of individual 
forecasters via a survey. This proposition would suggest that forecasters "anchor" 
their price or duration expectations on previously observed cyclical phases. We 
distinguish this from other forms of time-series forecasting anchoring by calling it 
proportional phase anchoring. 
The concept of anchoring is in itself not new (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) nor 
is the idea that forecasters base judgemental forecasts on preceding data. Lawrence 
and O'Connor (1992 and 1995) fmd that forecasters frequently use an anchoring-and-
adjustment heuristic based on the last data point when forecasting time-series. What 
has not been assessed is the practitioners' claim that individuals expect phases to be 
proportionate to preceding phases (Hamilton, 1922, Gann, 1942, Achelis, 2000, 
Murphy, 2000, Pring, 1998 and Edwards and Magee, 2001). 
The Chapter falls into four sections. Section 4.2 builds on Chapters 2 and 3 by 
providing more information about Fibonacci himself, the series that bears his name 
and the role of the series in the physical phenomona is examined. Section 4.3 surveys 
the role of proportionality in the humanities and aesthetics. The likelihood that 
forecasts will anchor on Fibonacci numbers or other key ratios is tested by a 
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judgemental forecasting experiment. Subjects are presented with time series with 
well defined peaks and troughs and asked to forecast the next turning point. Section 
4.4 introduces our judgemental forecasting survey. We develop a bootstrap method 
for assessing the statistical significance of specific ratios. Section 4.5 reports 
statistically significant ratios. It also reports the effect of forecast presentation style 
and the characteristics of our respondent sample on the resulting distributions of price 
and time ratios. 
4.2. FIBONACCI AND PHYSICAL PHENOMONON 
There are well defined physical contexts where Fibonacci numbers do appear. Before 
looking at the probability of finding these numbers in the arts and social sciences it 
may be useful to outline their origins. Leonardo Pisano, better known as Fibonacci, 
was born in Pisa in cl175 AD. He was the son of Guilielmo Bonacci, a secretary of 
the Republic of Pisa - hence Fibonacci, filius Bonacci, son of Bonacci. His father 
was responsible for the Pisan trading colony in Bougie, now Bejaia, in northeastern 
Algeria during the I 190s. Bonacci intended his son to become a merchant and had 
him tutored in calculation techniques. In time Fibonacci was engaged in business in 
Egypt, Syria, Greece, Sicily, and Provence for the Pisan republic. This provided 
Leonardo with the opportunity to study mathematical techniques used across these 
regions. 
Fibonacci returned to Pisa in cl200 where he worked on his own writings for around a 
quarter of a century. Despite Di minor guisa. examining commerical arithmetic, and 
his commentary on Euclid's Elements being lost, Fibonacci's more abstract theoretical 
legacy is still well recognised. Yet it was the practical applications of his work that 
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brought Fibonacci fame amongst his contemporaries and his wider contribution is not 
well known. Practica geometria (Pisano, 1220) was a collection of geometric 
problems based on Euclid's Elements and On Divisions, such as calculating the sides 
of geometric shapes using the diameter of circumscribed or inscribed circles, for 
example. These came with precise proofs and practical information for surveyors, 
including a chapter on how to calculate the height of tall objects using similar 
triangles. Flos (Pisano, 1225) addressed some of the challenges highlighted by Omar 
Kyahbam's algeraic treatise. Liber quadratorum (Pisano, 1225) was arguably 
Fibonacci's most remarkable work, yet it was not widely read, and addresses number 
theory, examining Pythagorean triples calculations for example. 
Nevertheless, the work that left the most personal mark on mathematics was 
Fibonacci's earliest major work, Liber abaci (Pisano, 1202). This is presumed to have 
introduced the Hindu-Arabic decimal system to Europe (more conducive to 
calculations than Roman numerals), simultaneous linear equations, irrational numbers 
and accounting issues and currency conversion for merchants. 
It is the third section of Liber abaci that introduced the series of numbers that now 
bears Fibonacci's name. A number of problems were used to illustrate the role of the 
sequence, including the famous rabbit reproduction problems where somone puts a 
pair of rabbits in an enclosure. "How many pairs of rabbits can be produced from 
that pair in a year if it is supposed that every month each pair begets a new pair 
which/rom the second month on becomes productive?" (Pisano, 1202) 
The first pair mate at the end of the first month (1 pair total) but their pair is only born 
at the end of the second month (now 2 pairs). At the end of the third month the 
85 
original female produces a second pair (3 pairs). The close of the fourth month brings 
another two pairs, from both the original female and the fema le born two months ago 
(5 pairs). This growth is illustrated by Figure 4- 1. 
Figure 4-1 - Fibonacci Growth of Rabbit (Kno tt, 2003) 
.. 
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So the number of pairs of rabbits at the start of each month increa e a follow : I, I, 
2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 2 1, 34, etc. Each number in this equence is the sum of the pr ceding 
two. Fibonacci provided other similar examples and problem that demon trate the 
role of the series and the series provides the basis for many simple numerical puzzles. 
There are many interesting properties exhibited by the Fibonacci series itself. If one 
examine the final digits of the numbers in the serie one see that the repeat 
themselves after 60 numbers in the eries, a cycle length of 60. For the la t two digit 
the cycle length is 300, the last three digit the cycle length i I 500 th la t four 
digits the cycle length is 15,000, the last five digits 150,000. The initial digit of the 
numbers in the Fibonacci series are governed by Benford ' law (Benford, 193 and 
De Ceuster, Dhaene and Schatteman, 1997), in the same way that orne natural 
phenomena and randomly chosen integers/real number are. 
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For further examples of the many mathematical points of interest of Fibonacci see 
Knott (2003) - cited as the leading resource by the Fibonacci Association. If one 
takes the ratio of a number in the Fibonacci series versus the immediately preceding 
number one find that the ratio has some interesting properties. The ratios stabilise by 
approximately the fifth number in the Fibonacci series and remain accurate to fifteen 
decimal places after the fortieth number in the series. This irrational number has been 
given many names over the centuries: <I> (Phi), the golden mean, the golden ratio, the 
golden proportion, the golden section or even the divine proportion or divine section. 
A ratio of <p (phi) is found if one instead descends down the sequence, 0.618034 ... 
Between alternate numbers in the sequence, the ratio is approximately 0.381966 
(0.6180342). Phi is the only number that when added to I produces its inverse, phi. 
The Fibonacci series is also of interest to scientists beyond its purely mathematical 
properties. There appears to be a significant tendency for anatomy of plants to be 
governed by Fibonacci numbers (Knott, 2003). There are many species which 
consistently have a precise number of petals they have, for example buttercups, whilst 
many others have petals that are very close Fibonacci numbers, with the asymptotic 
mean being a Fibonacci number. The number of clockwise and anti-clockwise 
rotations before meeting a leaf directly above the first tends towards Fibonacci 
numbers, as do the number of leaves that are passed along the way. There is also 
tendency for these three numbers to be consecutive Fibonacci numbers. The 
evolutionary reason for this phenomenon is that Phi provides the single optimal fixed 
angle of rotation for exposure of flowers or petals to light and insects, whilst allowing 
for optimal soil exposure for rain. 
Furthermore, this also provides a fixed angle of rotation between new cells or seeds, 
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with uniform packing that can be maintained at any stage of plant growth, even when 
the final number is unknown. Pinecones and cauliflowers, for example, also show the 
golden (Phi proportioned) spirals clearly. The number of turns in each set is a 
Fibonacci number, and this avoids overpopulating the centre or underpopulating the 
edges (Brousseau, 1968 and 1969, also see Onderdonk, 1970, Davis, 1970 and 1971). 
The shape of cells or seeds dictates the optimal packing formation of a defined 
number of cells. But Phi appears to solve the problem of maintaining optimality as a 
plant grows to an undefined number of cells. Douady and Couder (1993) prove this 
optimal stacking theorem mathematically. 
There is also a literature that suggests that on average human anatomy is proportioned 
according to Phi. Kawakami and Tsukada (1989) documents some of the Phi based 
relationships that appear to define human facial attractiveness. The ratio of the 
distance between our eyes to the width of the eyes themselves tends towards the 
golden section, for example. As seen from the front, the width of one's central incisor 
is in the golden proportion to the width of the lateral incisor. This relationship 
continues as the lateral incisor is in the same proportion to the adjacent canine and this 
in tum is proportional to by Phi to the first premolar. These asymptotic tendencies are 
also found as a golden rectangle in human front teeth; the height of the central incisor 
is the width of the two central incisors (Levin, 1978). There is even a literature that 
Phi proportions the cycles exhibited by a healthy heart beat and brain wave cycles 
(Weiss, 1992; Weiss and Weiss, 2003). These physical manifestations are interesting, 
but it must be noted that whilst the Fibonacci series and Phi appear in various natural 
phenomenon, they are not the only such numbers. All that can be said is that this 
intriguing natural pattern is "not a universal law but only a fascinatingly prevalent 
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tendency" (Coxeter, 1961). 
4.3. HUMANITIES, AESTHETICS AND JUDGEMENTAL FORECASTING 
There is a consensus about the role of Phi in nature. Whether Phi plays a role in 
aesthetic preferences is more controversial. Facial attractiveness appears to depend 
on possession of average and symmetrical features, and Kawakami and Tsukada 
(1989) document some of the Phi based relationships that appear to define human 
facial attractiveness. Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth (1982) show that the importance 
that we place on the face when interpreting and judging others does not differ 
culturally. Mainstream dental aesthetics reading for dental and orthodontic students 
also includes Phi based relationships (Levin, 1978). 
There is some evidence of conscious use of Phi in the humanities, but this is not 
necessarily the same as an innate aesthetic preference. This controversy is at the heart 
of understanding how or whether market participants anchor cyclical phases on prior 
phases. It could be the case that chart analysts anchor in Fibonacci ratios because 
they "look right". 
Livio (2002), Knott (2003) and O'Connor and Robertson (2003b) document the role 
of Phi in two-dimensional geometry and Platonic solids. Basic shapes proportioned 
using Phi, such as the rectangles, triangles or spirals, have often been the starting 
point for artists when proportioning their works. Weiss (1992) suggests that Phi plays 
in handwriting, the fonnation of which becomes more automatic as one matures. 
However, many such speculative examinations of the occurrence of phi are derived 
from wishful thinking, visual "data mining", or even a judicious choice of where 
exactly to start measuring from. Claims about its use in structuring the Pyramids and 
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the Parthenon, for example, are not easily verifiable due to both ruin and erosion. The 
ancient Greeks were aware of Phi but did not write of it as pleasing or beautiful. The 
idea did exist by the Renaissance, but only took hold by the late 1800's. Moreover, 
erroneous occurrences of Phi can be observed when measuring and averaging values 
in inappropriate contexts (Fischler, 1981). Nevertheless, there are a number of artists 
who have used Phi explicitly. Phi based proportions have been implemented 
explicitly by artists and designers throughout the ages from Islamic art, Da Vinci's 
works, Mondrian's Rectangles, Picasso's Post through to the architect Le Corbusier. 
Occurrences of Phi intrigued Jacob Bernoulli to the extent that he had a golden spiral, 
a Phi based growth curve, etched on his gravestone and Isaac Newton had one etched 
on his bed headboard. The debate about the status of cj) in art is summarised in the 
entertaining and informative monograph of Livio (2002). 
The application of golden proportion has also extended into musical composition. Kay 
(1996) reports an analysis of Mozart's sonatas, finding that they are composed of two 
sections, divided exactly at the golden section in nearly every case (see Putz, 1995 for 
more information on Mozart and Phi). Whether or not this was a conscious choice or 
intuitive application is not known, but Mozart's fascination with mathematics has 
been well documented. Haylock (1978) states that the well known opening of 
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony appears at the beginning and end of the piece, and it 
also repeats exactly 0·618 (phi) of the way through the symphony and at the start of 
the recapitulation, 0·382 (= 0.6182 = 1-0.618) of the way through. 
Do artists use Phi proportions because they are in some sense innately "pleasing"? 
The aesthetic preferences literature has examined how pleasing respondents found 
differently proportioned shapes and sets of lines presented to them. 
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The pioneering psychologist Gustav Fechner (1876) conducted experiments that 
seemed to show that people had preferences for rectangles with sides approximately 
in the ratio 1 :11>. Criticisms have been made of his methodology, but Green (1995) 
argues that most of these are based on flawed translations from German. Benjafield 
(1976) and Piehl (1978) also draw supportive conclusions and McManus (1980) finds 
"moderately good evidence for the phenomenon which Fechner championed". 
Nevertheless the evidence is certainly not overwhelming or consistent. Davis (1933) 
asked respondents to draw "pleasing" rectangles, as opposed to selecting them from a 
set, but only 3% of the Davis (1933) subjects drew the golden rectangle. The idea 
was also strongly challenged by Godkewitsch (1974), who found that respondents 
preferred shapes proportioned by equality. Green (1995) critiques both the advocates 
and the critics, pointing out that results have regularly been followed by contradictory 
work that accounts for recent criticisms. In short, if it exists, any Phi effect is 
certainly fragile. 
Interestingly, there do appear to be patterns as to when suggestive evidence arises. 
Thompson (1946) concurred with Titchener (1899)'s belief that younger people prefer 
equality and preference for asymmetric shapes develops with age. However, 
Thompson was perplexed by the "nonverbal transmission" of the idea of the golden 
section since the majority of his subjects "had never even heard of the golden 
section." He assumed that they must have been following subconscious cultural 
norms, since nothing in the psychological literature suggested that shape preferences 
followed innate behaviour (Green, 1995). Berlyne (1970) did find a general cultural 
effect on aesthetic preferences of Japanese versus Canadian high-school girls. The 
Japanese children had a clear preference for squares or near square rectangles whereas 
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the Canadians preferred Phi shapes. Berlyne (1971) later noted that the golden 
section has historically been an element of the "Mediterranean civilizations and their 
offshoots." Although the point was not made in the context of culture, Piehl (1978) 
also notes that subjects more familiar with the golden rectangle came to prefer it. 
The idea of an aesthetic preference for equality is of direct interest to our work. As 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the practitioners' literature on technical analysis claims 
that turning points can occur at ratios such as 0.5, 0.618 or I times a preceding phase. 
Hamilton (1922), for example, asserts that 50% is the "typical amount", as if some 
kind of aesthetic balance has been reached. Whilst it is patently subjective to the 
point of being untestable (Mandelbrot, 1999), Fibonacci based Elliott Wave analysis 
is far from uncommon in industry. 
4.4. DATA AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The contribution to the literature by this Chapter is based on a judgemental 
forecasting survey of sixty MSc students matriculated on specialist finance 
postgraduate degrees at Cass Business School in the City of London. To identify the 
characteristics of our sample, the respondents were first asked to complete the form in 
Figure 4-2. This asked a number of questions including age, gender, pre-MSc country 
of study, a breakdown of experience in the finance industry and opinions about 
technical and fundamental analysis. As well as providing an understanding of our 
sample, this data allows us to compare the forecasts made by groups with shared 
different ages, cultural backgrounds and other characteristics. 
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Figure 4-2 - Respondents' Survey Form 
Please answer the following questions: 
1) Name: 
2) MSc: 
3) Age: 
4) Gender: Male II Female II 
5) Pre-MSc country of study: 
6) Have you ever worked in the finance industry? 
Yes! I No! I 
If yes, which markets? 
Equities Index Non-energy Energy Foreign Government Corporate 
Futures Commodity Futures Exchange Debt Debt 
Futures 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
How much did you know about technical analysis before this elective? 
Nothing at all Very little Some knowledge Expert 
[] [] [] [ ] 
Before starting this elective, what was your opinion about the usefulness of technical analysis? 
Completely Probably useless No opinion Sometimes useful Always useful 
useless 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Before starting this elective, what was your opinion about the usefulness of fundamental analysis? 
Completely Probably useless No opinion Sometimes useful Always useful 
useless 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 
Before starting this elective, how did you think practitioners mixed technical analysis 
with fundamental analysis? 
All fundamental Mostly No opinion Mostly technical All technical 
fundamental 
[] [] [] [] [] 
93 
Each respondent was gIven one of two survey packs and asked to make forty 
forecasts, a total of eighty unique forecasts across both groups. The time series for 
each forecast showed four turning points. Respondents were told to assume that the 
series would reverse at the final turning point and they should identify the next 
turning point in the data. 
Twenty unique random walks were used for the series in the survey - ten of these 
terminating at a peak and ten at a trough, generated with the same noise parameter for 
each trough/peak pair. An equal number of peaks and trough series were thus 
presented. 
There is clear evidence that different presentation formats can affect the accuracy of 
forecasts (Lawrence, 1983, Lawrence, Edmundson and O'Connor, 1985 and Harvey 
and Bolger, 1996). Moreover, aesthetic preferences would depend on graphical 
presentations of data rather than tabular data. We therefore present each series in four 
different forecast styles, giving the total of eighty forecasts. These include the series 
being plotted with: 
I) unscaled axes; 
2) scaled axes (daily frequency); 
3) scaled axes (daily frequency) with a table of the primary turning points; and 
4) only the table of turning points and no graphical presentation. 
Figure 4-3 shows the written instructions given to the respondents and examples of 
the building blocks of each forecast style. For the first three forecast types the 
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forecaster is asked to write a cross on the graph at the time and price of the next 
turning point. The final tabular forecast style requires a written date and price. 
The 80 ( = 20 series x 4 format style) charts were split across the two packs to ensure 
respondents made forecasts for each series in two different formats. Both packs had 
an equal number of each style of presentation. This caters for the guidelines of 
Harvey and Bolger (1996) with regards to balanced within-subject design, consistency 
in altering presentation and the use of a variety of series so as to not be hostage to 
idiosyncratic features of series. The structure and contents of the survey packs 
attempts to avoid a number of other potential biases. We avoided framing the forecast 
phase gradient by stating that a reversal is to occur at the end of the series. Care was 
also taken so that the axes did not frame responses within tight visual boundaries. It is 
unlikely that respondent recognition of the same series in the alternative fonnat would 
have affected the results. The half an hour given is unlikely to have allowed sufficient 
time for respondents to make the associations across forty forecasts. Many of these 
series will also have been redisplayed only in a tabular format, which provides further 
reassurance. 
Before filling in the survey, the students were read a verbal set of instructions a 
number of times (Figure 4-4). As in Lawrence & O'Connor (1992), they were told 
clearly that they were being presented with financial time-series and also that a prize 
of a bottle of champagne was to be awarded to the "winner". The intention was to 
motivate serious forecasting based on how the students believed financial time series 
behave. There could be no "correct" answers as the students were presented with 
random walks and so the winner was in fact selected randomly. 
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Figure 4-3 - Survey Instructions 
Forecasting Turning Points 
You will now be asked to make two types of forecasts of turning points for several 
price series: Graphical forecasts based on charts of cycles in security return , 
Numerical forecasts based on tables of cycles in security return . 
Turning points in security X's returns have been identified on each diagram! table. 
Assume that X's price reverses direction exactly at the final turning point. 
Instructions (Graphical Forecast) 
Mark a cross on the page at the date and price of where you believe the next turning 
point will be. 
DO NOT mark the chart in any other way i.e. do not draw any line etc. 
Example: 
Plate an X at tile next peak 
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Instructions (Numerical/Tabular ONLY Forecast) 
Write the date and price of where you believe the next turning point will be. 
Write the month ALPHABETICALLY e.g. 12th Septemb r 2002 (NOT 12/9/02) 
Example: 
Turning Points 
Date 
1-Jan-01 
1-May-01 
1-Mar-02 
1-Sep-02 
Price 
37 .00 
45 .00 
39.00 
62 .00 
Forecast the Next Peak 
Date Price 
I 01· S.,. OJ I !)~ 
Calendar Days $ Returns 
120 8 
304 -6 
184 23 
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Figure 4-4 - Verbal SlIn'ey Ins/me/ions 
We are asking you to take part in a study of intuitive forecasting of turning 
points in financial time series. This is not an assessment. But there will be a 
bottle of champagne for the most accurate forecaster. 
first, fill in the cover sheet with some personal details. 
You then have to make a series of forecasts. 
Some are graphical. You should mark an "X" where you think the next turning 
point will occur. 
Some are tabular. You fill in the date and level at which the next turning point 
will occur. You must write the month alphabetically e.g. Ith September 2002. 
NOT 12/9/02 or 9/12/02 
Do not spend too long on the forecast. You should aim spend less then 10 
seconds on average for each for forecast. 
There will be a bottle of champagne for the most accurate forecaster. 
This is not an assessment you are not marked for it. BUT putting your name 
you have a chance of winning a bottle of champagne. 
After the task was completed, the data from each respondent was transferred from 
paper to a relational database, to ensure data consistency and flexible data pooling and 
extraction. Structured query language (SOL) is the standard relational database query 
language and allows for flexible extraction from datasets. Our SOL code was called 
seamlessly from our database engine directly from our coded statistical environment. 
The calculation of phase ratios for both the graphical and tabular forecasts was 
perfonned in SOL. These ratios were then pooled differently for different analyses. 
Firstly, the eight individual phase ratios for each graphical forecast type were pooled. 
The three graphical forecast types and eight ratio types thus gave 24 datasets, each of 
which contained a specific ratio for a specific forecast fonnat pooled across all 
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respondents. Figure 4-5 document the eight different phase ratio . 
Figure 4-5 - Specific Pha e Ratio 
so 
30 
120 B 
70 
60 
Amplitude of the forecast phase I F-E I 
versus the amplitude of 
I) the entire series I B - C I 
2) the preceding phase I D - E I (the 
price retracement) 
3) the penultimate phase I D - I (the 
price projection) 
4) three phases previously I B - A I (an 
alternative price retracement) 
4.5. RESULTS 
F )(. 
Duration of the for ca t pha e I F-E I 
ver u the duration f 
5) the ntire erie I - A I 
6) the pr ceding pha e I E - D I the 
durati n retra ement) 
7) the p nultimate pha e I D - I (the 
duration pr ~e tion) 
) thre pha e pr iou Iy I B - A I an 
alternati e duration retr em nt) 
Table 4-1 details the profile of respondents fonn their ompletion of th backgr und 
survey preceding the forecast survey. 
It shows that around 40% of our sample were tuden pur uing the mor quantitati 
specialist Masters degree. Our ample recei ed their pre-M ducation in 17 
different countries. 53% of the re pondent tated that their pr -M education wa 
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British. The next largest groups were those educated in China (8%) or Greece (7%). 
78% of the students were under 30 years of age and 48% were under 25 old. 68% of 
the sample had work experience in the finance industry, with a strong focus on 
equities, government bonds and corporate bonds respectively. There was no 
experience in commodities or energy and only few with foreign exchange experience, 
the dominant domain of technical analysis (Allen and Taylor, 1992; Lui and Mole, 
(998). The perception was that practitioners do mix both technicals and 
fundamentals. Whilst nobody believed that technical or fundamental analyses were of 
no use, fundamentals were held in slightly higher regard, and more consistently so. 
Table 4-/ - Sample Profile 
Country of Pre-MSc Education Profile of Sample 
Pre-MSc _Country Percentage Count 
Britain 53% 32 
China 
Greece 
America 
India 
Canada 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Germany 
Italy 
Pakistan 
Russia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Venezuala 
8% 
7% 
5% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Degree Profile of Sample 
Degree 
MSc Investment Management 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
MSc Mathematical Trading and Finance 
MSc Financial Economics and Econometrics 
PhD in Finance 
MSc Financial Management 
MSc Banking and International Finance 
MSc Energy, Trade and Finance 
MSc Finance 
Experience Profile of Sample 
Percentage 
52% 
30% 
5% 
5% 
3% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
Age Profile of Sample 
Ages Frequency 
21-24 48% 
25-29 30% 
30-34 15% 
35-39 5% 
40-45 2% 
Count 
31 
18 
3 
3 
2 
Count 
29 
18 
9 
3 
Corporate 
Bonds 
13% 
Government Index 
Percentage 
Count 
Commodities 
0% 
o 
Opinion Profile of Sample 
Technical 
Analysis 
Knowledge 
Max 4.00 
Min 1.00 
Mean 2.22 
Median 2.00 
SDev 0.78 
8 
Opinion of 
Technical 
Analysis 
5.00 
2.00 
3.68 
4.00 
0.77 
Energy 
0% 
o 
Opinion 
Equities 
27% 
16 
Forex Bonds Futures 
7% 20% 2% 
4 12 1 
of Belief re: Industry 
Fundamental TA & Fundamental 
Analysis Mix 
5.00 4.00 
2.00 2.00 
4.27 2.67 
4.00 3.00 
0.69 0.73 
Technical Analysis Knowledge (scaled 1-4, 1 = no knowledge, 4 = expert) 
Opinion of Technical Analysis (scaled 1-5, 1 = low opinion, 5 = high opinion) 
Opinion of Fundamentals Analysis (scaled 1-5, 1 = low opinion,S = high opinion) 
Opinion of how Technical and Fundamental Analysis are mixed in practice (scaled 1-5, 1= All 
Fundamentals,5 = All TA) 
We were initially interested in whether or not the volatility of the series drove forecast 
amplitude or duration. It might be expected a priori, but the relationship did not 
appear to exist (Table 4-2). 
Table 4-2 - Series Volatility versus Forecast Phases' Amplitudes and Durations 
ForecastAmplitudef = a + PUF + f:f where f is the respondent forecast and F 
is the series corresponding to forecast f 
Coefficients: 
Estimate Std. Error 
(Intercept) -0.23 1.79 
SOevSeries 0.30 0.20 
Residual standard error: 25.49 
t value 
-0.13 
1.49 
Pr(>ltl) 
0.90 
0.14 
Multiple R-Squared: 0.00049, Adjusted R-squared: -0.00027 
F-statistic: 0.657 on I and 1320 OF, p-value: 0.422 
ForecastDurationr = a + PUF + f:f where f is the respondent forecast and F is 
the series corresponding to forecast f 
Coefficients: 
(Intercept) 
SOevSeries 
Estimate 
29.97 
0.0083 
Std. Error 
1.33 
0.15 
t value 
22.51 
0.056 
Signif. codes: 0 ' ••• ' 0.001 ''''*' 0.01 '.' 0.05 '.' 0.1 " I 
Residual standard error: 21.97 
Pr(>ltl) 
<2e-16··· 
0.96 
Multiple R-Squared: 5.797e-05, Adjusted R-squared: -0.0007 
F-statistic: 0.0765 on I and 1320 OF, p-value: 0.782 
Appendix 4-1 and Appendix 4-2 provide a summaries of ratios for each survey style 
and broken down further for each phase ratio per style. Nothing of note can be 
interpreted from these summaries of the distributions, yet the plot of ratio distributions 
in Figure 4-6 reveals the dominance of whole number ratios for each amplitude ratio 
across all forecast styles - with the ratio I strikingly consistent. There were only two 
most frequent ratios which were not 1. When comparing forecast phase amplitude 
versus the amplitude of the series, the 50% ratio is most frequent. 50% price 
tt6-
10 1 
retracements also stand out in frequency, consistent with technical analysis textbooks. 
These two occasion of 50% ratio dominance were closely followed by a ratio of I as 
the second most frequent ratio. Figure 4-7 illustrates duration ratios across all 
forecast styles. The same whole number pattern dominates, except for the ratio of the 
duration of the forecast phase versus the whole series. Both the distributions of 
amplitude and duration ratios strongly suggest that the ratio of 2 is of interest. 
The same occurs in Figure 4-8, but only the three chart-based styles follow this 
pattern, despite the tabular forecast ratios being closest to the chart-plus-table by KS 
p-value (see below). Table 4-3 shows the two ratios with the highest densities for 
each forecast style, but broken down by both style and phase. A similar whole 
number pattern emerges. Ratios of 1 and 2 clearly dominate the rankings of both 
most frequent and second most frequent ratios from the respondents' forecasts. 
Figure 4-6 - Amplitude Distributions (with reference to Figure 4-5 's phase lettering) 
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Figure 4-7 - Duration Ratio Distributions (with reference to Figure 4-5 's phase lettering) 
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Figure 4-8 - Ratios Distributions for Forecast Styles 
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Table 4-3 - Ratio with maximum densities per phase 
Unscaled Chart Amplitude/Price 
Anchoring 
Max 2ndMax 
Vs. Series 0.515 0.245 
Retracement 0.355 0.49 
Projection 0.995 0.665 
Altern. Retracement 0.595 0.99 
Unscaled Chart - Duration Anchoring 
Vs.Series 0.18 0.19 
Retracement 0.995 0.79 
Projection 0.995 1.985 
Altern. Retracement 0.995 0.705 
Scaled Chart Amplitude/Price 
Anchoring 
Max 2ndMax 
Vs. Series 0.115 0.49 
Retracement 0.195 0.555 
Projection 0.995 0.795 
Altern. Retracement 0.995 0.495 
Scaled Chart - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.085 0.21 
Retracement 0.995 0.37 
Projection 0.995 1.99 
Altern. Retracement 0.33 0.99 
Chart-plus-Table Amplitude/Price 
Anchoring 
Max 2ndMax 
Vs. Series 0.445 0.395 
Retracement 0.695 0.495 
Projection 0.995 0.665 
Altern. Retracement 0.995 1.99 
Chart-plus-Table - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.285 0.325 
Retracement 0.995 1.99 
Projection 0.995 1.99 
Altern. Retracement 0.995 1.43 
Tabular - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Vs. Series 
Retracement 
Projection 
Altern. Retracement 
Max 2ndMax 
1.158 0.432 
1.215 1.085 
1.29 1.11 
0.36 1.03 
Tabular - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.06 0.058 
Retracement 0.14 0.595 
Projection 0.92 0.29 
Altern. Retracement 1.205 1.505 
To test fonnally whether some ratios occur significantly more frequently than others we 
develop a novel test based on bootstrapping residuals from a kernel density estimator fitted to 
the empirical phase ratio distributions. 
Firstly, a kernel density estimator (KDE) was fitted to each of the eight phase ratio 
distributions for the three chart styles. There are a number approaches to smoothing an 
empirical distribution to estimate the distribution from which it is drawn. Simple approaches 
from moving averages, whether basic or exponential, though to polynomial smoothing may 
be used. KDEs provide a primary accepted means for estimating a population distribution 
(Parzen, 1962). The KDE algorithm disperses the mass of the empirical distribution function 
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over a regular grid and then uses a fast Fourier transform to convolve this approximation with 
a discretized version of the kernel. Linear approximation is then used to evaluate the density 
at the specified points. 
Secondly, the residuals of each KDE were then resampled with replacement 2000 times to 
provide us with a p-values for the the expected frequencies of each ratio. Based on these 
resampled distributions, we computed 95% confidence interval for the number of ratios found 
within bands of ± E around the hypothesised ratios of 0.382, 0.5, 0.618, 0.786, I, 1.382, 
1.618,2, and 2.618, where the band width is variously set at E = 0.005,0.01,0.025 and 0.05. 
This allows the examination of whether ratios cluster very tightly around 0.5, say in the range 
0.495 to 0.505, or whether they are scattered in the more diffuse range 0.445 to 0.555. 
This impact of whole numbers is corroborated by our KDE bootstrap test on the chart based 
forecasts. Table 4-4 shows those ratios which are significant at the 5% level when pooling 
together the ratios for each forecast style regardless of phase. The only two ratio densities 
greater than their 95% confidence levels are I and 2. This is consistent across all forecast 
styles. Table 4-5 shows the results of the KDE bootstrap when we also examine the ratios for 
each phase. From the most frequent anchoring ratios that we saw previously (Table 4-3), we 
see that ratios I and 2 again dominate the per phase KDE bootstrap results of Table 4-5. The 
ratio 0.5 is significant in only one case, for duration projections in full infonnation forecasts. 
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Table 4-4 - Ratios significant at 5% level (by Survey Style) 
Bare Chart 
Ratio Band KDE Bootstra~ Stat 
1 0 0.80** 
2 0 5.17** 
Scaled Chart 
Ratio Band KDE Bootstra~ Stat 
0 5.05** 
2 0 10.16** 
Full Info Chart 
Ratio Band KDE Bootstra~ Stat 
1 0 3.87** 
2 0 14.46*· 
KDE Bootstrap Statistic: 0 = Critical Value/or 95% Confidence Level 
There are a number of other interesting observations that can be made from the KDE 
bootstrap results in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. Firstly, when we pooled anchored ratios by 
style (Table 4-4) only a band of 0 led to statistical significance. Moreover, it is interesting 
that band values of 0 dominate significance of a breakdown of the individual ratios (Table 
4-5). This same phenomenon was found when determining the number of bins to plot the 
distributions on page 103 - 1 % bins were used as any less did not show the whole number 
ratio phenomenon which existed across all chart based forecasts. This means that 
respondents not only anchor their forecast phases on previous phases, but that they do so 
more precisely that might be expected. Secondly, there is support for our hypothesis of a 
general anchoring of phases separately and in addition to anchoring on support or resistance 
from previous extremes. This is important because frequent amplitude anchoring of a ratio 1 
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could often be dismissed as only support or resistance from previous extremes. Nevertheless, 
we can definitively dismiss the suggestion that we are only witnessing a support or resistance 
effect, due to the greater significance of the ratio 2 in the KDE bootstrap tests and because 
anchoring also occurs in the duration of phases. 
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Table 4-5 - Ratios sign~/icant at 5% lel'el (by SlIn'ey Style & Spec~fic Ratios) 
Unscaled Chart - Amplitude/Price Anchoring Scaled Chart - Amplitude/Price Anchoring Full Info Chart - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Ratio Band KDE Bootstrap Slat Phase Ratio Band KDE Bootstrap Stat Phase Ratio Band KDE Bootstrap Slat Phase 
1 0 1.29 Altern. Retracement 1 0 0.32 Projection 1 0 3.97 Altern. Retracement 
2 0 0.18 Vs. Series 1 0 2.62 Altern. Retracement 1.618 0 om Vs. Series 
2 0 0.29 Projection 2 0 0.25 Retracement 2 0 0.36 Retracement 
2 0 1.66 Altern. Retracement 2 0 0.38 Projection 2 0 1.27 Projection 
2 0 1.54 Altern. Retracement 2 0 3.32 Altern. Retracement 
Bare Chart - Duration Anchoring 2.618 0 0.26 Vs. Series 2.618 0 0.34 Vs. Series 
1 0 0.10 Vs. Series 2.618 0 0.44 Retracement 2.618 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 
0 1.37 Retracement 2.618 0.01 0.26 Vs. Series 2.618 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 
0 0.11 Projection 2.618 0.01 0.44 Retracement 2.618 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 
0 1.64 Altern. Retracement 2.618 0.025 0.25 Vs. Series 
2 0 0.34 Vs. Series 2.618 0.025 0.08 Retracement Full Info Chart - Duration Anchoring 
2 0 0.70 Retracement 2.618 0.05 0.25 Vs. Series 0.5 0 2.54 Projection 
2 0 1.70 Projection 0 0.20 Vs. Series 
2 0 0.80 Altern. Retracement Scaled Chart - Duration Anchoring 1 0 0.72 Retracement 
2.618 0 0.34 Vs. Series 1 0 0.18 Retracement 1 0 3.92 Projection 
2 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 1 0 3.19 Projection I 0 2.91 Altern. Retracement 
2.618 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 0 0.90 Altern. Retracement 1.618 0 0.21 Vs. Series 
2 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 1.618 0 0.22 Vs. Series 2 0 0.34 Vs. Series 
2.618 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0 1.56 Retracement 
2 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0 2.13 Retracement 2 0 5.06 Projection 
2.618 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0 4.02 Projection 2 0 2.94 Altern. Retracement 
2 0 1.57 Altern. Retracement 2.618 0 0.34 Vs. Series 
2.618 0 0.34 Vs. Series 1.618 0.01 0.21 Vs. Series 
1.618 0.01 0.22 Vs. Series 2 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 
2 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 2.618 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 
2.618 0.01 0.34 Vs. Series 1.618 0.025 0.21 Vs. Series 
2 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 
2.618 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 2.618 0.025 0.34 Vs. Series 
2 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 1.618 0.05 0.20 Vs. Series 
2.618 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 2 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 
2.618 0.05 0.34 Vs. Series 
KDE Bootstrap Statistic: 0 = Critical Value/or 95% Confulence Level 
Where different phase:forecast style combinations have the same empirical densities and the KDE density is zero the test of significance has the same value 
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An examination of the histograms in Figure 4-8 suggests a number of further 
phenomena. The ratios of respondents' phases in the tabular forecasts appear to be 
distributed less "smoothly" than the other three. This might be suggestive of an 
aesthetic effect when using graphical forecasts - what might "look right" on a graph 
might not be chosen with only a table. 
We can also assess the effect of forecast format on the distribution of ratios more 
formally. We pool the ratios by all modes of presentation, regardless of phase, giving 
four datasets. The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test then allows us to 
test if two distributions are significantly different. If we tum to Table 4-6 we can see 
the KS p-values between survey styles. We can see that presenting respondents with 
more data does have a clear effect - the KS p-values of the graphical styles versus the 
unsealed chart style show a decrease as the respondents are provided with more 
information - from an unscaled chart, through providing a scale, to also providing a 
table of turning phases. It appears that tabular information also has an effect as per 
the literature. The ratio distribution from scaled charts was 12%, similar to those of 
the bare charts, whilst there was a 0% chance that chart-plus-table ratios came from 
the same distribution as the unscaled chart or scaled chart ratios. The distribution of 
ratios closest to chart-plus-table forecast ratios were the tabular, as opposed to any of 
the graphical. 
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Table 4-6 - Effect of across Survey Styles: KS P-Values 
Unsealed Chart 
Scaled Chart 
Chart-plus-Table 
Tabular 
Unsealed Chart 
] 
0.13 
0.000001 
0.51 
Scaled 
Chart 
0.13 
I 
0.0000005 
0.55 
Chart-plus-Table 
0.00000] 
0.0000005 
I 
0.09 
Tabular 
0.51 
0.55 
0.09 
I 
KS-Pvalue J = J 00% chance that phase ratios for the paired forecast styles were 
drawn from the same distribution 
KS-Pvalue 0 = No chance that phase ratios for the paired forecast styles were drawn 
from the same distribution 
Table 4-7 - Effect of Controlling for Respondent Characteristics: KS P-Values 
Respondent 
Characteristic 
Culture 
Age 
Industry 
Experience 
Gender 
T A Knowledge 
TA O~inion 
Fundamentals 
Ooinion 
Control Variable 1 Control Variable 2 KS P-Value 
Chinese Respondents Greek Respondents 0.00000000000002 
Respondents aged Respondents aged 0.000001 
<25 years >24 years 
Respondents with Respondents with 0.05 
any experience no experience 
Males Female 0.30 
Less «50% of More (>=50% of 0.0000005 
survey scale) survey scale) 
Less «50% of More (>=50% of 0.01 
survey scale) survey scale) 
Less «50% of More (>=50% of 0.01 
survey scale) survey scale) 
KS-Pvalue J = Respondent characteristic does not affect the phase ratios of forecasts 
(100% chance that phase ratios for the two control samples were drawn from the 
same distribution) 
KS-Pvalue 0 = Respondent characteristic does affect the phase ratios of forecasts 
(0% chance that phase ratios for the two control samples were drawn from the same 
distribution) 
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Finally, we examined the effect of our respondents' profiles on the distribution of 
ratios. For each of the seven respondent characteristics we pooled the ratios into two 
control samples, regardless of modes of presentation or phase. We were then able to 
assess the effect of each characteristic by comparing each characteristic's control 
samples using the KS test. Significantly similar control samples would suggest that a 
characteristic does not influence how respondents anchor forecast phases. China and 
Greece were chosen to control for culture because they were the second and third 
most frequent countries respectively and were of a similar number. This comparison 
is somewhat analogous to Berlyne (1970),s examination of Japanese and Canadian 
respondents. The ratios were also split between those aged under 25 and those over 
24 years old to control for age. Industry experience was tested by comparing those 
with any experience versus those with none. T A Knowledge, T A Opinion and 
Fundamentals Opinion were tested by splitting the ratios between those respondents 
who gave higher values (>50%) versus those who gave lower values «=50%). 
Gender was tested by splitting ratios between male and female respondents. 
When we control for respondents' characteristics we see that all characteristics except 
gender had some influence on how respondents anchored phases (Table 4-7). This 
might be thought to support Berlyne (1970) and Thompson (1946)'s finding on 
culture and age respectively, but there was only weak evidence that Chinese 
respondents and younger respondents were anchoring more on whole numbers than 
Greek and older respondents. Our sample was restricted to postgraduate fmance 
students, an appropriate sample, and this does limit the age range that we can 
consider. 
What can we reasonably conclude from these survey results? The aim of our exercise 
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has been to detennine whether individuals have an in-built aesthetic sense of what 
chart retracement looks right. Had we surveyed experienced technical analysts our 
results would have been biased by their discipline. The fact that our sample of 
respondents, although not innocent of financial markets, did not consider themselves 
knowledgeable about technical analysts avoids this problem. Conditional on the 
validity of our sample, we have found some significant results, in the fonn of ratios 
that occur more frequently than might be expected to occur at random given the shape 
of the distribution of ratios thrown up by our survey. However, the ratios are very 
simple - I or 2. A ratio of I suggests a belief that prices will reverse at their most 
recent turning point, a standard way of calculating support or resistance levels. A ratio 
of 2 suggests a very simple extrapolation (doubling) of the most recent trend. None of 
our findings support the idea of a more complicated aesthetic involving fractional 
ratios like Y2 or 1/8, far less Fibonacci ratios like 0.618 or 1.618. We conclude that, at 
least in this sample of lay individuals, there is no evidence that forecasts are anchored 
on Fibonacci ratios, and hence find no support for the assertion made by some 
technical analysts that Fibonacci retracements can represent some natural or intuitive 
law in financial forecasting. 
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4.6. APPENDICES 
Appendix 4-J - Survey Style Ratios Summaries 
Min 1st Qu. Med Mean 3rd Qu. Max SDev Skew Kurt 
Unsealed Chart 0 0.42 0.8 1.2 1.41 39 1.69 8.31 117.51 
Scaled Chart 0 0.4 0.79 1.18 1.41 19.5 1.43 4.16 26.46 
Chart-plus-Table 0 0.44 0.88 1.36 1.58 29 1.87 5.68 49.25 
Tabular 0.024 0.41 0.82 1.24 1.38 21.18 1.62 6.35 67.00 
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Appendix 4-2 - Survey Style & Specific Ratios Summaries 
Min 1st Qu. Med Mean 3rd Qu. Max SDev Skew Kurt 
Unsealed Chart - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0 0.31 0.55 0.60 0.83 2.68 0.38 1.32 3.54 
Retracement 0 0.40 0.70 0.97 1.16 6.80 0.91 2.28 6.86 
Projection 0 0.55 0.93 1.38 1.71 8.33 1.32 2.07 4.84 
Altern. Retracement 0 0.55 0.93 1.78 1.50 39.00 3.68 5.50 35.74 
Unsealed Chart - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.44 1.63 0.21 1.57 3.91 
Retracement 0.04 0.61 1.00 1.37 1.78 11.60 1.14 2.66 13.44 
Projection 0.08 0.83 1.33 1.72 2.18 9.25 1.39 2.11 6.04 
Altern. Retracement 0.07 0.71 1.10 1.45 1.72 8.22 1.22 2.42 7.57 
Scaled Chart - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0 0.29 0.50 0.58 0.80 2.55 0.39 1.30 2.93 
Retracement 0 0.39 0.69 0.98 1.20 4.84 0.91 1.96 4.09 
Projection 0 0.53 0.92 1.40 1.67 10.43 1.44 2.51 8.22 
Altern. Retracement 0 0.52 0.96 1.27 1.42 19.50 1.66 6.03 48.17 
Scaled Chart - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.02 0.18 0.29 0.33 0.41 3.14 0.25 3.72 29.93 
Retracement 0.04 0.64 1.11 1.37 1.68 12.41 1.22 3.63 22.36 
Projection 0.08 0.76 1.25 1.71 2.00 10.86 1.61 2.73 9.12 
Altern. Retracement 0.06 0.61 1.13 1.81 2.07 16.06 2.14 2.92 10.24 
Chart-plus-Table - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0 0.29 0.55 0.62 0.89 2.73 0.40 1.04 1.77 
Retracement 0 0.42 0.74 1.02 1.30 9.38 0.95 2.66 12.62 
Projection 0 0.60 1.00 1.43 1.75 16.67 1.46 3.46 22.60 
Altern. Retracement 0 0.53 1.00 1.57 1.61 29.00 2.66 6.03 44.24 
Chart-plus-Table - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.01 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.46 3.73 0.27 4.11 39.68 
Retracement 0.04 0.74 1.15 1.56 1.99 22.00 1.49 5.47 60.64 
Projection 0.06 1.00 1.55 2.39 2.50 23.00 2.84 3.43 14.50 
Altern. Retracement 0.07 0.82 1.35 1.89 2.08 23.75 2.04 4.08 27.62 
Tabular - Amplitude/Price Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.05 0.34 0.57 0.61 0.84 1.30 0.36 0.31 -0.98 
Retracement 0.05 0.39 0.76 1.17 1.74 4.47 1.04 1.16 0.74 
Projection 0.05 0.54 1.13 1.61 1.81 6.39 1.56 1.44 1.09 
Altern. Retracement 0.05 0.60 0.92 1.70 1.32 21.18 3.34 4.82 24.38 
Tabular - Duration Anchoring 
Vs. Series 0.02 0.18 0.25 0.33 0.41 1.35 0.25 1.83 4.46 
Retracement 0.08 0.55 1.072 1.47 2.12 5.95 1.27 1.31 1.74 
Projection 0.07 0.81 1.327 1.75 2.496 5.68 1.33 1.00 0.45 
Altern. Retracement 0.24 0.66 0.99 1.27 1.42 6.60 1.10 2.84 10.22 
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S. FUNDAMENTALS, BEHAVIOUR AND TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
WITH STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY IN EQUITIES 
S.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter examines a number of active market-timing strategies that simulate 
investors' "real-time" trading decisions, through recursive forecasting of excess 
returns from the Standard and Poors 500 stock index. The strategies involve both 
technical and fundamental indicators, and our aim is to detennine whether technical 
indicators really do add value to more conventional forecasting and trading methods. 
A number of regression-based approaches to forecasting the stock market have been 
developed in the academic literature. Some of these use corporate sector 
fundamentals such as aggregate price: earnings ratios, book: market value ratios, and 
the spread between corporate and treasury debt yields as predictors of returns. Some 
models use macroeconomic indicators such as the lagged inflation rate, growth in 
industrial production as regressors. More recently, the behavioural finance paradigm 
has extended the boundaries of fmancial theory beyond fundamental considerations of 
value. This new thinking has led to trading approaches that are driven by the 
behavioural weaknesses of the market, and rationalises the use of price patterns such 
as momentum and mean reversion as possible predictors of the stock market. Finally, 
in parallel with these studies, technical indicators of various kinds - principally 
moving averages and filter rules - have been used to try to find profitable trading 
rules from predictions of the direction of change of the stock market. 
It appears that the literature has not integrated behavioural or technical indicators into 
a linear regression framework. In this Chapter we therefore extend the literature by 
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evaluating five predictor sets, comprising I) equity fundamentals; 2) macroeconomic 
fundamentals; 3) behavioural variables; 4) mainstream quantative technical analysis 
indicators and 5) combinations of all the preceding predictors. 
Most of the predictability literature implicitly assumes time-invariance in model 
coefficients or uses unconditional time-invariant estimation window sizes. Our 
models are recursively re-estimated to make "real-time" forecasts that a forecaster 
could have made at each point in time. We follow the methodology of the recent 
influential and persuasive study of stability in fundamentals-based regression models 
by Pesaran and Timmermann (2002). They argue that predictability is significantly 
improved if regression models are continuously tested for the presence of structural 
breaks, and that only data points in a window following the most recent structural 
break can be used to improve performance. Their results favoured the conditional 
reverse ordered cusum method (ROC) of testing for structural breaks, an adaptation of 
Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) 's structural stability test. 
We examine several alternative estimation window sizing approaches. We look at 
expanding estimation windows, which include all historical data, we look at rolling 
data windows of various fixed sizes, and we compare these with the Pesaran-
Timmerman procedure of using data only after the most recent confirmed structural 
break. To extend the ROC analysis further, different structural break sensitivities and 
initial estimation windows are used. We also extend their analysis by accounting for 
transactions costs, assuming three different commission-slippage scenarios. This 
results in a comparison of 120 real-time recursive models with returns conditioned on 
the different sets of regressors, the window sizing methodlparameterisation and the 
different transaction cost levels. 
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The Chapter falls into four sections. Sections 5.2 to 5.4 reVIew stock market 
predictability with the fundamental based, behavioural and technical inputs. Section 
5.5 introduces our data and develops a forecasting method for our recursive models. 
Section 5.6 discusses using the ROC approach to account for structural breaks whilst 
recursive forecasting. Section 5.7 reports our findings and examines some of the 
determinants of the different performances of the recursive models by examining 
predictive performance, model fit, risk-adjusted returns and returns. 
S.2. FUNDAMENTALS AND PREDICTABILITY 
Various fundamentals have been proposed as means to identifying profitable 
opportunities, with much of the predictability of stock returns coming from valuation 
ratios and interest rates. Vuolteenaho (2002) and Cohen et al (2002) show the role of 
book-to-market values in explaining future earnings and profits, a phenomenon that 
feeds into equity returns. Campbell & Shiller (1987) show that firm PE ratios predict 
subsequent returns over the following ten year period. Other studies that support this 
idea include Fama and French (1992), Fuller et al (1993), Jaffe et al (1989) and Roll 
(1994). The Fama and French (1992) three factor model itself makes use of the book-
to-market value, one of three primary value measures alongside PE ratios and 
dividend yields. These predictors have also been used to forecast the aggregate stock 
market, the subject of our study. Lander et al (1997) use PE and bond yields 
regressions to forecast the Standard and Poors 500. Pesaran and Timmerman (2002) 
model equities in a recursive framework using the dividend yield, T -bill rates and the 
default premium on corporate bonds. 
Macroeconomic variables that exhibit clear business cycle variations, such as 
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inflation, industrial production, money supply and oil prices have also been used to 
predict the stock market (Pesaran and Timmerman, 1995 and Pesaran and 
Timmerman, 2000). These variables represent undiversifiable risk factors that effect 
economic agents both directly and via interest rates. Inflation and money supply 
growth negatively affect the level of returns (Bodie, 1976, Fama, 1981, Geske and 
Roll, 1983, and Pearce and Roley, 1983 and 1985). However, the relationship of 
returns with real sector economic measures has been notoriously difficult to establish 
(Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986), though there is evidence that measures such as GOP, 
industrial production or employment do influence the volatility of returns (Flannery 
and Protopapadakis, 2002). 
5.3. BEHAVIOURIAL PHENOMONA AND PREDICTABILITY 
We could VIew this fundamentals-based predictability as reflecting a set of 
systematically varying rational risk-premia (see Fama and French, 1992). We could 
alternatively see this as a behavioural phenomenon driven by over (under) reactions to 
information. Shiller (2002) highlights the excess volatility of real stock prices relative 
to its discounted present value, and the influence of mass psychology around efficient 
pricing of equities. Daniel et al (1998) explain this in terms of investor 
overconfidence whilst Hong and Stein (1999) suggest investors add volatility by 
initially under-reacting, and follow this with later overreaction. 
Correlations in returns over the intennediate and long tenn have been found that are 
not explained by fundamental factors. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) found that returns 
over three to five year periods are negatively correlated, creating long tenn reversals 
in prices. They also found positive correlation in the returns of one year winners, 
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which outperfonned one year losers (see also Barberis and Thaler, 2002). This 
momentum phenomenon was first tested extensively by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
showing that stocks that perfonned exceptionally well beat the losers over the 
following year. 
The long tenn reversal phenomenon can be partially explained by the three factor 
model (Fama and French, 1996), but momentum in 3 to 12 month returns cannot, and 
therefore remains outside a risk-premia framework, arguably due to limits on 
arbitrage (Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004). When controlling for macroeconomic factors 
both momentum and long tenn reversals are robust (Cooper et aI, 2004). Grundy and 
Martin (200 I) further find that whilst factor models can explain much of the 
variability of momentum returns, they do not explain their mean returns (see also 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 200 I). 
S.4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND PREDICTABILITY 
The remaining branches of the predictability literature tend to be grouped under the 
title of "trading rules", encompassing a range of mechanical price driven techniques 
from elements of textbook technical analysis through to more general machine 
learning approaches. Park and Irwin (2004) provide a comprehensive review of these 
studies. Of 92 studies published in the period 1988-2004, 58 reported positive excess 
profits from a technical rule, 10 yielded mixed results, and 24 reported losses. Even 
allowing for a bias towards publishing positive results, and the possibility that not all 
studies properly accounted for transactions costs and risk, this does suggest that not 
all of technical analysis can be dismissed prima facie. 
Early studies examined "filter rules", which trigger trades when prices rise or fall in 
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excess of a defined percentage. Whilst Alexander (1961), Fama and Blume (1966) 
and Sweeney (1988) found no value in such rules in the equity markets, Sweeney 
(1986) and Levich and Thomas (1993) successfully implemented a number of 
different sized filters on daily closing prices of major currencies. Using a bootstrap 
approach, Brock et aJ (1992) found statistically significant forecasting ability in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average using a channel-breakout system, generating trades on 
breaks of resistance or support, and using moving averages. Their level breakout 
results potentially stem from the order-flow price cascade thesis of Osler (2001 and 
2002), but methodological weaknesses do exist in their study. Transaction costs are 
not accounted for. Data-snooping problems were revealed by Sullivan et aJ (1999). 
Their re-examination of Brock et aJ (1992) used a bootstrap methodology to correct 
for the effects of data-snooping in a way that was not previously possible. A universe 
of approximately eight thousand parameterisations of trading rules gave similar 
results to Brock et aJ (1992), but failed a ten year out-of-sample test. Nevertheless, a 
key point of Brock et aJ (1992) still stands. The returns resulting from its strategies 
were not consistent with either a random walk in the stock index, an AR( I) process, or 
processes overlaid with GARCH-M or Exponential GARCH models for residual 
volatility. 
Neural network systems driven by moving averages have also generated profits in 
some stock market applications (Gencay 1996 and 1998), yet the moving average 
application in the forex markets have not found profitability (Lee and Mathur, 1994, 
Lee, Gleason and Mathur, 2001, Lee, Pau and Liu, 2001 and Olson, 2003). Allen and 
Karjalainen (1998) used genetic algorithms to generate a trading system that switched 
between stocks and T -bills between 1928 and 1995. Consistent excess out of sample 
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returns were not achieved, with Neely et a1. (1997) reaching a similar conclusion. 
Neely et al (1997) also used a genetic programming approach to identify trading rules 
across a variety of currencies in the period between 1975 and 1980 and then 
scrutinized their out of sample performance between 1981 and 1995. Neely and 
Weller (1999) found that the profitability of single trading rules are consistently lower 
than the profits from the more complex genetic combination of a number of 
indicators. 
5.5. DATA AND EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The basis of our method is an active market-timing strategy that simulates investors' 
"real-time" forecasts as trading decisions through recursive forecasting of the US 
stock market. The fundamental data, technical indicators and statistical techniques 
were all available during the sample period. Treasury Bill rates, industrial output, MO 
money supply and Moody's Aaa and Baa cOIporate bond yield indices are sourced 
from Datastream. The remaining fundamental data is from the Shiller (2001) dataset 
kindly made available on Shiller's website. The dataset run from February 1971 until 
September 2003. Fundamental variables and macro-economic variables are lagged 
one and two periods respectively. 
The recursively estimated models forecast out-of-sample excess returns at t+ I, only 
using data available at t. Excess returns are defined as monthly total returns from 
holding the Standard and Poors 500 index minus monthly T -bill returns. Where 
excess returns are forecast as positive, the S&P500 is held for capital gain and 
dividend income. Where negative excess returns are forecasted, T-bills are held. We 
estimate returns based on real-time forecasts from recursive models conditioned on a 
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number of factors that we test for sensitivity: different sets of regressors, the real time 
window sizing method, the initial window size and different commissions levels. 
This results in 120 real-time recursive models. 
Five different sets of regressors are employed in the least squares regressions. A base 
set, three sets of regressors consisting of this base set plus additional variables, and a 
set containing all nonduplicated variables from all sets: 
J) Base regressors 
Constant, Dividend Yield(t-l), the one month deannualised Thill rate(t-l), the 
Default Premium(t-l), defined as the yield spread of Moody Baa rated bonds 
over Aaa rated bonds, and CPI(t-2) 
2) Base plus fundamentals 
Dividends(t-l), eamings(t-l), PE Ratio(t-l), 10 year average PE Ratio(t-I) (as 
per Shiller, 2001), log change in industrial production(t-2), log change in MO 
money supply(t-2) 
3) Base plus behaviourals 
3 month, 12 month and 36 month log-returns to capture momentum and long 
run reversals 
4) Base plus technicals 
A representative selection of nonlinear technical indicators detailed below (12 
month highs and lows, moving averages versus price, moving averages versus 
other moving averages, DI, ADX and RSI) 
5) Base plus all variables 
The fifth set of regressors uses all unique variables from the initial four sets 
The technical indicators used were selected because of their mainstream usage 
amongst practitioners (Murphy, 2000). The 'base plus technicals' inputs contain: 
a) the support & resistance levels from the 12 month highs and lows in the 
index, 
b) the ratios of the index to its 6, 12 and 36 month moving averages, 
c) the ratios of 6, 12 and 36 month moving averages to moving averages with 
twice the sample size, 
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d) the 6, 12 and 36 month Directional Index (DI), 
e) the 6, 12 and 36 month Average Directional Index (ADX) and 
f) the 6, 12 and 36 month Relative Strength Index (RSI). 
The calculation the support and resistance levels and the moving averages indicators 
are self-explanatory. The DI, ADX, and RSI indicators are calculated as follows. The 
DI (Wilder, 1978) is a momentum indicator that quantifies directional behaviour of a 
market, attempting to identify stronger trends in that the hope that they persist. It is 
based on the largest part of the current period's price range that is outside the previous 
period's price range. Where the greater excess is above (below) the previous period's 
high (low), this is regarded as positive (negative) Directional Movement, +DM 
(-DM) - a day is either allocated a +DM or a -DM value. Where there are inside or 
outside bars (bars that are enveloped by or envelope the previous bar) an inside day's 
+DM and -DM will always equal zero and where there are outside days the larger of 
the positive +DM and -DM is used. The positive (negative) Directional Indicator, 
+DI (-DI), is the exponential moving average (EMA) of the +DM (-DM) divided by 
the Average True Range (ATR), a measure of volatility defmed by Wilder (1978). 
This can be formally expressed as: 
+DM, =H, -H, 
o 0 -I 
EMA,"(+DM) 
+ DI = _---'0=---__ 
'. ATR" 
'. 
-DM, =L, -L, 
o -I 0 
_ DJ = _E_MA--:;.':_( -_D_M_) 
'0 ATR" 
'0 
The A TR is the EMA of True Range (TR). True Range is defined by Wilder as the 
largest of the following: the difference between H,o and L,o (the high and low of the 
current period respectively), the difference between C,-J and HtO or the difference 
between C,_} and L,o. This multifaceted defmition of volatility stems from Wilder's 
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attempt to account for gaps (prices at which no trading took place) between periods 
when calculating range: 
1 
abs(H, - L, ) 
o 0 
TR,o = max abs( H,o - C,_) ATR,: = EMA,: (TR) 
abs(C, - L, ) 
-I 0 
Wilder (1978) developed the ADX from the +/-DI to quantify the extent to which a 
security is trending. ADX is calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference 
between +DI'on and -DI/on and dividing this by the sum of +DI/on and -DI,on to obtain 
the Directional Index (DX). ADX is then obtained by calculating the EMA of DX for 
n periods: 
abs«+Dr) - (-Dr)) DX = 10 '0 
'0 (+Dr)+ (-Dr) 
,0 10 
ADX,: = EMA,:(DX) 
Wilder (1978)'s RSI is an extremely popular momentum oscillator amongst 
practitioners. RSI compares the scale of a security's recent gains to the scale of a 
security's recent losses and standardises that information between 0 and 100. 
Although the term "relative strength" is used, it has no relation to intermarket analysis 
of the ratio between a two securities or indices. RSI calculation is performed in 
several stages: the differences between the closing prices are averaged separately for 
where changes are positive or negative for n periods. This results in an average 
upward and downward price changes within the specified sample. 
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{
(CI - C, ) if (C, - c, ) > I 
Upchange = "-. "-. 
I, else 0 
Average Up Change;. = EMA,: (Upchange
" 
) 
Average Down Change; = EMA; (Downchange , ) 
.. , 
{
(CI -C, )if(C, -C, )<1 
Downchange = "-. " • 
I, else 0 
The "relative strength" (RS), in terms of RSI, is computed by dividing the average 
upward change by the average downward change and standardised between 0 and 
100: 
RS n = Average Up Change~ 
10 Average Down Change~ 
RSr = 100 _ 100 
10 I+Rsn 
10 
Three transaction cost scenarios are used. These are based on commission and 
slippage assumptions from Pesaran and Timmennan (1995): a no commission 
scenario, a low commission scenario (0.5% equities, 0.1 % Tbills) and a high 
commission scenario (1 % equities, 0.1 % Tbills). 
S.6. STRUCTURAL STABILITY AND THE REVERSE ORDERED CUSUM 
The size of the real-time estimation window is determined in three different ways: a 
window starting after the most recent structural break, a rolling window and an 
expanding window comprising of all data from the start of the series. We can 
therefore compare a window size conditioned on the last break to using both a fixed 
window size and a window that includes all data prior to the forecast point. 
To test for the most recent structural break we implement a reverse ordered cusum 
squared (ROC) break dating technique as a recursive structural stability test. This is 
an implementation of Brown et al (1975)'s test by Pesaran and Timmennann (2002). 
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The ROC approach applies Brown et al (1975),s cusum squared tests to observations 
reversed in time to identify the most recent break. Pesaran and Timmermann 
compared a number of approaches to dealing with structural instability when 
estimating their recursively estimated trading system. They found that the ROC 
approach best increased predictive performance versus the other unconditional and 
conditional methods. As we shall see, predictive performance is central to the needs 
of a trading system and is more important to profitability than model fit. 
Dating of the most recent ROC break point is estimated as follows. Prior to the trade-
decision forecast of tn+ J at tn the recursive residuals are calculated and reverse 
ordered. This is a separate recursive process from the recursive trading decision 
forecasting. The reversed recursive residuals are the residuals of forecasts of tn. tn-I. 
t n-2 ••• t 0+ X where X is the initial estimation window length. X = 120 months is tested in 
addition to X = 60 months, which Pesaran and Timmerman used. These forecasts are 
made using only data in-sample to that estimation, starting at to and at ending at tn-I. tn-
]. tn-3 ... tO+X-J. The reversed recursive residuals are then squared and cumulated to give 
the cumulative sum of recursive residuals - hence reverse ordered cusum squared. 
Pesaran and Timmerman reconfirmed prior findings that the CUSUM squared method 
detects breaks better than the standard (unsquared) cusum. The squared recursive 
residuals are reversed prior to being cumulatively summed because cusum methods 
identify the first break point in a series from to. We require the most recent break in 
the series, and our post-break estimation window must run until the most recent data 
point at tn. The cusum squared series is then standardised and critical values are taken 
from Brown et al (1975) to determine the break point. 
Forecasting whilst accounting for structural breaks is a two stage process. Firstly, 
128 
investors must monitor and test for breaks in 'real-time' - before every the forecast 
the ROC test must estimate the most recent break. Secondly, they must use an 
estimation window based on the post-break data to generate the forecast. This two 
stage process must of course be executed for each recursive forecast to replicate real-
time break monitoring and forecasting. For every forecast ROC identifies the date of 
the most recent break and thus the sequence of post-break estimation windows that an 
investor could identify in real-time. As per the suggestion in Pesaran and 
Timmermann (2002), we assume a minimum break window of twice the number of 
regressors. Whilst Pesaran and Timmermann made use of only one ROC p-value not 
documented in their paper, we test our models using ROC p-values of both 2.5% and 
10% that a break has occurred. This allowed us to estimate recursive models with 
lesser and greater sensitivity to breaks respectively. 
It is useful to understand how the reversed CUSUM squared line evolves graphically. 
Figure 5-1 plots the reversed CUSUM squared from an example model at four points 
in time. The data points on the left are from the most recent recursive residuals, as the 
reversing means that new recursive residuals are "introduced" at the start of series. 
The data points on the right are from the earlier recursive residuals. In graphic A the 
line is entirely contained by the confidence intervals and thus no breaks are detected. 
The entire dataset would then be used to estimate the model. As time moves on our 
forecaster has roughly double the amount of historical data available (graphic 8). A 
break would be detected "early" in the series, at the point where the CUSUM squared 
line moves below the critical band. Note that because the recursive residuals were 
first reversed this is a relatively recent break. Our estimation window size is therefore 
the number of data points from the start of the series until the first break of the 
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confidence intervals. By graphic we can ee that the arne break point ha moved 
along the seri es and is still being detected. That br ak point i of cour e now older 
than before and thu the window ize i larg r. Once the fo reca ter ha all the data in 
graphic 0 , no breaks are detec ted. The average recur i e r idual that tran pir d 
since C were sufficiently small to reduce the olatili ty of th rever e USUM quared 
line versus its mean. The entire data et i then u ed aga in for model timati n. 
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F or each regressor set and model, the initial window size X for estimating the first 
break is tested with values of both 60 and 120 months. The initial window size for 
break detection also determines the tested rolling window sizes and initial expanding 
window sizes. Pesaran and Timmermann (2002) considered only one rolling window 
period of 60 months. These different window sizing methods and parameterisations 
provide context for our examination of the ROC approach. 
5.7. OUT OF SAMPLE RESULTS 
Figure 5-2 gives a three page example of the output from one of the 120 estimated 
recursive models. This model set uses all predictor variables, is less sensitive to 
breaks, and the window required for the initial break estimation is 60 months. 
In graph A we can see what would have been the most recent ROC break date at every 
data point, excluding the initial window. In this example we can see that the break 
date tends to move with time for most of the SPSOO history. 
This break date can then be used to calculate the number of data points to be used at 
each point in time, shown in the graphic B. We can see that because the break date 
tends to move with time in graphic A, the window size in graphic B is generally 
constant, almost like a rolling window. Yet there are occasional and substantial 
spikes in the window size. From this we can see that the model sometimes decided to 
rely on and "remember" more of the past. This occurred at some critical junctures in 
this example: during a short period in 1982, the mid-l 980s around the 1987 crash, the 
1992 recession and the bursting of the 1990s equity bubble. 
Graphic C in Figure 5-2 shows the forecasts of excess returns under the three window 
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sizing methods: the rolling window size, initial expanding window size and size of the 
initial window for estimating the most recent break are all 60 months. The forecasts 
therefore all commence at the same point in time. Allowing the model to use all pre-
forecast data means that, for better or for worse, the expanding window forecasts are 
not hostage to any idiosyncratic characteristics of a smaller sample. As we would 
expect, expanding window forecasts are therefore relatively stable. 
The cumulative returns are in graphic D. Positive forecast excess returns mean that 
equities are held for total return and negative forecasts dictate that T -bills are held. 
We can see that the expanding window is more correlated to the index because of its 
use of all available data. The rolling and ROC (marked CusumSQ) window methods 
generated T -bill returns with more risk and are also closely correlated in this specific 
example. This is because of the 31 regressors in the "Base plus All" regressor set. 
The minimum window size of double the number of regressors therefore excludes the 
possibility of window sizes of less then 62 data points - and the rolling window size is 
60. 
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In graphic E we can see the evolution of model fit for three methods. As we would 
again expect, the expanding window fit is more stable than allowing the model to 
exclude data. The model fit of the rolling and ROC windows are however 
consistently and substantially higher. Model fit is therefore not of clear value when 
seeking to understand the relative over performance of the expanding window. It is 
by other measures that the expanding window's merit in this example can be seen. 
The risk adjusted returns in graphic F and predictive performance of graphic G show 
the superior performance of the expanding window, despite the lower average 
adjusted R2 shown by graphic E. 
Each of the 120 recursive models generates series that record monthly model 
performance exactly as would be calculated in real-time by an investor trading on the 
model. This allows us to evaluate the evolution of performance over time. From 
these histories of model performance we can calculate average historic performance 
of a model and see how stably the different performance measures evolved over the 
sample. Such metrics are of importance. Take the Sharpe ratio for example, the ratio 
between return and its standard deviation and our measure of risk adjusted return. An 
investor may change his mind about trading a model with a Sharpe ratio of 2 if the 
ratio has a month-to-month volatility of 1 and instead opt for a model with a more 
stable Sharpe ratio. 
Appendix 5-1 and Appendix 5-2 list the results of aU 120 recursive models. They are 
split by initial/rolling window size because the tradable period differs. Whilst the 
same length of dataset is used by all parameterisations of the models, the use of a 
larger initial/rolling window does reduce the tradable period. By using more of the 
initial data for model estimation and hence being able to enter any positions later, 
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benchmark returns and cumulative returns are lower. 
The following performance statistics are given for each forecasting combination in 
Appendix 5-1 and Appendix 5-2: 
• The proportion of correctly predicted forecast signs 
• The Pesaran & Timmermann (1992) market timing statistic 
• The average adjusted-R2 for the models estimated within each real-time 
recursive model 
• The Sharpe ratio 
• The cumulative return. 
The tables also provide the window sizing method for each model. the break p-values 
for the ROC based models. the regressor set used and the level of commissions. We 
can see that a number of real-time recursive models do outperform the Standard and 
Poors 500 total return benchmark, both in returns and on a risk-adjusted basis. The 
technical regressor set, the ROC method and the rolling window perform relatively 
well in risk adjusted returns. Conditioning the estimation window on the last break 
using ROC also benefits the model fit. So that we can quantify the sensitivity of 
performance, the following tables summarise these results conditioning on each 
factor. These summaries aggregate the models by these factors to give us average 
performance across real-time recursive models and the volatility of that performance. 
When summansmg performance across real-time recursive models by the 
initiaVrolling window (Table 5-1) it appears that no window method or regressor set 
consistently generated models with returns that outperform the Standard and Poors 
500 total return benchmark. It is also clear from Table 5-1 that model fit need not 
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lead to superior returns or risk-adjusted performance. This phenomenon is again 
shown clearly in Table 5-2, which breaks down the real-time recursive model 
performances by all five regressor sets. 
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Table 5-1 - Results controllingfor initial estimation/rolling window size 
When t.lnltial = 60 
Benchmark s 
S&P Total Return 
Tbills 
Sharpe Ratio 
1.88 
40.38 
. Model performance by wndow method 
Return 
1812% . 
562% 
. . . StDevOfSlgn AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg AvgOfSharpe StDevOfSharpe 
AvgOfSlgn Test Test Timing Stat Timing Stat AdjRsq AdjRsq Ratio Ratio AvgOfReturn StDevOfReturn 
'ROC Window" 57% 6% 0.0171 0.0325 27% 13% 1.91 0.90 817% 802% 
Expanding Window 59% 3% 0.0167 0.0202 13% 3% 1.49 0.86 744% 742% 
Rolling Window' 55%" 6% 0.0257 0.0422 27% 15% 1.98 0.66 737% 743% 
: Model performance by independent variable set 
4· " . . SmevOfSign . AvgOfMarket' StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg AvgOfSharpe StDevOfSharpe 
AvgOfSlgn Test Test Timing Stat 
o . 60% 1% 0.0115 IBase 
: B'aseplusAIl 
IBaseplusBF 
tBaseplusFunda . 
lB.t'sf!PlusTA 
49% 3% -0.0283 
r' . 
iWhen t.lnltla. = 120 
61% 
61% . 
54% 
1% 
2% 
4% 
llienchmarlc s-._ ". , 
i Sharpe Ratio Return 
is&p TotalReturn 2.01 . 1122% 
!Tbiils" 51.98 325% 
0:0435 
0.0468 
0.0220 
Timing Stat AdjRaq 
0.0213 12% 
0.0133 41% 
0.0196 15% 
0.0116 21% 
0.0221 29% 
: Mode/performance by wndow method..., . 
i StDevOfSlgn AvgOtMarket StDevOtMarket AvgOfAvg 
. . . AvgOfSlgn Test Tellt Timing Stat Timing Stat AdjReq 
'ROC Window ,. 59% . 6% . 0.0149 0.0294 25% . 
:ExparnUng Window 61%' 4% 0.0041 0.0133 12%' 
!Rolling Window 59% 4% 0.0218 0.0151 16% 
[MOdel p!!,rformance ~y independent variable set . 
, StDevOfSlgn AvgOtMarket StDevOtMarket AvgOfAvg 
iBase 
!"Bas8plusAIl 
I BasePIusBF 
fBasepiusFunda 
fSas8PIusTA . 
AvgOfSlgn Test Tellt Timing Stat Timing Stat AdjReq 
62% 2% 0.0114' 0.0195 11% 
50% 4% -0.0241 0.0150 38% 
62% 2% 0.0379 0.0192 13% 
62% 2%' 0.0377 0.0159 19% 
55% 3% 0.019i 0.0158 25% 
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AdjRsq Ratio Ratio AvgOfReturn StDevOfReturn 
1% 1.29 0.76 767% 802% 
13% 1.57 0.70 324% 291% 
3% 1.82 0.86 857% 804% 
5% 1.85 0.65 1076% 955% 
10% 2.57 0.79 870% 694% 
StDevOfAvg AvgOfSharpe StDevOfSharpe 
AdJRsq Ratio Ratio. AvgOfReturn StDevOfReturn 
13% 1.96 1.00 489% 456% 
3% 1.52 1.03 469% 456% 
8% 1.99 0.85 516% 461% 
StDevOfAvg AvgOfSharpe StDevOfSharpe 
AdjRsq Ratio Ratio. AvgOfReturn StDevOfReturn 
1% 1.37 0.86 637% 673% 
13% 1.57 0.69 302% 269% 
3% 1.76 0.90 684% 673% 
5% 1.80 0.73 835% 800% 
10% 2.69 0.82 716% 572% 
Table 5-2 - Results controlling/or Regressor Set 
Base 
AvgOfSign StDevOfSign AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
Test Test Timing Stat Timing Stat AdjRsq AdjRsq 
i ROC Window 62% 2% 0.0067 0.0069 12% 1% 
r-··_·--·--- ---.-~,--" .. ---.-- _.- " •.. -.--
~_I;x~!,~g WLn~()w _ 60% 1% -0.0090 
L. ~()!I!r:t~~i!'.~()~____ 61% 1% 0.0412 
0.0029 11% 1% 
0.0039 10% 2% 
BaseplusAiI 
AvgOfSign StDevOfSign AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
Test Test Timing Stat 
E~!~~~i~~()~=::~~:_~~~H~~:--~l~ __ ---~ - ~:~g~- -. 
Timing Stat AdjRsq AdjRsq 
0.0019 47% 1% 
0.0021 18% 1% 
L __ Rolling Win~~:. __ ~~_~_.~ .. ___ . 04_0/0_ .. __ : -0.0155 0.0172 39% 11% 
BaseplusBF 
AvgOfSign StDevOfSign AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
~_ . __ _ _ ___ _ _.- _ Test. _ Test Timing Stat __ ~~~in_dC)W ___ ~ .62% __ '. 1% 0.0397 ~~di~~in~~ _ 63%_ ;. 2% 0.0196 __ .~oIIing "Yin~ __ J _. __ 61'% 1 % 0.0527 Tlmil19 Stat AdjRsq AdjRsq 0.0171 16% 2% 0.0042 10% 0% 0.0193 12% 3% 
BaseplusFunda 
AvgOfSlgn StDevOfSlgn AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
,-________ ~-- _ T~J ___ , _ .. Jest . Tlmll'!g_~. TI",ln_9 S~ _ _~JRsq 
I ROC Window '62% 2% 0.0428 0.0103 23% 
AdJRsq 
2% 
1% 
4% 
[-._-_ .. _-----_._------_ ........... _._...--.. .; - - , 
L~ndi~inC!~L ____ ~3%._~_ 1% 0.0_224 _. 0.0,:156 1,3% 
L~~~rI9,"Y!rI~,_,: 61% '2% 0.0428 0.0179 19% 
BaseplusTA 
AvgOfSlgn StDevOfSlgn AvgOfMarket 
Test Test 
Fi!~-W~rldOW--': ., ~% ---=--- -0% 
~ing Win~,_ . __ ~~ __ O~, 
LRoIJ~Wi~ .. _,~ 51% 3% 
Timing Stat 
-- 0.0269 
0.0275 
-0.0025 
StDevOfMarket 
TimlngS~ 
0.0067 
0.0097 
0.0131 
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AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
AdJRsq AdjRsq 
31% 4% 
12% 1% 
26% 12% 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio 
1.32 
1.11 
1.73 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio 
1.48 
1.33 
1.98 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio 
1.96 : 
1.18 
1.94 , 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio 
1.96 
1.28 
2.00 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio 
2.94 
2.63 
2.27 
StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio 
0.90 
0.80 
0.84 
StDevQfSharpe 
Ratio 
0.66 
0.62 
0.73 
StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio 
0.94 
0.73 
0.81 
StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio 
0.62 
0.79 
0.75 
StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio 
0.72 
0.96 
0.79 
For example, the 'base plus fundamentals' regressor set has the highest returns in each 
scenario, holds second place by Sharpe ratio and yet this is driven by a mediocre 
adjusted-R2. For both values of initial/rolling windows the 'base plus technicals' 
variables generated risk-adjusted returns over those of the benchmark and all other 
predictor variables. This is despite being consistently surpassed by the 'base plus all' 
predictors in adjusted-R2; the combination of fundamental, behavioural and technical 
variables best encapsulates the dynamics of month to month excess returns. 
Moreover, despite the leading superior model fit of the 'base plus all' set, it has the 
second lowest Sharpe ratios for both initial/rolling windows. The correlation matrix 
of prediction performance, model fit, risk adjusted return and return shows the 
confused relationship between different measures of performance (Table 5-3). 
Table 5-3 - Correlations between different performance measures 
Sign Test Market Timing Stat AvgAdjRsq Sharpe Ratio Retum 
Sign Test 
Market Timing Stat 
Avg AdjRsq 
Sharpe Ratio 
Return 
1.00 
0.74 
-0.87 
-0.11 
0.25 
1.00 
-0.58 
0.26 
0.31 
1.00 
0.14 
-0.19 
1.00 
0.07 1.00 
What we see is that a higher in-sample model fit leads to lower out-of-sample 
predictive performance, as measured by the sign test and the market timing stat. This 
example of classic over-fitting is also reflecting in the relationship between model fit 
and return. Other than this trade-off, the market timing statistic offers little 
discernable pattern other than leading to selection of the 'base plus behaviourals' and 
'base plus fundamentals' regressor sets (Table 5-1 and Table 5-2) - these regressor 
sets hold the second and third places in Sharpe ratio performance with Sharpe stability 
comparable to the other regressor sets. 
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The expanding window is noticeably more stable in model fit (Table 5-1), as might be 
expected, yet it generates half the adjusted-R2 of the ROC window method for both 
initial window values and decisively has the lowest Sharpe ratio. Whilst the rolling 
windows generated the highest Sharpe ratios, these were only marginally higher than 
the ROC break based windows. Furthermore, increasing the initiaVrolling estimation 
window from 60 to 120 months almost halves the adjusted-R2 of the rolling window 
method. This is perhaps unsurprising a priori - a rolling window is arbitrary whilst 
ROC or expanding windows adapt to data evolution, albeit in a different manner. 
This arbitrariness versus adaptability point can be seen in the lack of change in ROC 
or expanding window adjusted-R2 when increasing the initial window. When 
examining the results by regressor set (Table 5-2), both ROC and rolling windows 
again outperform the expanding windows. Yet it is perhaps this arbitrariness of a 
rolling window that drives the instability in its relative instability in adjusted-R2, but 
this is once again not consistently reflecting in Sharpe variability. 
Table 5-2 shows that the highest Sharpe ratios were attained using 'base plus 
technicals' variables with ROC estimation windows. The poor performance of the 
expanding window and the arbitrary nature of rolling windows prompts further 
examination of the ROC windows. We have already seen the relative insensitivity of 
ROC break dating to the initial window size and Table 5-4 shows ROC sensitivity to 
break p-values (more data is available in Appendix 5-3). Allowing for detection of 
less significant breaks with a p-value of 10% consistently generated higher adjusted-
R2 values and Sharpe ratios and generally higher returns, versus using a p-value of 
2.5%. The variability of the Sharpe ratio was also marginally lower with a p-value of 
10% (Appendix 5-3). The regressor sets that benefited the least from the increased 
142 
sensitivity from a 10% p-value were the 'base plus fundamentals' and 'base plus 
technicals" sets. The 'base' regressor set's mild improvement in model fit is 
contrasted with it benefiting the most in market timing predictive power, risk adjusted 
returns and cumulative returns. 
Table 5-4 - Improvement from 10% ROC p-values versus 2.5% p-values 
Market Sharpe 
Timing Stat AdJRsq Ratio Return 
Base 1060% 9% 42% 25% 
BaseplusAIl -5% 2% 12% 15% 
BaseplusBF 132% 10% 35% 18% 
BaseplusFundc -36% 16% 5% -3% 
. BaseplusTA -1% 26% 3% -8% 
Different commission scenarios are implemented in Table 5-5 to show the resilience 
of the different strategies to different commission levels. Returns are unsurprisingly 
slashed at all levels of commission. The primary point to note is that the only 
predictor set that maintained a respectable Sharpe ratio was the 'base plus technicals' 
regressor set. 
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Table 5-5 - Results controlling/or Commissions 
No Commissions 
Commission effect bk:: window m~thQd 
AvgOfSharpe StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio AvgOfReturn StDevOfReturn 
ROC Window 2.77 0.61 1374% 663% 
Expanding Window 2.32 0.72 1374% 439% 
Rolling Window 2.76 0.37 1302% 615% 
Commission effect b~ window method 
AvgOfSharpe StOevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio .. AvgOfReturn StOevOfReturn 
Base 2.25 0.43 1497% 384% 
BaseplusAIl 2.31 0.33 602% 250% 
BaseplusBF 2.63 0.48 1529% 422% 
BaseplusFunda 2.52 0.30 1804% 584% 
BaseplusTA 3.56 0.42 1347% 517% 
Low Commissions 
Commission effect bk:: window method 
AvgOfSharpe StOevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio AvgOfReturn StOevOfReturn 
ROC Window 2.01 0.59 454% 236% 
Expanding Window 1.60 : 0.59 3780/0: 117% 
Rolling Window . . _ ?05 ' 0.31 444% 184% 
Qommi§§ion effeyt p~ win02w meth2e . . __ 
Base 
BaseplusAIl 
BaseplusBF 
BaseplusFunda 
BaseplusTA 
High Commissions 
AvgOfSharpe StOevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio. AvgOfRetum 
1.48 0.34 • 370% 
1.60 0.27 232%. 
1.87 ! 0.46 : 436% 
1.90 ' 0..31 ; 559%' 
2.73 ' 0.34 566% ' 
StDevOfSharpe 
StOevOfReturn 
100%, 
71% 
129%' 
213%~ 
225% 
Commission effect bk:: window method 
AvgOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio AvgOfRetum _ StOevOfRetum 
ROC Window 1.02 
"_. - --_ ........ 
0.66 . 132% 120% 
... - _ ... - ... j 
. Expanding Window 0.60, 0.53 68%J 57% 
Rolling Window .. ". 1.14 ; 0.35 ' 67% 
CommissiQn eff§ctQY wia2Qw mfl,tlJ2d .. . L '. .._ 
Base 
BaseplusAIl 
. BaseplusBF 
.- ""- - -
Baseplus£unda ... 
Bas,eplusTA 
: AvgOfSharpe StOevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio AvgOfRetum StOevOfRetum 
- L ___ J!:~ Q.~_1.l__ ~~~l- - . '---~~~1 
i 0.80 0.24 i 72%: 23% 
t'------·--O.7S·· "'--O~47't ---89%'; ,., '--'-62%1 
.... --t-'-- ·-······----·t-·· ... -- --- ... --. - .-.- .. ~ .---.-.. - ---"--T' .... _-.---... ..--.~ 
, 0.98 ; 0.46 : 143%1 92%: 
. ----".+ --- -- -.-,-.--'--~' ~- ---.---~-.+---. ----.----.--~--.- _.- _ .. _-" -----" ..... - ~--"" 
1.79 I 0.33 : 235%: 116%: 
__ .. ____ . ___ ~. __ . __ i _~~ ___ . __ . ~ _______ . .I.._. ___ ~ _._ .. ______ J.. _ • __ ~_. ___ • __ _____ 
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This study leads us to several conclusions. First, we can see that using the criteria of 
predictive performance, model fit, risk-adjusted returns or returns can lead to different 
model selection choices. Second, the models that include technical indicators 
provided the only respectable risk-adjusted returns after introducing commissions and 
also generated returns that were less affected by costs. Testing for structural 
instability via the ROC method does lead to improved performance by every measure 
when compared to an expanding window. This observation is strengthened when the 
estimation window is more sensitive to potential breaks, thus moving further from an 
expanding window's assumption of using all previous data. Third, there are models 
where the rolling window outperforms ROC windows, yet this stems from choices of 
window sizes that are not conditioned on the data. If we see interruptions in structure 
that exceed the length of the rolling window, the model has no "memory" of 
estimations that may need to be reverted back to. Arbitrary data exclusion could 
arguably be worse than the unconditional inclusion of data by an expanding window. 
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5.S. APPENDICES 
Appendix 5-1 - A II results, Initial/Rolling Window 60 months 
Initial/ 
Independent Commls.lon Sample Sample Roiling c_ IInet Avg Sharpe 
ROC Pval Varlabl .. Pro"le Start End Lag Window Signa Timing Slat AdIRaq RatloRetum 
S&P T etal Return 1971.02 200309 60 188 1812% 
Tbills 1971.02 2003.09 60 40.38 562% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 ·1 60 60% -0.0037 12% 0.14 16% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 ·1 60 60% '()0037 12% 117 335% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 ·1 60 60% '()0037 12% 186 1562% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusAll High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% .()0385 47% 0.84 55% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusAll Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% -00385 47% 141 179% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusAll No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% '()0385 47% 2.13 450% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusBF High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 00287 17% 0,60 70% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusBF Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 00287 17% 179 454% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 00287 17% 2,84 1787% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusFunda High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 62% 0,0566 23% 120 199% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusF unda Low Commissions 1971,02 2003.09 ·1 60 62% 0,0566 23% 1,97 759% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusF unda No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 62% 00566 23% 2.47 2503% 
ROC Window 2,5% BasepiusTA High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 ·1 60 55% 00321 29% 2,14 432% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusTA Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 55% 0.0321 29% 2,87 938% 
ROC Window 2,5% BaseplusTA No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 55% 0,0321 29% 3,53 2102% 
ROC Window 10.0% Base High Commissions 197102 200309 ·1 60 62% 0.0115 13% 0,42 45% 
ROC Window 10,0% Base Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 62% 0.0115 13% 188 459% 
ROC Window 10,0% Base No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 60 62% 00115 13% 2.50 2102% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasepiusAll High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% .()0388 48% 0,81 76% 
ROC Window 10,0% BaseplusAll Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% '()0368 48% 1,55 210% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasepiusAll No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% '()0368 48% 2.26 495% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusBF High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 0,0518 18% 1,24 138% 
ROC Window 10,0% BaseplusBF Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 0,OS18 18% 2,34 571% 
ROC Window 10,0% BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 61% 0,OS18 18% 3,01 1929% 
ROC Window 10,0% BaseplusFunda High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 59% 0,0348 26% 131 241% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasaplusFunda Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 59% 00348 26% 2.05 791% 
ROC Window 10,0% BaseplusF unda No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 59% 00348 26% 261 2382% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasaplusTA High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 56% 00342 38% 2,12 392% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasaplusTA Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 56% 0,0342 38% 2,98 870% 
ROC Window 10,0% BasaplusTA No Commissions 1971,02 2003.09 ·1 60 56% 0,0342 38% 376 1973% 
Expanding WindoW NA Base High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 59% ,(),0064 II'll. 026 34% 
Expanding Wondow NA Base Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 59% '()0064 11% 122 379% 
Expanding Window NA Base No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 59% ,(),0064 11% 1,88 1889% 
Expanding Window NA BasepiusAll High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 54% .(),QOII7 19% 062 78% 
Expanding Window NA BasepiusAll Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 54% .(),QOII7 19% 138 338% 
Expanding Window NA BasepiusAll No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 54% .(),QOII7 19% 1.811 1063% 
Expanding Window NA BasaplusBF High Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 80 62% 0,0234 11% 0,42 65% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusBF Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 62% 0,0234 11% 1,27 482% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplulBF No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 82% 0,0234 11% 1,88 2067% 
Expanding Window NA BalaplusFunda High Commission. 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 63% 0,0387 13% o,se 75% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusF unda Low Commissions 197102 2003,09 ·1 80 63% 0,0387 13% 1,45 473% 
Expanding Window NA B.saplusFunda NoCommlsslona 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 80 63% 0,0387 13% 2,00 1905% 
Expanding Window NA BaiapiusTA High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 56% 00363 13% 1,51 184% 
Expanding Window NA BasaplusTA Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 58% 0,0363 13% 2.59 590% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusTA No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 80 56% 0,0363 13% 3411 1735% 
Rolling Window NA Base High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 60% 0,0«8 12% 0,78 126% 
Roiling Window NA Base Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 60% 0,0448 12% 1,51 548% 
Roiling Window NA Ba .. No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 60% 0,0«8 12% 2,04 1883% 
Roiling Window NA easepiusAll High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 47% ,(),0312 49% 1,21 107% 
Roiling Window NA BasepluaAII Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 47% ,(),0312 49% 2,04 258% 
Roiling Window NA BasepiusAll No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 60 47% ,(),0312 49% 2,87 578% 
Roiling Window NA BaiaplusBF High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 60% 0,0702 14% 1,47 213% 
RoIUng Window NA BasepluaBF Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 60% 0,0702 14% 2,31 847% 
RoIHng Window NA BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 60% 00702 14% 2,94 1887% 
Roiling Window NA BasapluaFunda High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 80 60% 0,OS1l1 22% lse 283% 
Roiling Window NA BasaplulFunda Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 60% 0,0591 22% 2,25 848% 
RoIUng Window NA BasaplusFunda No Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 60% 0,05111 22% 2.711 2475% 
RoIUng Window NA BaaeplulTA High Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 48% .(),0145 37% 1,28 140% 
Roiling Window NA BaaeplulTA Low Commissions 1971,02 2003,09 ·1 60 48% ,(),O145 37% 1,98 326% 
Roiling Window NA BasaplulTA No Commissions 1971.02 2003,09 ·1 80 48% ,(),0145 37% 2,83 751% 
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Appendix 5-2 - All results, Initial/Rolling Window J 20 months 
Initial I 
Independent Sample Semple Roiling eon.ct .,uIlet Ava Sharpe 
ROC PYal Variable. Comml .. lon Profile Start End Lag Wlnd_ Sign. Timing Slat AdJRaq Ratto Return 
S&P Total Relum 1971.02 2003.09 120 2.01 1122% 
Tbill. 1971.02 2003.09 120 51.98 325% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 00059 11% 0.15 15% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 00059 11% 1.24 277% 
ROC Window 2.5% Base No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 0.0059 11% 2.01 1138% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusAll High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -0.0357 46% 0.58 40% 
ROC Window 2.5% BasepiusAll Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -00357 46% 1.42 138% 
ROC Window 2.5% BasepiusAll No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -0.0357 46% 2.21 326% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusBF High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0191 13% 0.36 30% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusBF Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0191 13% 1.78 282% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0191 13% 2.82 1045% 
ROC Window 2.5% BasepiusFunda High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 0.0475 19% 112 123% 
ROC Window 2.5% BasepiusFunda Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 0.0475 19% 2.04 474% 
ROC Window 2.5% BasepiusFunda No Commissions 1971.02 200309 -1 120 64% 0.0475 19% 2.88 1425% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusTA High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 58% 00219 26% 207 240% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusTA Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 58% 0.0219 26% 2.96 524% 
ROC Window 2.5% BaseplusTA No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 56% 0.0219 26% 3.77 1119% 
ROC Window 10.0% Base High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 65% 0.0132 12% 0.30 24% 
ROC Window 10.0% Base Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 65% 0.0132 12% 1.72 310% 
ROC Window 10.0% Base No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 65% 0.0132 12% 2.69 1258% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusAll High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -0.0334 48% 0.79 59% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusAll Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -0.0334 48% 1.59 162% 
ROC Window 10.0% BasepiusAll No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 48% -0.0334 48% 2.37 361% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusBF High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 00591 15% 1.22 102% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusBF Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 64% OOS91 15% 2.44 402% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 64% 0.0591 15% 3.25 1203% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusF unda High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 61% 0.0321 23% 1.20 139% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusFunda Low Commissions 1971.02 200309 -1 120 61% 0.0321 23% 2.11 472% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusFunda No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 61% 0.0321 23% 2.80 1314% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusTA High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 55% 0.0194 34% 2.01 208% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusTA Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 55% 0.0194 34% 3.04 488% 
ROC Window 10.0% BaseplusTA No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 55% 0.0194 34% 4.00 1006% 
Expanding Window NA Base High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 62% -0.0117 10% 0.09 6% 
Expanding Window NA Base Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 82% -0.0117 10% 1.19 244% 
Expanding Window NA Base No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 82% -0.0117 10% 200 1005% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusAll High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 56% -O.01OS 17% 0.60 61% 
Expanding Window NA BasepiusAll Low CommIssions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 56% -0.0105 17% 1.44 288% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusAll No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 56% -0.0105 17% 2.06 783% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusBF High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 115% 0.0158 10% 0.22 25% 
Expanding Window NA BasaplusBF Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 85% 0.0158 10% 1.27 307% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 65% 0.0158 10% 2.02 1248% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusFunda High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 0.0082 12% 0.13 11% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusFunda Low Commission. 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 64% 0.0082 12% 1.36 252% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusFunda No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 64% 0.0082 12% 2.14 1038% 
Expanding Window NA BasapiusTA High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 58% 0.0188 11% 1.56 144% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusTA Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 58% 0.0188 11% 2.60 447% 
Expanding Window NA BaseplusTA No Commission, 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 58% 0.0188 11% 3.84 1204% 
ROiling Window NA Base High CommIssions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 83% 0.0376 8% 0.91 89% 
Roiling Window NA Base Low Commission. 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0378 8% 2.11 407% 
Rolling Window NA Bas. No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 83% 0.0378 8% 3.01 1311% 
Roiling Window NA BasepiusAll High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0002 29% 1.11 101% 
Roiling Window NA BasepiusAII Low Comminions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0002 29% 1.97 302% 
ROiling Window NA BasepiusAII No Commission, 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0002 29% 2.88 759% 
Roiling Window NA BasaplusBF High ComrnIaaIons 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 62% 0.0351 9% 0.88 69% 
Roiling Window NA BasaplusBF Low Commission, 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 62% 0.0351 9% 1.73 339% 
Roiling Window NA BaseplusBF No Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 82% 0.0351 9% 2.50 1086% 
Roiling Window NA BaseplusFunda High Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0265 15% 0.78 71% 
Roiling Window NA BasepiusFunda Low Commissions 1971.02 2003.09 -I 120 63% 0.0285 15% 1.92 402% 
Rolling Window NA BaseplusFunda No ComminIonI 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 63% 0.0265 15% 2.88 1413% 
Roiling Window NA BaseplusTA High Commission, 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0094 15% 1.83 138% 
Roiling Window NA BlsepiusTA Low CommIasIona 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0094 15% 283 388% 
Roiling Window NA BaseplusTA No Commission, 1971.02 2003.09 -1 120 54% 0.0094 15% 3.411 884% 
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Appendix 5-3 - Results controlling for ROC P-value 
Less sensitive break detection (ROC pval = 2.5%) 
All ROC window based models' perfonnance 
AvgOfSign StDevOfSign AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
_- ________________ !!~t _______ :rest_ _ ~-Tim~~g~ta~. Timing Stat AdjRsq_ AdIRsq 
ROC Window i 58% 6% 0.0134 0.0308 24% 13% 
'-_______ . ___ ~ __ ._.~ _____ .__J. __ ~._. _ . ______ .. ___ ._.L~ __ ._. __ .' __ ._ ,_.< 
ROC window based model Perfonnance by independent variable set 
AvgOfSign StDevOfSign AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg 
[ease---·-----·--.---T~~2%T-----T~t -2%1 Ti",i'!9a::1: Timing 0~:52-~ AdjR~~ok 
,-------------+-------------- -----+-- -----------------~ - -- ------ -----+ ----- -I 
~-aseElu~L-_--+_----~%L-.------ __ 10;0+ ____ -O.0371j .0.0015 ;_ 
Ll!asepl~~~F ___ _+_.---.62~i ____ . ___ 1_0;0-1-_ _ _ _ o..02~~J__ 0.0053 + 
~~~~~fu~.!..---t--. ___ ~~! ____ _ _ 10;0_; _ 0.05201 _0:0050 t 
LBaseplusTA H_.-l ______ 56~_ _ ___ ()~.i__ __ 0~0279! 0.0056 [ _ 
More sensitive break detection (ROC pval = 10%) 
All ROC window based models' pgrformance 
47% 
15% 
i10/~~ 
28% 
StDevOfAvg 
AdjRsq 
1% 
0% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
AvgOfSlgn StDevOfSlgn AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
_________________ .r--I~! _.-' Te~t _ _ _ Tlmlng~~ _ ~lmin9_ Stat, AdJRsq AdjRsq 
: ROC Window ! _~~~ _____ §.~L_. ____ 0.01~§! _JlO~10 L _ 27~L 13% 
ROC window based model Performance by indeoendent variable set 
AvgOfSlgn StDevOfSfgn AvgOfMarket StDevOfMarket AvgOfAvg StDevOfAvg 
,----------------r---T~- ___ ---_:r~t ___ !i~.I~ S~ Timing S~ __ AdJRsq _ AdJ~q 
fi:;,!'!~C-==t-=-~--~~t~~--~-------:~~L- -·-::~:g~jl-- --~:~~~:t- !~~: ~~: 
BaseplusBF I 63%! 1 % i 0.0554 i 0.0040 : 17% 2% 
------1----------·--- .. _·_-.. --_·_-----+-- ., .. -- - - - - .. -~~seplusFund~ .. _ .• __ ... ___ 69.%L_ .1-roj 0.033510.0015) 24% 2% 
BaseplusTA ________ L_H ____ ~~L __ .___ Q«I(c.j _O.O~L _ 0.0082 1 35% 1% 
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AvgOfSha~ StDevOfSharpe 
Ratio Ratio 
1.79 0.96 
AvgOfSha~ StDevOfSha~ 
Ratio Ratio 
_1.09, 0.81 
1.40 . 0.70 
1.67 1.01 
1.91 0.64 
2.89 0.69 
AvgOfSha~ StDevOfSha~ 
Ratio Ratio 
2.07 - 0.93 
AvgOfSha~ StDevOfSha~ 
Ratio 
AvgOfReturn StDevOfRetum 
635% 671% 
AvgOfReturn _ StDevOfRetum 
560% 648% 
198% 161% 
611% 683% 
914% 910% 
893% 677% 
AvgOfRetum StDevOfRetum 
671%. 676% 
Ratio 
1.55 
1.56 
2.25 
2.01 
2.98 
AvgOfRetum StDevOfRetum 
1.01 - 700%· 821 % 
0.68 
0.86 -
0.65 
0.82 
227%. 
724%' 
886%' 
819%: 
171% 
713% 
839% 
640% 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
This thesis examined a number of aspects of the technical analysis approach to 
forecasting financial markets. The dominant focus has been on technical analysis 
techniques that are used by mainstream analysts in the financial markets. This 
approach is mainstream for market participants, but peripheral for academic analysts. 
Chapter 2 shows that where academics have taken technical analysis seriously, 
evidence for its effectiveness is mixed. There seem to be microstructural reasons for 
expecting support and resistance levels to emerge in markets. Yet implementing levels 
within simple trading systems yields mixed results. The many published studies of 
mechanical moving averages and filter rules on balance suggest that they can be used 
to trade profitably. But doubts remain about their validity out of sample, and their 
robustness to reasonable assumptions about trading costs. 
There remains a large gulf between the academic literature and industry practice and 
there are few examples of dialogue. Most analysts use judgemental rather than 
mechanical chart methods. Most use a combination of methods rather than a single 
indicator to support trading recommendations. And even within the class of 
mechanical statistical indicators, they use they use a much wider range of data 
transformations than has been considered by academic studies. This problem is not 
always eased by reference to industry textbooks, which make little reference to 
academic research, or even to the evolving discipline of Behavioural Finance, which 
certainly allows a role for price trends and patterns to be induced by investor 
"irrationality", and provides a route for future work to integrate technical analysis 
more closely into existing academic theory. 
- 149 -
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis examine one of the more judgmental aspects of 
technical analysis - the popular idea that price (and time) targets can be gauged as 
multiples of the most recent trend. The examination of proportional phase anchoring 
in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in Chapter 3 is not supportive to this field of 
textbook technical theory. The exercise makes two methodological contributions. 
First, the Pagan and Sossounov (2003) approach to dating cycles in asset markets is 
extended. Second, a robust bootstrap methodology is developed from the ground up to 
examine the phenomenon. We find that the US stock market does not appear to 
anchor expected phases on prior cyclical phases, neither using round fractions nor 
Fibonacci ratios. 
Having established the methodology for testing these propositions in an aggregate 
index, it would be of interest to extend this analysis to individual equities, 
commodities and especially currencies to assess the significance of proportional phase 
anchoring in such series. The methodology that we have developed is directly 
applicable to any index or cash security, such individual stocks, ETFs or currencies. 
Many technical analysts also analyse futures contracts in a Fibonacci context. 
Examining an application in this context would impose several considerations on the 
researcher. Examining individual contracts presents a methodological issue with the 
final trend phase, which of course terminates with the delivery of the contract rather 
than the reversal of the trend. This problem is partially answered by instead 
examining continuous contracts to address the problem as some analysts do in 
practice. There are two primary ways of concatenating contracts to create a 
continuous contract: splicing together each nearby futures contact as time progresses 
or having a continuous contract for each expiry month of an underlying instrument. 
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There are numerous reasons for looking at a senes of concatenated December 
Soybean contacts, for example. The seasonality of commodities such as agricultural 
or energy products leads some analysts to examine only a specific contract month and 
exchanges to offer otherwise irregular expiry months - even if theory would suggest 
futures contacts should distribute temporal risk efficiently. Additionally, a trader with 
a longer trade time horizon may want to avoid the costs of rolling over contracts until 
December. Thoroughly extending the methodology employed to the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average to futures would therefore require application to the individual 
contracts minus their final trend phase, the nearby continuous contract and continuous 
contracts for each expiry month. 
Chapter 4 examines whether individuals exhibit innate proportional phase anchoring. 
Again, we have introduced two methodological innovations, in the fonn of the 
forecasting survey, and the kernel density estimator bootstrap evaluation of the survey 
results. We find that practitioners' belief in the importance of specific ratios is to 
some extent true, with respondents choosing forecasts that mimic the previous trend 
(a ratio of 1 : I) or extrapolate it (a ratio of 2: I ). We also find that the fonnat of series 
presentation does influence the phase anchoring of forecasts, as does subjects' cultural 
background, age and knowledge of technical analysis. The sample of respondents 
chosen (graduate finance students) is in many respects ideal since they have an 
understanding of market prices, but little prior knowledge of, or bias for or against, 
technical analysis. However, it would be desirable for future work to repeat this 
exercise with different respondents. This would be not only to see if the phenomenon 
reappears, but to see if the result is affected by older respondents. Our respondent 
sample was naturally biased by being young postgraduate finance students. For the 
- 151 -
same reason it would be useful to examine forecasts made by respondents that have 
absolutely no knowledge of finance (although an irrational heuristic was in fact 
employed by the postgraduate finance students), or are experienced technical analysts. 
Alternative presentation formats could also be used - for example, asking respondents 
to choose between alternative forecasts rather than allowing a free choice of forecast. 
Chapter 5 addresses the criticism that academic studies do not use a rich enough 
characterisation of technical analysis, by testing 120 active market-timing strategies 
using equity fundamentals, macroeconomic fundamentals, behavioural variables and a 
diverse set of mainstream statistical indicators from technical analysis. Previous 
literature has not considered many of these variables, such as the Relative Strength 
Index and Directional Movement, though they are popular with practitioners. Nor 
have they been integrated into a linear regression framework, or one that accounts for 
structural breaks. We simulate investors' "real-time" trading decisions through 
recursive forecasting of excess returns from the Standard and Poors 500. Our 
recursive approach uses time-invariant rolling and expanding estimation windows 
alongside the conditional reverse ordered cusum method of Pesaran and Timmermann 
(2002). Accounting for structural instability via the ROC method does lead to 
improved performance and models that include technical indicators perform relatively 
well when faced with transactions costs. 
Again, there are obvious extensions to this work. We are trading in the same assets as 
Pesaran and Timmermann (2002) - the Standard and Poors 500 index and T -bills -
and our results need to be benchmarked against other markets and asset classes. Any 
traded instrument is a candidate to replace the SP500 index. Cash instruments would 
simply require calculation of behavioural and technical variables based on the series 
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and selection of relevant fundamental data. Applying the strategies to futures 
contracts would face similar considerations to our above discussion of extending 
Chapter 3 to futures. The researcher would need to elect whether to use individual 
contracts, nearby continuous contracts or monthly continuous contracts to drive 
trading decisions. Any rollover costs between contracts would also need to be 
accounted for. 
As in earlier regression models we use monthly data. While model fit is bound to 
deteriorate as we move to higher frequencies, this may not matter for trading 
purposes, and continuous testing for structural breaks may improve model stability. 
There has been a recent trend towards models (and software packages) designed to 
forecast financial markets by combining technical indicators in complex nonlinear 
ways using neural networks, genetic algorithms and the like. This assumes that there 
is some stable underlying structure, which is too complex to uncover using 
conventional linear regression methods. This assumption seems at odds with the idea 
of changing investor behaviour that underpins a lot of technical analysis. Our results 
in Chapter 4 suggest that difficulties in forecasting arise not from complexity but from 
structural change, and that properly used - that is, controlling for structural change -
statistical indicators used by technical analysts can give meaningful signals to 
investors. 
What is known about technical analysis remains largely unintegrated into academic 
theory whilst the field of behavioural fmance has deservedly developed into the 
mainstream. Behavioural theories of market behaviour are clearly rigorous when 
compared to the technician's textbooks. Nevertheless, there are more than casual 
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similarities with western technical analysis and how Dow Theory views trends in 
markets. As Chapter 2 suggests, this perhaps provides the opportunity for future 
research to bring elements of technical analysis into a more rigorous conceptual 
framework and resolve Jegadeesh (2000)'s disappointment. 
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